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INTRODUCTION 
One of the many paradoxes at the heart of the English 
Romantic Movement concerns the impulse of the writers of the time, 
great and minor, towards drama. It is startling to discover, for 
ordinarily we do not think of the early nineteenth century as a 
period of much activity in the theatre, that while 110 tragedies 
(to mention only one dramatic form) were printed in England bet\ore;an 
the appearance of Gorboduc in 1565 and the closing of the theatres 
in 1642 9 200 were published between 1800 and 1825 alone, and this 
number does not take into account the very numerous translations 
from foreign vrorks •1 The ttspiri t of the age" 't'las lyrical rather 
than dramatic, and yet each of the great Romantic poets tried his 
hand at drama--some with considerable, but hardly durable, popular 
success. The motives behind the composition of their plays ranged 
from the financial to the doctrinal, but one constantly- reiterated 
sentiment sets the attitude to drama of the great Romantics apart 
from that of their less illustrious contemporaries. For all the 
major poets and critics of the time, drama Has the highest and the 
truest of literary forms. In spite of this belief, and in spite of 
the remarkable flov•ering of literary genius 't'lhich characterises the 
period, the drama 't-Tas without any doubt the vreakest of all literary 
1
see Carl J. Stratman, "English Tragedy 1819-1823," ~' 
XLI (1962), 465-474• 
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modes until late into t he century. 
But if the Romantics produced no great drama, they did 
write great and enduring dramatic criticism. William Hazlitt's 
Characters Q£ Shakespear ' s Plays has been fairl y constantly 
avail abl e since its publication in 1817, having gone through ten 
editions and innumerabl e reprintings since that time. Coleridge ' s 
several l ect ures are now regarded as seminal in the history of 
Shakespearean cr iticism, and Lamb ' s remarks in the Specimens or 
Engl ish Dramatic Poets are only slightly less well established in 
Ebgl ish critical tradition. The greatest part of the corpus of 
dramatic evaluation written at the time was, of course, journalistic, 
but a significantly large portion of it, especially that by Hazlitt 
and Leigh Hunt, is journalism which has taken on the stature of 
criticism and in turn that of literature. Their newspaper reviews, 
hurriedly written a century-and-a-hal f ago, have lost their ne"'-TS 
value, their immediate and practical usefulness; they survive now 
not as guides to pleasure, but as pleasures in themselves, self-
sustaining and sel f-contained . 
At this juncture, it seems to be worth repeating the point 
that final judgments of literary cri·ticism must always be literary 
judgments. When we read the revie"'·7s in defunct periodical s, our 
admiration is naturally aroused by the expression of aesthetic 
notions which a..'lticipate those upon l·rhich the taste of our o-vm day 
is founded; and we applaud the occasional contemporary notice in 
favour of a writer whose fame v1as otherwise posthumous . But, like 
other things, aesthetic notions are subject to constant change, and 
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what appears to us today to be prophecy or insight may very well 
escape the notice of generations to come. We must take care when 
we evaluate the criticism of the past by referring its standards to 
present ones, since feu equations discoverable by this method can 
be proved to have more than a transitory bearing on the eosential 
value of the work of art under scrutiny. Criticism is neither 
science nor history; it is a branch of literature which is a branch 
o:f art, and it is, in one sense, only as a '' ork of art that it 
endures, and it is only as such that we can appreciate that portion 
o:r the criticism of the past the quality of "'vhich continues to fix 
our attention. And it is not the prophetic ability, nor the dim 
outline of ideas used by later writers, nor the possibility that t he 
critic w·ould. have reacted favourabl~· to ne~<T artistic concepts-- it 
is not on such grounds that past criticism continues to exercise an 
influence and an appeal. It is the sensibility and the passions 
expressed in the prose of those long-dead critics which have a force 
that, however misapplied in the light of current thought, neverthe-
less continues to have its way -vTith us. 
William Hazlitt has never been secure in his reputation 
as a critic of English literature. His opinions of the literary 
productions of his own day were distrusted and disputed by many of 
his contemporaries. Much of •·rha t he 1·rrote regarding Coleridge, 
Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley, and Southey was received as evidence of 
his "malignity" and "spite." Those of his works devoted to earlier 
periods "'lere applauded by readers vrho kept separate politics and 
literature in an age when it was the fashion to combine them. But 
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Hazlitt, like many of his literary forbears, seldom found a large 
and appreciative audience. There are many reasons for the distrust 
and dislike of his works, one of which is implied in the mention 
of politics. Hazlitt ' s loyalty to his own particular brand of 
political and social liberalism, a loyalty which in one respect 
demanded allegiance to Napoleon even to the bitter end, is the 
primary cause of t he prejudiced and sometimes vitriolic attitude 
of his contemporaries towards his work. His devotion to political 
radicalism was a costly one in his own lifetime; its expense has 
not decreased over the years. Those who emphasise his political 
bias against such great poets as Coleridge and Wordsworth frequently 
deny that he possessed a stable literary platform, a theory of 
literary art. But it is not unreasonable to assume that his 
constancy in politics argues at the least a comparable constancy 
in his literary views. One of the aims of this study is to 
illustrate this constancy, and to answer affirmatively through its 
illustration the question whether a writer's views expressed at 
different ages, for different purposes, and in varied contexts, 
constitute--or even imply--either a systematic critical theory or 
an ideology. 
Just as Hazlitt 1s political beliefs endangered his 
reputation as a serious, disinterested critic, so his method and 
practices in criticism contributed to ambival ent and contradictory 
estimates of him. Since his death in 1830, he has been frequently 
praised and damned, both separately and in combination. To 
Thackeray, for example, Hazl itt was none of the keenest and brightest 
critics that ever lived.n1 Harriet Martineau called him "the 
Prince of Critics, 112 and George Saintsbury 1-1rote that he 1-1as 
"one of the very greatest critics who have ever lived."' I an 
J ack considers that "he is not only a major cr i tic, a '\'Torthy 
successor to Dryden and Johnson, 11 but that he as surel y excel s 
Coleridge in the practice of criticism "as he is excell ed by him 
in the discussion of critical theory. " 4 T. S . Eliot on more than 
one occasion simply dismisses Hazlitt as uninteresting, and Rene 
Well ek feel s that the ideal of criticism implied by Hazlitt ' s 
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practice is "hardly one of knowledge or judgment , system or theory. 
The critic, rather, serves as an ent husiastic guide through a 
picture gall ery. n5 In nineteenth-century America, it was sometimes 
a mark of esteem to be compared to him: Henry Tuckerman was often 
praised, in the 1830's, as the American Hazlitt, and many of the 
criticisms of Poe, Reid, and Longfello'\'T are extensions and 
developments of Hazlitt ' s ideas . Of course, he has never lacked 
admirers as well as detractors. Dut he has been frequently sub-
ject ed to a combination of misunderstanding of his ideas and 
disapprobation of his personal affairs: this is certainly true of 
Saintsbury' s nimpressioni stic" vievr and the "holier-than-thou" 
111Roundabout Papers, 11 in ~ vlorks of William Makepeace 
Thackeray (22 vols . ; London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1869), XX, 152 . 
2History of England During the Thirty Years ' Peace, 1816-
1846 (2 vols.; London: c. Knight, 1850), II, 178. 
3! Short History of English Literature (London: ~mcmillan 
and Co . , Limited, 1920), p . 701 . 
4English Literature 1815-1832 ("Oxford History of English 
Literature"; Oxford : at the Clarendon Press , 1963), p. 270. 
5~ Histor~ Q£ Modern Criticism: 1122-1222 (4 vola.; London: 
Jonathan Cape, 19?5 , II, 197 · 
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attitude of Augustine Birrell's biography.1 In genaral, the earlier 
opinions mentioned simply delayed the attempt at a just estimate of 
Hazlitt's place in the history of criticism, an estimate which \'laS 
not provided until the publication of P. P. Houefs Life in 1922 and 
Elisabeth Schneider t s ~ Aesthetics 2£ William Hazlitt in 1933. 
The ambival ent attitudes toward Hazlitt are partly the 
result of his own methods. The mere fact that he wrote so much has 
been against him, for his commentators have Eometimes felt that 
quantity presupposes the lack of critical principles and theory, and 
that a critic who is primarily a journalist can have no really 
valuable ideas about literatuxe. Moreover, in speaking of himself 
as tta taster for the public, 11 and in characterising rules and models 
as useless, Hazlitt left himself vulnerable to the imputation that 
his methods are merely impressionistic, superficial, and capricious. 
There is some truth in this approach, but it distorts by its over-
emphasis upon the journalistic side of Hazlitt ' s career, and it 
ignores his repeated references to the concepts of sympathy and 
gusto, to the criterion of "nature, n and to his theory of ·the poetic 
imagination. Miss Schneider's pioneer work provided a scholarly but 
very general treatment of these ideas in Hazlitt •s aesthetic theory; 
in the following pages an attempt is made to clarify the bases of 
the system on which Hazlitt erected his dramatic theoi'"IJ, and to 
show that his dramatic criticism is more a pattern than a collection 
of casual journalistic observations . 
1William Hazlitt ( 11EnGlish Men of Letters"; London: 
Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1902). 
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Anyone ,.,ho gives more than a cursory glance at Hazli tt ' o 
literary theory will :r:ealise that he saH literature and life as 
complementary parts of' a whole7 which will not bear separation with-
out ueakening thos.e parts . His frequent correlation of the health 
of the drama and the health of the community in uhich the drama 
exists is sufficient proof of this. 11\ve are all Hamlet , 11 and 11\ie 
are all poets 9 11 are remarks -..rllich grew out of this tendency to see 
life in literature and literatuxe in life . This should not be taken 
to mean that Hazlitt subscribed to any ideas about the identity of 
art ~~d normal daily experience . Rather, he felt positively that 
art is not somethin.s apart and sacred, to be approached with care 
and t hen set aside while one gets on vTi th the ordinary business of 
living. His ideas of sympathy and g~sto are closely related to this 
belief, since for IIazli tt a literary \'rork mu.st contain the basis of 
its readers' response . The more powerfully they respond to it, the 
more intensely their feelings are excited about and by the work, the 
greater the 'I.Wrk is. To Hazlitt, the final value of' l:il:erature lies 
in i t s ability to affect its audiencest to add something to their 
lives. 111Jt for artts sake," 11ivory-tovrer" aesthetics, a.re in 
general as foreign to Hazlitt as would be that modern insistence on 
form implied by MaoLeish ' s "Ars Poetica"--nA poem should not mean/ 
But be." Like Arnold, Hazlitt felt that if art was to survive it 
had to fill the hearts and souls of Everyman. The future of 
literature, he was convinced, lay in its role as a s!~ping, ordering, 
moulding pmrer in the future of man. 
I t is possible that the distrust of many modern critics 
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and lit erary historians for the type of criticism practised by 
Hazlitt springs from their confusion of the notion of the inseparable 
nature of life and lit eratvxe, so fundamental to a man like Hazlitt, 
with the belief that life and literature constitute an essential 
unity, which is something very different. Rene Wellek castigates 
Hazl itt because he "confuses fiction and reality," a.nd he cites the 
passage on Desdemona from Characters of Shakespear ' s Plays as an 
example; 
The remarks on Desdemona 1>1hich suggest lewdness as a 
motive for her marrying the Moor might be appropriate 
if applied to a real life situation where Hazlitt's 
realistic insight into sexual relations might apply, 
but they are completely inapplicable to the Desdemona 
of the play, 
a maiden never bold: 
Of spirit so still and quiet, that her motion 
Blush ' d at itself . 
She is not actual flesh and blood but a dramatic character . 1 
Wellek continues that "with Hazlitt we are not far from books like 
~ Girlhood 2£ Shakespeare t s Heroines or discussions of the famous 
question 1Ho'\'z many children had Lady Macbeth? ' Because Hazli tt has 
an insufficient sense of the distinction between art and reality he 
teeters on the brink of such absurdities . His Characters££ 
Shakespeare t s Pl ays (sic] is partly vitiated by a view of art as a 
mere copy of real ity. Antony~ Cl eopatra and Hamlet are pro-
nounced, astonishingly enough, transcripts of real events . " 2 Now 
it is true that Hazlitt often discusses dramatic characters as if 
1! History Q£ Modern Criticism, II, 205. 
2Ibid. The last statement is simply untrue, as a glance 
at the relevant essays will show. 
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they had lives outside the plays in which they appear, but, as I 
hope to show, this is not evidence that he had an insJ~f~cient sense 
of the distinction between art and reality. It is, however, part of 
a theory of drama which places more importance upon probability and 
V€risimilitude in character for its own sake and for an ultimately 
moral end, than upon the integral nature of character, plot, and 
act ion; the c~nsequences of this attitude, which is not a view of 
art as a. mere copy of reality, 'loTill also receive attention in these 
pages. And against vlellek vTe might cite part of Hamlet ' s advice to 
the pl&yer~:s: nanything so overdone is from the purpose of playing, 
t<Those end, both at the first and nmr, vias and is, to hold, as ' twere, 
the mirror up .to nature." We should remember, in discussing the 
work of critics and thooristn of the past, not to distort their 
accomplishments by finding them 1-ranting against cri tcria vrhich are 
"from their purpose" and '·Thich ignore t he toole ·!;hey hao. at hand. 
Hazlitt's aim, a perfectly respectable one fifty ye~rs after Burkets 
Enquiry had pointed the way, was to evoke for the reader or intending 
spectator the Hfeeling" of a uork; his critical apparatus v1as a 
psycholoeical one; and, as '·Till emerge from the ensuing discussion, 
he 'vrote at a time l·Then the study of man ' s mental complexion and the 
study of art had not yet reached t:r..e stage t-There it '·ras possible to 
distinguish clearly the aesthetic from the psychological and the 
moral. "There is a common mistake madet 11 said a crit:t.c of the London 
theatre recently, "that a dramatic critic essentially delivers 
judgments; vlho.t he really does is to record feelines, ~ feelines, 
though these feelines may easily take the form of judgments. Any 
other sort of theatrical criticism is either self-deception or a 
fraud •••• Emotion must, of course, be anchored to intel l ect."1 
Hazlitt ' s statements about the nuture and function of 
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criticism have been more of a bane than a blessing to his reputation . 
Because he spoke of himsel f as a taster and characterised criticism 
as an att empt to "reflect the colours, the l i ght and shade, the soul 
2 
and body of a vrork," he beca.r!le and remains for many the outstandincr 
exampl e of t he superficial critic . Saintsbury uas hardly voicing an 
i sol ated o:pinion uhen he '\oTrote that Hazli tt is "remarkable for his 
ext raordinary fertility and felicity, as recrards English literatvxe, 
in judgments, more or less •arasped ' , of individual authors, books, 
or pieces,n 3 and vTe have al ready noted ~lellek ' s estimation of hi m 
as an enthusiastic guide through a picture gall ery . 
Nonethel ess, Hazlitt regarded criticism as an art, and 
though he felt that the critic should impart "the essence of tho 
llork • • • what passion has been t cuched, or hm-r skilfull y, and \That 
tone and movement t he author ' s mind imparts to his subject or receives 
f rom it,"4 he adhered consistenU.y to a theory of criticism based 
on his conceptions of sympathy, gusto, and nature. There are several 
reasons why his a.pproach to criticism as an art has not been 6iven 
the attention it deserves . Chief among t hem is the fact that he did 
1uarold Hobson, "A Hand upon the Royalty," Sunday Times 
(London), October 27th, 1963 7 p. 33. 
2110n Cri t .icism," '£able-Talk. The Comylete 1'/orks .£f. Hilliam 
Hazlitt, ed. P. P. liouo (21 vo1s.; Lond~ J. N. })ent and 8ous , Lt d.., 
1930-1934), VII I , 217. Hereafter cited as Works. 
/]! History of Crit:i.c:i. sm .!m!!, Li·torary Taste 11! Enfj1and ( 3 
vols.; 3:rd ed.; ECl.inbuxt;h and. London: \•/illiaru Blackwood & Sons , 1917), 
III, 252. 
4non Cri ticism," VIII, 217. 
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not leave a manifesto of his critical principles . It is not 
possible, as it is Hit:1 Coleride;e 1 s Bioe;ra-phia Literaria, to turn 
to a single i!Ork by Hazli tt and to find there his ideas organised 
into a system. As, primarily, a journalist 1·1ho l'Trote for bed and 
boardJ he had neither the time nor the financial resources for such 
an undertaking. I n the second place, he was opposed to coll ections 
of rul es and precepts, for he felt that criticism itself "undergoes 
a ereat variety of changes, and aims at different objects at 
different times,tt1 and that nrules and model s destroy genius and 
2 
art.n Because criticism may emphasise different concepts and ideas 
at different times, depending on the temper of the t imes, the 
critic 1 s true function in his vie"T is to examine the work for 't'lhat 
it says, and then to estimate its effectiveness for, and its 
appropriateness to, the mass of readers . His ideas about the nature 
and purpose of literature as applied to drama were philosophic and 
psychological in ori&;in, as w·ill be sho,m. 
Hazlitt ' o debt to eignteenth~century theories of mind has 
been noted by every serious student of his nork . It is appropriate, 
perhaps, to call him a man with an cighteenth·century vocabul ary and 
a nineteenth-century head. To a greater extent than any other major 
Romantic critic, Hazlitt is dominated by eighteenth- century modes of 
t hought. He spent his life trying to formul ate his objections to 
empirical phil osophy, but his indebtedness to it was too great to be 
111 0n Criticism," VIII, 216. 
2110utliues of Taste," Uorks s XX, ]90 . 
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1 discharged. The limitations i..rhich an eighteenth-century empiricist 
vocabul ary forced upon him are real enough, but so is the intellectual 
balance i>lhich he achieved. Stephen Larrabee has called him ttthe most 
bal anced, if mos t unclassifiable, of the Romantic critics , " 2 and 
J acob Zeitlin referred to "the rare union i n hi s nature of the 
analytic and t he emotional."3 Walter J ackson Bate sets the conflict 
i n its contex·t i>7hen he writes that 
Hazlitt, i n his moral, critical, and psychological premises, 
represents more than any other writer of his time a union of 
eigh·~eenth-century English empiricism and emotional intuit-
ional ism, a combination i·Thich--i-Ti t h its distrust o.f abstract-
ion , its confidence in concrete nature, its values of sym-
pathy and emotional i mmediacy--had encouraged the dinint e6-
ration of classical rationalism and sust ained the develop-
ment of European romanticism as a whole.4 
The a ttention which this study pays to the eighteenth-century back-
ground of Hazlittrs i deas is calcul ated not so much t o ehou t hose 
i n t ellectual debts per ~' but to show how· they contri b11ted to his 
conception of drama and how they formed the basis of his critical 
principles. 
Dramatic poetry, on Hazlitt ' s premises, is that form of 
1 
-'-See Elisabeth Schneider, The Aesthetics of \'iill:l.a.m IIazli tt 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl-;;mia Press, 1933 L p . 14; 
\l. K. 1./imsat·~ and Cleantll Brooks, Literary Criticism: ! Short History 
(Ne-vr York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), p. 308; 'valle~~, A HistorY of 
I1odern C:dtici&ra, II, 20) . - -
211HazliJ.;·~ 1 s Cri·~icisi:l of Greek Sculpture," .:ll[h, II (1941), 
P· Tf • 
3rro.zli t·t .Qll Ei15lis~1 Literature (Ne1.-1 York: Oxford University 
Press, 1913), pp . xi-xii . See al so Vir{sinia, \voo1f, !h£. Secane_ Conmon 
Reader (Hew York t Harcourt, :Brace and Company, 1932), p. 160, end 
G. D. K1ingopulos, 11Hazlitt as Critic," DC, VI (1956), p. )88 . 
4Prefa.ce~ to Criticism ( 11 Anchor J3ooks'1 ; Ne"l.·i York: Doubleday 
& Compan;:J', Inc., 19~-g}, p . 125. 
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literary composition llhich best ma..l'lifests the creative ir:P.ginationts 
pouers. The creation of character, vhich in order to be convincing 
and succee;sful demands the annihilation of the author ' s oHn person-
ali ty a.nd his identification through sympathy 1-d th the essential 
nature of the character he depicts, is for Hazlitt the foundation 
of the dramatic. 
The characters vThich the dramatist creates must not be 
mere puppet~, and neither must they be extensions of the poet ' s own 
nature. They must be true to life, and internally concistent or 
'tprobaule," as must be the events in which they are involved. 
Chaucer's pilgrims, Hazlitt felt, fulfil these requirements, and 
so his poetry may fairly be described as dramatic: his sentiment 
is not the voluntary indulgerwe of the poet f s fancy, 
but is founded upon the habitual prejudices and passions 
of the very characters he introduces. His poetry, 
thereforet is essentially picturesque and dramatic . l 
Integral in his del ineation of character is Chaucer t s careful 
co- ordination of all the parts of his composition, and their 
subordination to what Hazlitt sees as the poet ' s major purpose--
the presentation of convincingly realistic and significant human 
types. Description t here is in the Canter·bury '].'ales, but it is 
not inserted by Chaucer for its mm sake; the picturesque and t he 
dramatic, which in Hazlitt ' s view are usually opposed, are in 
Chaucer "in a {)Teat measure the same thing; for he only describes 
external objects as co~~ected with character,-- as the symbols of 
1
"Si smond:L ' s Literature of the f>ontl1," Wor-ks, XVI, 54 . 
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internal passion. "1 
The element of :passion is vital to the dramatic creation 
of character. In Ha.zlitt ' s theory, the creative imagination is in 
one of its modes an associative faculty. Not only is it the poet ' s 
mecns of perceiving, which enables him to "imagen vividly the 11 truth" 
of the objects on which he fixes hi s attention; not only is it a 
combining factor 1-rhich in the act of artistic creation allm,,rs him 
to bring about a coalescence, as Coleridge called it, or subject 
and object; it is also the faculty by means or 'rhich he calls up 
·t;he correspondences bet-vreen those impressions Hhich -.Jere obtaineo. 
by his senses and vrhich uere hoarded b;T his meL1ory. On the basis 
of experience, Hazlitt says, the mind, trJough the agency of the 
associative imaGination, for~s a aeries of intuitive comparisons 
between the bonse- im?ressions retained by memory. Experience, in 
.... 
other vords, provides t:!:1e mind \d th a mine of corrospond.ences from 
which, in a stutc of imo.Linative excitement, the poet can draw- . 
This process , raised to a hi~her pitch than is normal by the poet ' s 
passion, becomes his impulse--and the basis or his ability--· to 
intuit poetic trut:t. . In this higher exci temer..t of emotion, t he 
process or ascociation is speedef up, and many more correspondences 
are introduced, albeit in a very short space of time, to give the 
poet ' s conclusions a far higher degree of truth than is available 
t o the im~ination of the ordinary peraon. It is the trt:,usto, 11 tnen, 
the condition of intense excitement, 1:Thich enables the poet to grasp 
111Bismondi 1 s Literature of the South," XVI, 54. 
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more truthful ly the nature of the character which he attempts to 
portray. Razlitt considered that although Manfred had provided 
evidence of Byron's capacity for gusto, l1arino Faliero, with its 
parade of flat stage personages mouthing sentiments which '\·Tere 
inconsistent with their :personalities and ,.,hich did not advance t he 
playts action, vras convincing proof that its author's genius was 
not dl;amatio: 
We know not much about the plot, about the characters, 
about the motives of the persons introduced 9 but we 
know a good deal about their sentiments and opinions 
on matters in general, and hear some very fine 
descriptions from their mouths; which would, howevert 
have become the mouth of any other individual in the 
play equally well • • • [ Lord Byron] dives into the 
secret and subterranean workings of his ovrn breast; 
but he does not, with equal facility or earnestness, 
wind into the march of human affairs upon the earth, 
or mingle in the throng and daily conflict of human 
passions. There is neither action nor reaction in 
his poetry; both l'Thioh are of the very essence of the 
drama.tic.l 
Hazlit t does not go so far as to say that delineation of character 
alone constitutes the dramatic; the characters, passionately and 
therefore truthfully conceived, must be developed before our eyes 
through action, and in this development they must manifest to us 
the essence of their individuality. In this again Byron ' s play is 
singularly deficient: 
We cannot call to mind, after reading it, a single 
electric shook of passion; not a spark of genius struck 
out of the immediate occasion, like fire out of the 
flint; not one revelation of our inmost nature. forced 
from the rack of restless circumstance. But this is 
all that is truly dramatic in any tragedy or poem. 2 
1
"Lord Byron ' s Tragedy of l.farino Faliero," \'lorks, XIX, 44. 
2Ibi d., p. 45. 
I£ the truly dramatic author is merely the vehicle, in one sense, 
for the sentiments of his characters. then, Hazli tt says, \ ·le must 
conclude that Milton's genius was essentially undramatic, for "he 
sa1-1 all objects from his own point of vievT, and with certain 
1 
exclusive preferences." He is a writer of epic, and "\>Ihile his 
characters appeal to our imagination, i~e do not sympathise "\'Ii th 
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them or identify "\d th them to the degree that we would 1vi th truly 
dramatic characters, £or epic figures affect us by their "mag-
ni.tude and distance" as much as by their "permanence and univers ... 
ality." They fill us \oJith "admiration and delight," while tragic 
characters, of course, £ill us vlith terror and pity. 112 
Hazlitt's insistence upon the premise that drama is 
character in action leads him to minimise certain aspects of the 
dramatic mode and to ignore others, and the dangers inherent in his 
theory will receive attention in due course. But there are certain 
positive qualities in his theory which also deserve notice too, the 
most important of which is his concept of the sympathetic imagination; 
and the subtitle given to this essay, "'Imagination' in Criticism," 
is intended to indicate the centrality of that concept in his thought. 
It is in the eighteenth century that men gradually begin to believe 
that the excellence of great poe try depends not so much on its 
general truth as upon its power of stimulating the reader's sensibility 
by emotional means. A hm1dred and fifty years before Eliot, a grm·Ting 
1
"Comus," ~ ~ .2£ ~ English Stage, \lorks, V, 230. 
') 
'"""On Shakspeare and Milton," Lectures .Qn ~English Poets , 
\vorks , V, 52. 
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number of critics and poets came to realise t hat t he sensationist 
philosophy first systematised by Hobbes had l ed to a dissociation 
of sensibility in '\'Thich Feel ing and Reason were polarised, and 
t heir spheres of operation regarded as disti nct . The Romantics , 
synthesising and buil ding on the theories of mind worked out by 
5en as separated by time and outlook as Shaftesbury, Bishop 
Butler, Hume , Hartl ey, Reid, and Stewart, attempted t o heal the 
breach by maintaining t hat the poetic imagination and its products 
were not reducible to rule or rational, logical evaluation. To the 
Romantics , imagination is "Reason in her most exalt ed mood," an 
intuitive, unerring facul t y of cogaition. The eighteenth-century 
vogue for the subl ime, f or the Gothic novel and t he paintings of 
Salvator Rosa, is only one manifestation in the t aste of the period 
of the emergence of feeling, based upon the i magination, as the 
principal criterion of artistic power . 1 
The first part of this study is an att empt t o define 
Hazlittts theory of the imagination, and to pl ace it against similar 
eighteent h-century theories out of w·hich it developed . This is 
folloued by an examination of Hazlittts theory of t ragedy, and 
finally the development of his concept of the comic is traced. The 
l a tter section i s perhaps more technical and abstract t han the 
portion devoted to tragedy, f or Hazlitt att empted a number of 
detail ed t heoretical discussions of t he substance of comedy, whil e 
1rt would be superfluous to attempt to add to the out-
standing work done on t he concept of the sublime by Samuel H. Monk, 
in~ Sublime: A stud.y of Critical Theories in XVIIIth-century 
England (New Yorkz Modern Language Associa tion, 1935), and by J. T. 
Boulton in t he introduction to his edition of Burke's Philosophical 
Engui~ ~ !h£ Origin of ~ I deas £f ~ Sublime ~ Beautiful 
(London: Routledge and Ke8~n Paul, 1958) . 
18 
most of his remarks concerning the nature of tragedy are scattered 
throughout h i s writings. Hazlittfs practical criticism, the fruit 
of t he t heories here examined , are easil y ava~.lable in the many one-
vol ume editions of separate works of his, in several collections of 
his essays, and i n Ho,-re t s magnificent edition of the complete works, 
which incorporates a great deal more material than was known to 
Waller and Glover, '\·Those thirteen-volume edi tion9 nm·r extremely 
difficul t to obtain, was published beti'Jeen 1902 and 1906. This 
crit icism has been recorcled and discussed in its ovm right by a 
fair number of scholarst as a glance at the bibliography '"'ill shorr. 
It has been my major purpose in this investiga tion not to evaluate 
Hazlitt ' s critical pronouncements, but to elucidate the grounds 
upon which he made t hem. If this essay makea some contribution to 
the knowledge of Hazlitt' s idea::: , and through t hem to an under-
standing of one a spect of the Romantic impulse toward drama , it will 
have achieved its aim. 
PART I 
IMAGINATION 
CHAPTER I 
While many of the major writers of the nineteenth century 
openly and uniformly based the tenor and direction of their uritings 
upo~ the sympathetic imagination, or turned frequently to it for 
justification and support, many of their counterparts in the previous 
century held that the principal means of grasping and articulating 
poetic truth vias reason. llany of the Romantics and their successors 
made attempts toward· careful definition of the faculty of imagination; 
some~ with varying measures of success, tried to distinauish it from 
its traditional association \oti th fancy and fiction; nearly all of 
them emphasised the necessity of imagination to the perception of 
truth, and streSS'}d i·hs singular importance in aesthetics. But before 
the last quarter of the eigh·teenth century, the function of the 
imagi nation \>Tas never systematically investigated, and it Has usually 
considered a "wild and la,o~less" appendage to reason, so seduc·t.ive 
that " l ike a.n llieh-rangL11.g Spaniel it must have Cloggs tied to it, 
lest it out-run the Judgment.u1 
Dr. Johnson's restatement of Horace ' s dictum, "the end of 
writing is to instruct; the end of poetry is to instruct 'by pleasing, 11 
may be regarded as an attitude typical of those held by aany of the 
more central writers of his time. To the majority of such men, poetry, 
1John Dryden, "Dedication11 in The Rival Ladies, 1664. 
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being "merel y a luxury, an instrument of pl easure , " could have no 
no value, "unless when exquisite in its kind, 'tl and t he imagination 
was the aBent uhich added this beauty and rendered t he instruction 
pl easurabl e: 
The great art of a writex shows itself i n the choice 
of pleasing allusions, which are generally t o be taken 
from t he great or beautiful works of art or nature; for, 
t hough what ever i s new or uncommon is apt to delight 
the im~:.inatione the chief design of an ill usion being 
t o illustrate and expl ain t he passages of an aut hor , it 
should altvays be borrolofed from lihat i s more knovm and 
common t han the passages to be expl a ined . • • • The 
i magination makes addi tions to na ture, and gives a greater 
variet y to God 's works •• •• It is abl e to beautify and 
adorA the most illustrious scenes in the universe, or to 
fill the mind with more glorious shows and apparitions 
than can be found in any part of i .. ~ . 2 
J ohnson, ·Hho 1-Iith Sir Joshua Reynolds produced perhaps the mos t rep-
r esent a tiV'e body of criticism i n his day, indirectly emphasised this 
decorative quality of the imagination in his comment on Akenside ' s 
Pleasures .2! jill£ Imagi nation \>then he asserted that "the subject is 
well-chosen, as it includes all images that can strike or please, and 
thus comprises every species of poetical delight"; 3 and he expressly 
poi nt ed out the imagination ' s inability to grasp truth \Then, i n 
summing up the career of~ Rambler , he cl arified his editorial 
policy--fl As it has been my principal design to inculcate wisdom or 
1~oswell ' e 1iig Qf Johnson, ed . George Birkbeck Hill 
( rev . and enl arged ed . by L. F . Powell; 6 vols . ; Oxford: At the 
Clarendon Press, 1934), II, 351-352 . 
2Joseph Addison, S12ect ator 421 . 
3The 1-'lorks of Samuel J ohnson, hl.J2.. , ed . Sir John Ha1-1kins (11 vol s . ; Londons J . Buckl and, J. Ri vington, ~ §!. , 1787), 
"Ak.enaide," in~ Lives .2f ~~ Eminent English Poets, IV, 290. 
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piety, I have all otted fe\'1 papers to the idle sports of i magination. 111 
This 11 licentious and vacrant faculty, unsusceptibl e of l imitations,n2 
could e;ive pl easure , but if abused or exercised uithout restraint it 
could obs cure and falsify the truths obtained from reason and judg-
ment, It is undeni abl e t hat during the greater part of the eight eent h 
century, a large number of writers and critics i mpl icitly believed 
t hat particular t ruth and the products of t he i magination were at 
opposite poles . Poetry was a pleasant embellishment of general truth, 
but it 'i-las essentially illusory and fabulous; therefore it was 
inferior t o the products of reason. 11 These two poems," Johnson 
remarked i n a paper comparing the pastoral forms of Theocritus and 
Virgil , "were produced by events that really happened; and may, there-
fore, be of use to prove, that we can al ways feel more than "re can 
7.: 
imagine, and that the most artful fic tion mus t give way to t ruth."J 
However, there were those '-rho disagreed with J ohnson, and unless we 
examine their theories, it i s all to easy to accept as fe,ct the 
facile juxt aposition, originated by the Romantics themselves, of neo-
classic reason and romw1tic i maginati on.4 
Although the first three quart ers of the century produced 
no systematic i nvestigation of the faculty of imagination, a growing 
interest in its mode of operation was evi nced , and as empiri cal 
1 The Works of Samuel Johnson, "Rambler" 208, VII , 396 . 
2Ibid . , "Rambler" 125, VI, 344-345· 
3I bid., "The Adventur er" 92 t IX, 76. 
4The imagination in the eighteenth century is treated by 
M. H. Abrams , !h£ Mirror~~ Lamp (New York: Oxford University 
Press , 1953); ~ . J. Bate, From Classic 1£ Romantic (Cambridge , l~ss .; 
Harvard University Press, 1946 ) ; vi. J. Bate a.."l.d J. H. Bulli tt, 
.. Distinctions :Bet'i>Teen Fancy and Imagination in Eight eenth-centur-J 
Engl ish C:riticism,n MLN, LX (1945 ), 8-15; and W. J. :Bate , "The Sym-
pathetic Imagination in Eighteenth .. century English Criticism," ELH, 
XII (1945 ), 144-164. I have drawn on all of them. ---
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psy chology t urned f rom i t s mechanist i c origins and di scount ed t he 
mind as a s t rictly rational inst rument, a broadl y uniform t heory 
of t he 'vorki ne;s of t he imaginati on evol ved . Hobbes had assert ed 
t hat i maginat ion -vras a mere mechanica l associati ve faculty . "decayi ng 
sense , " and that i t v1as t ot a lly dependent for i t s ra-\·7 mat e rial on 
origi nal sense impressions . 1 Addi s on , v1ho perhaps most clearl y 
r efl ects t he infl uence of t he Hobbesian psychology as modi f i ed by 
Locke , spoke f or t he aes t hetici ans who accepted thi s t heory when he 
wr o t e t hat 
it i s thi s sense [ sight] 111hich furnishes t he imac ination 
wi th its ideas; so t hat by t he " pl easures of the i magi nati on, " 
or 11fancy11 (which I shall use promi scuousl y) , I here mean 
such as arise f r om visible object s , e ither when \'Te have t hem 
a ctual l y i n our view , or when we call up t he ir ideas i n t o 
our minds • • • 've cannot indeed have a single image in t he 
f ancy t hat did not make its f i rst ent rance t hrough t he sight , 
bu t we have the power of retaining, alt eri ng, and compoundi ng 
t hose i mages .2 · 
Ot her wri t ers did not limit t he i mpressi ons to t hose of sight ; but 
1 The t heory which Hobbes expanded i n Levi a t han was earlier 
a pplied by hi m specifically to art in " The Ans't-1er of Mr. Hobbes to 
Si r Wi l liam Davenant' s Prefac e before Gondi bert ": "Ti me and education 
beget s experience; experi ence begets memory; memory begets judgement 
and f ancy; judgement begets t he s trengt h and s t ructure; and fancy 
be get s t he ornament s of a poem • • •• For memory is the world ( though 
not really , yet so as i n a l ookinG glass ) in whi ch the judgement • • • 
busiet h herself in a grave and rigid examination of a l l t he :parts of 
Nat ure , aud i n regist ' ring by let ters, their order, causes , unes , 
diff erences , and resemblances; uhereby t he fe.ncy, "\'Jhen any work of 
art i s to be per f ormed , f i ndes her mat erial at hand a.nd pr epared for 
use , and needs no more than a swi .f t mo·!;:ion over t hem, t hat vlhat she 
1.-1ant s , and i s t here to ·be had, may not l i e too long unespi ed . So that 
when she seemet h to f l ye from one Indies t o t he other • • • t he voyage 
i s not very great, her sel f bei ng all she seeks; and her \'Ionderful 
ce l erity , consisteth not so much in mot ion, as in c opious imagery 
di s creet l y ordered , and perfectly regist ered in the memory. 11 The 
Works of~ Engl ish Poet o, ed . Alexander Chalmers ( 21 vol s . ; London: 
J. Johnson ~§!., 1810), VI, 370, ~ passim. 
2J oseph Addison, Specta t or 411. 
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in general it was accepted that the imaginat ion "selects ideas from 
t he treasures of rern.embrance," and, by an arbitrary process of 
association, 11 produces novelty only by varied conbinations."1 
Since itc operations o.re circumscribed by the range of 
original sense impressions received, lfthe imagination is incapable 
of producing anything original ly of itself , and can only vary and 
. 2 
c ombine those ideas vli th 1vhich it is furn~shed by the senses ." Its 
mode of operat ion is sel f - analytical and essentia lly pe.~sive, since 
it depends entirely on the mindts "original frame" 3 and it::; 
a ccretions of sensory images: " it is but opening the eye, and the 
s cene ent ers. The col ours paint themselves on the fancy , with very 
l i ttle attention of thought or application of mind in the beholci.er . u4 
Dist inctions between imagination and fancy before 1750 
are seldom encov~tered, and indeed after that date are by no means 
numerous . CLaracteristic of their identification i o Johns on's 
definition of the terms: 
FA' NCY ••• 
1 . I magi nation; t he po,<~er by which the mind forms to 
i t self images and representations of things, persons, 
or scenes of bei ng. • • • 
I~1A 'GINATION ••• 
1. Fancy; the power of forming ideal p~cliures; the power 
of representing things absent to one ' s self or othe~·s . :J 
1The \forks of Samuel Johnson, 11 The Idler" 44, VII I , 175 . 
2The Works of Sir J oshua Reynolds, Knight, ed . Edmond 
11al one {4th ed . ; 3 vol s.; London: T. Cadell & W. Davies , 1809), 
"Discourse VII ," I, 220 . 
3Ibid., p . 219. 
4J oseph Addison, Spectat or 411. 
c:: ~Samuel J ohnson, Di c t i onary . 
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On those occasions when the distinction was made by the more 
prominent artists and critics of the day, t he difference was held 
to be more of degree than of kind, more of product than of process: 
the images produced by the imagination \•rere considered to be more 
vast and awe-inspiring, more sublime 9 than those made by the fancy . 
Reynolds, \·Those Discourses to the Academy naturally dealt 11i t h 
aesthetics mainly in terms of painting, not only made t his rudi-
mentary distinction~ but he also indicated that, besides vrorking 
by varying and combining sensory impressions, the imagination 
t ended to exaggerate and to distort those impressions: 
Raffaele had more Taste and Fancy, ~lichael Angelo more 
Genius and Imagination. • • • Michael Angelo has more of 
the Poe tical inspiration; his ideas are vast and sublime; 
his people are a superior order of beings; there is 
nothing about them, nothing in the air of their actions 
or their attitudes, or the style and cast of ·their limbs 
and features, tha t reminds us of their belonging t o our 
own species.l 
The insistence of the uri ters of the early nineteenth cen·tury upon 
t he positive value, and , indeed, the necessity, of the imagination 
in great art was, however, by no means a complete volte-face in 
aesthetic theory. Hazlitt derived some of his most fundamental 
ideas from Butler's sermons preached a·!; the Rolls Chapel, and from 
the Analogy 1·1i th its appended Dissertations . Consequently his 
theory, though it has not a·btracted as muoh attention as Coleridge ' s , 
is clearer, more English, "less subtle, and certainly more central 
in the Romantic ethos. Butlel~ had emphasised the existence of a 
faculty of intuition allied to the imagination; by 1754 the intuit-
1 The \<forks .2f lli Joshua. Reynolds, "Discourse V," I, 128-129. 
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ional theory had been so far developed that James Burgh '-ras able to 
assert that 
there is no natural absurdity in supposing it possible 
for a human • • • to arrive at a clear and distinct 
perception of truth by intuition •••• It is there-
fore certain, that all evidence whatever is to be 
finally tried by and reduced to intuition.l 
Reynolds in 1776 ridiculed the idea that truth could be 8Tasped by 
i:ntui·tion and not by reason: 
Genius and taste • • • both, in the popular op~n~on, 
pretend to an entire exemption from the restraint of 
rules. I·t is supposed that their powers are intuitive; 
• • • One can scarce state these opinions rli thout 
exposing their absurdity; yet they are constantly in 
the mouths of men, and particularly of artists .2 
Ten years later, hov1ever , he told the students a·t the Academy that 
in certain circumstanoes p- imagination was indeed "the residence of 
truth,":; although reason was the final judge. Even Johnson gives 
evidence, in his life of Pope , published in 1781, that much of his 
earlier distrust of the imagination had diminished. But it is 
only well toward the end of the eighteenth century that a:ny really 
systematic attemp·t to define the imagination, to delineate its 
operations in detail, and t o rescue it from its demi- monde career, 
is to be fou.."l.d. 
Dugald Ste,.rart , ' ·rho as Professor of l<Ioral Philosophy in 
the University of Edinburgh from 1785 to 1810 was one of the most 
1James Burgh, 'l1he Digni·ty 2.£ ,ll~ nat ure (London: J. 
J ohr,son and J. Payne, 17 54) • 
2The \<lorks ..Q.;f. .fu Joshua Reynolds , "Discourse VII , 11 I , 197. 
3roid., 11 Discourse XIII, 11 II, 113. 
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influential members of the Scottish t'Common-sense" school ( and whose 
writings were certainly known to both Coleridge and Hazlitt), pro-
duced in 1792 a careful analysis of the nature and workings of the 
imagination in his Elements of !h& Philosophy of ~ Human ~· 
Stewart distinguished sharply between t-lhat he called "conception" 
and the imagination: 
The province of the former is to present us with an exact 
transcript of what we have formerly felt and perceived; 
that of the latter, to make a selection of qualities and 
of circumstances from a variety of different objects, and 
by combining and disposing these, to form a new creation 
of its own.l 
It is noticeable that Stelvart ' s nconception" embraces Hobbes t 
notion of "decaying sense," and that it is clearly on a lower 
l evel than t he imagination proper. 
In spite of the marked eighteenth- century emphasis upon 
the part of selection and association in his outline of the 
imaginative process, Stewart expressly rejects the well-established 
belief that the imagination is entirely dependent upon sensory 
impressions for its material. He also suggests a new significance 
in the operation of the faculty: if the imagination is able to 
"form a new creation of its own" from the "variety of different 
objects" which the conception has presented to it, it follot-Ts that 
the imagination can form ideas not previously contained in the 
mind--it can, in other words, function as a cognitive faculty just 
. 
as reason or judgment does. Stewart is one of the first to suggest 
1~ Collected Works .Q! Dugald Ste'\'rart, ed. Sir \</illiam 
Hamilton (11 vol s.; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1877), II, 431 . 
that the gap bet,.reen the individual and the external 'mrld may be 
1 bridged by the imagination. 
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Ste"rart sees imagination not as a simple, automatically-
working endowment, but as a "complex power," independent of, but 
not antithetical to reason, and including conception, abstraction, 
judgment or taste, and fancy, nwhich presents to our choice all the 
different materials 'vhich are subservient to the efforts of 
imagination."2 It is a dynamic power, not merely selecting and 
associating, but affording an immediate and intuitive perception 
into external reality. It enables the mind to comprehend the 
emotions and feelings of others: 
I have often been inclined to think, that the apparent 
coldness and selfishness of mankind may be traced, in 
a great measure, to a want of attention and a ·1:1ant of 
imagination •••• Without~ ~common degree of both, it 
is impossible for any man to comprehend completely the 
situation of his neighbour •••• If we feel therefore 
more for ourselves than for others, the difference is to 
be ascribed, at least partly, to this; that in the former 
case, the facts which are the foundation of our feelings, 
are more fully before us than they possibly can be in the 
l atter.3 
Stewart is thus to be regarded as a precursor of the Romantics 
not only in their insistence upon the intuitive capabilities of the 
imagination·, but also in their marked and most important belief 
that the imagination affords the only valid perception of the 
emotions and character of another: Hazlitt, the spokesman in 
1
see Stewart, II, 144-158. 
2~. , 435-436. 
3ill.!i•t 453-454· I use Stewart here because he is a 
vehicle for the theories propounded by such diverse people as 
Dui'f, Beattie, Alison, Gerard, and Smith, all of whom made 
contributions to the theory of the imagination. For Duff, see 
the discussion of fancy and imagination on pp. 30 ff. 
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applied criticism £or the Romantics, made this theory the foundation 
of his writings on ethics and, of course, on drama. It should also 
be noted that Stewart believed that exercise given to the imagination 
could lead to more immediate perception of external truth, and that 
he advocated the "cultivation11 of the imagination as an instrument 
for social benevolence. 
Careful and frequent analyses of the imagination are 
characteristic of the Romantic period . !'JSny writers of the time 
saw imagination as the fountain- head of morality, and poetry9 the 
language of a disciplined but strong imagination, as the only 
permanent and universal articul ation of nature's truths. The 
importance which t he Romantics attached to the imagination can 
be seen in Shelley's assumption that it constitutes the true moral 
and e thical foundation& 
The great secret of moral s is love; or a going out 
of our own nature, and an identification of ourselves 
with the beautiful which exists in thought, action, 
or person, not our own. A man, to be greatly good , 
mus t imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must 
put himself in the place of another and of many 
others; the pains and pleasures of his species must 
become his own. The great instrument of moral good is 
the imagination; and poetry administers to the effect 
by acting upon the cause.l 
For Shelley., as for Coleridge, Hazlitt, and Keats, this "great 
instrument of moral good, 11 through the active participation 1o1hich 
it makes possibl e in t he passions and feelings of others, obviated 
a rigid necessity for fixed standards of behaviour and rational 
_ 1~ercy Bysshe ?helley, ! Defence of Poetry, in Shelley ' s 
Literary~ Philosophical t;riti cism, ed. John Sha'\:Tcross (London: 
Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1909), p . 131. 
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codes of social ~ntercourse. The decorum of the eighteent h century, 
supported as it was by rules of conduct and ethical virtues delineated 
by reason, appeared not only sterile and constricting to t he thinkers 
of the next century, but was also inimical to the growing sense of 
individuality "rhich developed, as an understandable reaction, out of 
the rel ative conformity of the Age of Reason. While all four men 
wavered in or even discarded any faith they might once have had in 
the perfectibility of man, they retained a fervent belief in mant s 
pot ential for benevolence, and they maintained an entrenched mistrust 
of the common eighteenth-cent ury assertion that man was motivated 
natural ly by self-love. The Romantic conception of imagination 
enabled t hem to cast off t he distastefull y rigid idea of rules 
governi ng behavi our, to mai ntain their cherished individuality, and 
to propound a satisfact ory instrument for man fs humanity to man. 
The basic importance of the imagination in the Romantic 
conception of poetry is demonstrat ed by Leigh Huntts suggestion that 
it alone is able to grasp t he inmost truths of life 9 and that only 
2 poetry, which is "imaginative passion,n can properly express them: 
Poetry begins vrhere matter of fact or of science ceases 
to be merely such, and to exhibit a further truth, that 
is t o say, the connexion it has with the w·orld of emotion, 
and its power to produce imaginative pleasyre •••• 
Truth of every kind belongs to [the poe{} .) 
1It could perhaps be argued that this l eads eventually to 
a l ack of dogmatic and moral frames of reference, ·t .. rhich in turn might 
be one explanation for the need of later poets to be their own priests~ 
prophets, philos ophers, and myth-makers. 
2Leigh Hunt, Imagination~ Fancy (New ed . ; London: Smith, 
El der, & Co., 1891), p. 3. (1844.) 
3Ibid . ~ pp. 3- 5· 
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Al so, "without imagination there is no true embodiment .. " 1 Hunt 
quotes ui th approval Shelley's words on the moral pO't'ler of the 
imagination, and he too considers poetry to be a moral agent, 
administering "to the effect by acting upon the cause"; what the 
imagination, as the intuitive agent of truth, can create, that 
poetry expresses. 
Although, as \lie have seen, the dominant tendency in those 
inst ances in the eighteenth century 1-lhen fancy '\-laS distinguished 
from imagination t-ras to characterise the difference more as one of 
degree than anything else, there is evidence that the terms were 
not ah·ays used synonymously, and that the distinction was taken 
by some men to be a more profound one. Such differentiation 
naturally tended to derogate fancy, since there had been noticeable 
a general Shift in the rela tive positions of the terms- -in this 
respect-- a s early as Drydents Prefatory Letter in Annus Mirabilis, 
published in 1667: 
The first happiness of the Poet's imagination is 
properly Invention, or finding of the thou~1t; the 
second is Fancy, or the variation, deriving or 
moulding of that thought, as the judgment represents 
it proper to that thought; the third is Elocution, 
or tho Art of clothing and adorninb that thought so 
found and varied• in apt, significant and sounding 
words: the quickness of the Imagination is seen in 
the Invention. the fertilit~ in the Fancy, and the 
accuracy in the Expression. 2 
What is notevrorthy here is that although the 11 fertility" of the 
imagination is assigned to fancy, the basic imaginative po\'rer of 
1
nunt, Imagination ~ Fancy, p. 24. 
2 John Dryden, Preface, Annus Mirabilis, 1667 ~ 
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invention is not, and Dryden's comprehensive expression for the 
three aspects of poetic interpretation is "imagination." Instances 
occur soon after this where fancy is implicitly regarded as 
inferior to imag~nation, so perhaps Dryden ' s formulation encouraged 
a shift of which it was partly symptomatic. Some 1-rriters, 1-1hile 
they usually employ the terms interchangeably, seem to tend toward 
using fancy "rhen they speak of the lighter or more licentious 
aspects of imaginative indulgence, and imagination in a more 
complimentary sense. Shaftesbury, for instance, usually couples 
imagination with conceit, in reference to inherent capacity, and 
poetic inspiration; while he invariably associates fancy 1•1i th a 
condition of mental abandon. 
\/illiam Duff's Essay ~ Original Genius, published in 
1767, would appear to be the first clear attempt at explaining 
the nature of the distinction, vrhich by this time had begun to 
crystallise out in the theories of several Scottish writers. 
Duff holds that imagination is characterised by its vigour, its 
range, and its plasticity, while fancy is essentially quick and 
lively. The plastic imagination lays bare truths vrhich vrere 
formerly unknown. Fancy, hovrever, the less serious f8.cul ty, is 
the parent of "vri t" and of "wit and humour" as distinguished from 
Genius , lvhich is the province of imagination. Duff sugges·ts that 
fancy depends upon association for the correspondences which it 
produces, while imagination is able to produce creations of its 
The distinction i s also noted by James Beattie, in his 
Dissertations J.1oral ~ Critical , i'lhich appeared in 1783, but 
perhaps the clearest differentiation i s that made by Stewart . 
Stewart elaborates on Duffl e theory to the extent that he sees 
fancy as a power of associating ideas according to resemblance 
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and anal ogy, and its proper function is the collection of materials 
f or the imagination. On this reasoning, imagination presupposes 
the existence of fancy, asserts Stewart, but the reverse is not 
necessarily true. A "man of fancy" is one who habitually illustrates 
a subject by analogy or resemblances , but imaginative illus tration 
requires something more than this. The l a tter includes, as we have 
seen, abstraction and conception , which separate t he selected 
mate:rials from the circumstances •·rhich are connected with t hem in 
nature; and it a l so includes judgment or t aste , which sel ects the 
materials and di rects t heir combination. And finally, imagination 
in her highest mro1ifestation also includes fancy itself. 
Thus , by the time that the Romantics came to theorise 
on the nature of the imagination and its relation to t he fancy , 
t here was behind them a fairly strong tradition of specula tion 
on those very subjects . ~he way i n which Coleridge and Hunt, the 
t wo i·Tri tars of the period i n 1-Thom -~he dichotomy bet1-reen the two 
faculties finds i ts fullest expression, deal with the problem 
illuminates quite clearly one aspect of the poetic imagination 
which will receive fuller attention in t he next chapter. 
To Hunt, imagination is "the feeling of t he subtlest 
and most affecting analogi es; the perception of sympathies i n the 
nature of things, 11 whil e fancy is "a sporting with their resemblance, 
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real or supposed, and with airy and fantastical creations.n1 Fancy 
is neither r ooted in truth, nor does it sat isfy more than our most 
superficial desires. It deals in the less serious, transitory aspects 
of nature, whil e imaginationts province is nature ' s underlying truth, 
which is eternal. Hunt sees fancy, in effect, as an inferior kind 
of imagination. (Wordsworth, too, outlined a vaguer but similar 
distinction in the Preface to the 1815 edition of his poems--"Fancy 
is given t o quicken and to beguile the temporal part of our nature, 
2 Imagination to incite and support the eternal.n ) 
In Eiographia Literaria Coleridge understands fancy and 
imagination to l'rork in t-v1o distinct processes. In his view, fancy 
is a combining and a collecting process, retaining those qualitieo 
of memory, choice, and combination which characterised the Johnsonian 
concept of imagination: 
FANCY ••• has no other counters to play with, but 
fixities and definites . The Fancy is indeed no other 
than a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of 
t ime and space; while it is blended with, and modified 
by that empirical phenomenon of the i·rill, uhich we 
express by the word CHOICE. But equally with the 
ordinary memory the Fancy must receive all its n~terials 
ready made from the law of association.3 
It is a passive quality or faculty, operating according to the law 
of association, and it i s t herefore necessarily self-conscious &~d 
wilful. The imagination, however, is far more complex. Coleridge 
( 2 vols . ; 
Shawcross 
202. 
1Hunt, Imagination and Fancx, p. 26. 
2Prose Works of vlilliam Wordsworth, ed. \filliam Knight 
London: 1-iacmillan and Co., Ltd. , 1896 ), II, 217. 
3samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biogra;phia. Li teraria, ed . John 
( 2 vols.; Londont Oxford University Press, 1907), II, 
arbitraril y divides it into ttfo parts , differing only in degree: 
The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the l iving Pow·er 
and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a 
repetition in the finite mind of t he e t ernal act of 
creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary imagination 
I consider as an. echo of the former, co-existing with 
the conscious will, yet still as identical with the 
primary in the~ of its agency. and differing only 
i n degree, and in the ~ of its operation. It dissolves , 
diffuses, dissipates ~ in order t o recreate; or where 
this process is rendered impossible, yet still at a ll 
event s it struggles to idealise and t o unify. I t is 
essen·tially vi t al, eveu as all objects (E:§. objects) 
are essentially fixed and dead. l 
I magination is thus "the prime agent of all human perception.u 
For Coleridge it is vastly more important than fancy, or even 
reason. Neither of t he latter, dependent as they are on memory 
and association, are capable of escaping the finite limitations 
of the senses . But t he imagination, through its sympathetic and 
vi tal self-identification "'d th vlhatever is external to it, is not 
limited to the senses or by the senses--it "dissol ves, diffuses, 
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dissipates" the sensuous frame\llOl"'k of nature, and c;:m perceive and 
portray i n its unified ideality the hidden, underlying movement 
of life , t he ttliving pm\'er"of existence: i t can detect and express 
\-tha:ii Kant had implied by t he ttnoumenal" v1orld . 
Coleridge's distinction is condensed and ambiguous . Many 
of his readers must sil ently have demanded , along vii th the :more 
s.rtioulate Lord Byron, that Mr. Coleridge "explain his explanation.n 
But Hazlitt attempted a clear, consistent analysis of the operation 
and f unction of the poetic imaginationp based upon the concept of 
1 Biographia Literaria, II, 202. 
sympathetic identification. 
Sympathy, benevolence, disinterestedness--these a r e 
:frequently synonymous in Hazlitt 1s vocabulary. They pose s omething 
of a semantic problem, because at leas t as often t hey are used to 
indicate a universal quality or a feature of the imagination. As 
Bate points out , earlier i n t he eighteenth century the att empt had 
been made to ascribe moral feeling to sympathy. Hume is perhaps 
one of the best-remembered of t he philosophers wl:o dealt vTi th the 
matter, and Adam Smith of course t ried to base a vihole Theory ,2! 
I<!oral Sentiments upon it . "Psychol ogical analysis joi ned >'lit h 
this assumption to evolve a theory of the imagination that was 
eminently adaptable to criticism, especially the criticism of the 
drama and of Shakespeare,n wri tes Bate 
developed most fully by Razlitt, and echoed by Xeats 
in his term 11negative capability, 11 this was a concept 
of the imagination by which f evT English critics were 
untouched. A general sent iment congenial wit h it 
persisted. But the idea, in a specifically critical 
sense , l argely disappeared until at the close of the 
nineteenth century it was rediscovered, interpreted 
i n a more subjective i'lay, and systematized into the 
theory of Einfiihl ung--or "empathy11 --by the German 
est hetioian, Theodor Lipps; '\'lhile, in a more directly 
concrete way, the idea of imaginative identifica tion 
was suggestivel y applied in Russia to the theory of 
acting by Konstant in Stanisl avsky. l 
" Sympathy • n then, carries, in Hazli tt ' s i·Tri ting., both an ethical 
and an aesthetic connotation. It is the first attri bute of hi s 
critical t heory, a theory based upon a notion that criticism is 
1\l alter J ackson Bate , Prefaces to Criticism ("Anchor 
:Sook2"; Ne'" York: Doubleday & Company, In.C:', 1959 ), p. 110. See 
al so Clarence D. Thorpe , "Some Notices of 1Empat hy 'Before Lipps , " 
PaJ?ers .2£ the Hichie~an Aoadem.y of Science , ~. ~ Letters, 
XXIII (1937)7 525-533 · 
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an art. Through sympathy, we project our imagination-- one "projects 
himself into the station and circumstances of others with a fellow 
feeling of their joys and sorrows as the case may be; there is also 
the possibility of :projecting one's self into another's point Qf 
~ as well, and from that :point of view of looking in an external 
fashion, as it w·ere, upon our moral motives and purposes.111 Like 
Coleridge ts distinction between the primary and the secondary 
imagination, there is an implied distinction in Hazlitt's thought 
between the sympathetic imagination and the imagination as an entity 
in itself. Thus he is able to say that Wordsworth's imagination 
holds immediately from nature, and "bwes no allegiance' but 'to the 
elements. t n2 Milton's imagination uhas the force of nature,"3 and 
"the imagination and the passions are a part of man's nature •• .4 
Thus the imagination is both a sympathetic faculty and an "exclusive" 
qual ity, the former being the spring of the reader's response (and, 
of course, the :poet's chief tool), and the latter a characteristic 
inherent in every work of art. It is to the nature and function of 
the imaginat ion as Hazlitt sees it that we now turn our attention. 
1John G. Hibben, ~ Philosophy £! the Enlightenment 
( New York: Harcourt, Drace and Company, 1910), p:p. 262-263. 
2 
"Character of Mr. Wordsworth's New Poem, The Excursion, " 
Works, XIX3 10. 
"On Milton's Versification, 11 The Round Table, Works, IV, 37. 
4110n Poetry in General,., Lectures .Ql! ~ English Poets, 
Works, V, 3. 
CHAPTER II 
Although he echoes and expands Reynolds's cautious 
statement of 1786 that truth may reside in the products of the 
imagination, Hazlitt never denies the necessity and the value of 
reason, which "is no doubt one faculty of the human mind, and the 
1 
chief gift of Providence to man"; but, he maintains, reason is 
not the only faculty of the mind, and it is subject to other instincts 
and principles, the chief of 'iThich is imagination. It should be 
remembered• when Hazlitt ' s occasionally vituperative attacks on 
reason are read, that he \ias passionately against any theory which 
seemed to him to reserve cognitive power to reason at the expense 
of imagination. He does not confuse their provinces, and agrees 
\-Ti th Abraham Tucker that "of things \d thin our reach, some \.re discern 
by immediate intuition, others we gather by inference and by long 
2 deductions of reasoning"; nonetheless, he does believe that the 
imagination can discover much that is inaccessible to reason. 
Hazlitt ' s criticism and his philosophical speculations are based 
upon those truths lying within the grasp of the imagination. 
1
"0n the English Novelists," Lectures .Q!! .lli_ English Comic 
Writers, Works, VI, 132 . 
2An Abridgement .2f ~ Litht .2f Nature Pursued, ~ Abraham 
Tucker, Esq . ed. William Hazlitt London: J. Johnson, 1807.), 
p. xliii. 
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F Ha 1 · t t t · "th 1 f th · · t · n l or z 2 , poe ry 2s e e oquence o e ~mag2na ~on, 
"the l anguage of the imagination and the passions, of fancy and 
. 11 112 W1 o The poet and the painter, both of 1-1hom depend upon the 
qual ity of their imagination, "are superior t o the mere philosopher 
or man of science, because they exercise the powers of reason 
and intellect combined with nature and passion. They treat of the 
7, 
highest categories of the human soul, pleasure and pain.n.:> Thus 
(and Hazl i t tts point is as pertinent today as it was in 1817), they 
do not deal in trivia, as 
poetry is an interesting study, for this reason, that it 
relates to whatever is most interesting in human life. 
Whoever therefore has a contempt for poetry, has a con-
tempt for himself and humanity.4 
Since poetry is the expression of what is most vitally apprehended 
and intensely felt in life, it cannot proceed upon those principles 
1non Poetry in General," Lectures .Q!l ~English Poets, 
\vorks, V, 1 5 n . 
2~., p. 8. 
3uon Imitation," The Round Table, \vorks, IV, 76. In order 
more clearly to understand Eiilittts version of the sensationist 
criteria it is necessary to read this passage in the light of what 
fo l lows, from his essay "On Reason and Imagination," The Plain Speaker, 
\'lorks, XII , 46: 11So with respect to moral truth (as distinct from 
mathematical), whether a thing is good or evil, depends on the quantity 
of passion, of feeling, of pleasure and pain connected vlith it , and 
with which we must be made acquainted in order to come to a s ound con-
clusion, and not on the inquiry, whether it is round or square. Passion, 
in short, is the essence, the chief ingredient in moral truth; and the 
warmth of passion is sure to kindle the light of imagination on the 
objects around it. The 1uords that glow' are almost inseparable 
from the ' thoughts that burn.' Hence logical reason and practical 
truth are disparates." 
4"Lear, 11 Characters .Qf Shakespearts Pla.y;s, Wo::cks, IV, 271. 
This was, of course, one of Keats ' s most fundamental tenets. He 
heavily marked this passage in his copy of the volume, vrhich is no1·T 
in the Houghton Memorial Library, Harvard University. 
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of consecut ive l ogic established by reason, 
f or the end and use of :poetry, "both at the first and nmv, 
was and is to hol d the mirror up to nature, 11 seen through 
the medium of passion and imagination, not diverted of that 
medium by means of literal trut h or abstract reason.l 
The truths open to reason and those available to the imagination 
are not identical : 
To say that the intellect alone can determine or supply 
the movemento or the language of passion, is little short 
of a contradiction in terms •••• Nor can the indifferent 
observation of the outward signs attain to the truth of 
nature, without the inward s~:pathy to impel us forward, 
and to tell us where to stop. 2 
Thus for Hazlitt the province of reason is confined to the observation 
only of lvhat is external and apparent to the senses. Imagination, 
however, is able to grasp the hidden truths of nature. Just as 
objectivity and disinterestedness are vi t al to the proper function 
of t he reason, so intense invol vement and sympathy are the found-
ations of the imagination. It is only through this sympathetic 
int erest that the mind oan ndetermi ne the movements" or, as it lvere, 
suppl y t he language of the nhighest categories of the human soul." 
Col lation of Hazlitt t s remarks on reason shows that he 
saw it as an analytic, disentangling faculty which uconquers by 
dividing; and instead of exaggerating and excludingp a~ms at univer-
sa1 ity, connection, and proportion in all its determinations.u3 It 
sel ect s its materials from the store of memory, atomises them, a~d 
1
uen Poetry in General," V, 8. 
2
"0n Novelty and Familiarity," ~ Plain SJ.?eaker, \~orks, 
XII, 297. 
3~ ~ £1 Napoleon Buonaparte, Works, XIII, 51 n. 
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wilfully reconstructs the resulting particles of memory and exper-
ience into patterns which are significant for their order and t heir 
arrangement. It is a commonplace (and an oversimplification) that 
the Romantics rebell ed against the eighteenth century t s reduction 
of nature to a vast and artificially neat plan, -vThich was acknovTledged 
to be Divine in origin, 'but 1-1hich, the Romantics felt, vtas bereft 
of the \•Tender \·Thich they themselves felt nature to harbour. Some-
thing of the earlier spirit is apparent in Reynoldsts complacent 
insistence that reason "renders [its subjects] more artificial, 
carries it still furt her from common nature, and deviates only to 
render it more perfe~t." Reynolds points out that reason appeals 
to a specific need in man's constitution--to "the sense of congruity, 
coherence, and consistency, whioh is a real existing principle in 
man; and it must be g-ratified."1 Hazlitt would have agreed whole-
heartedly t hat reason abstracts its subject from "common nature," 
but he would certainly have held that, hovTever much the end-product 
appealed to onef s "sense of congruity," it had, through its 
artificiality and final remoteness from ttthe movements or t he 
lar1guage of passion," no place in poetry or painting. 
Coleridgets fancy is very close to Hazlittts reason: as 
has already been indica·ted, the former faoul ty depended for its 
material on Hfixities and definites, 11 modified by deliberate choice 
which was gui ded in its operation by the stable l aws of association. 
Ilazlitt's concept of reason differs only in its superior aims and 
1The \vorks .2.f. §i!: Joshua. Reynolds, "Discourse XIII," II , 
1 23. 
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in its more serious aspect. For Coleridge's much-disparaged fancy 
had as its end the stimulation of delight through novelty; Hazlitt's 
reason, guided by the same mechanical laws of association, and 
utilising the same "decaying sense," "tries to persuade the will"l 
by logical demonstration and consecutive argument. 
Reason depends "on the discursive or e:Ktensive";2 it is 
essentially disputatious in character, and, in its highest manifest-
ation, moralistic. Eut although this is an excellent attribute--
the chief gift of Providence to man--it does not admit reason into 
tho realm of :poetry. The eloquence of the imagi:nation is :poetry, 
whereas the el oquence of reason and of the understanding is rhetoric: 
art depends non the intuitive and intensive po•rer of the mind." 3 
The human mind, says Razlitt, "is a finer instrument than we some-
·cimes suppose it, and is not only s\<rayed by overt acts and taneible 
proofs, but has an instinctive feeling of the air of truth. 1A 
Reason attains to truth "through a certain proces~,"5 but the 
imagination, by an j_mmediate and instinctive movement, seize!3 on 
truth "'i thout effort or even conscious intention. :r.linds too 
1
non Poe-try in General," V, 1~ na Cf. 11Character of Lord 
Chatham,tr Works, VII, 299-300o 
2
"Why the Arts are not Progressive?" Works, XVIII , 8. 
) r · · d 
....Q..L.• 
411 0n DisaiS·reeablc People," \-iorks, XVII, 227 • 
.. 
.;"Troilus a.nd Cressida, 11 Characters of Shakes·pear • :~ 
Plays, works, IV, 226. :f.ly italics. Of course, t.t'le very notion of 
a "process" presupposes a certain dee;ree of abstraction or 
distance, a lack of involvement. This is anotllo~· reason for the 
superiority of imagination; ima..;ination Goes straight to the 
essential identity of its o~ject. 
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"sensible to the external differences of thingo 1 too passive under 
their impressions, to adnit of those bold and rapid combinations 
which imacination creates , • • • and too confined • • • by the 
material form or vehicle in 1-:hich [ ideas] uere conveyed"1--minds 
l ike those of the Graeco-Romans, for example--are minds which are 
open only to the trtlth of the external signs of nat11re--reason ' s 
tr~th; the trutlls of imagination are more profound, and cannot be 
ascertained by attention mc:t·ely to the ou-tward forms of objects, 
1:1hich, in Coleridge's words, "as ob,jects, are essentially fixed 
and dead." Imaeination perceives analogies and relt.:.tionships bet-
ween these objects: 
This intuitive perception of the hidden a~tlalogics of 
things , or, as it may be called, this instinct .2£~ 
imagination, is, perhaps, what stamps "~>he character of 
0enius on the productions of ar·t more than any other 
circumstance: for it works unconsciously, like nature, 
and receives its impressions from e. kind of inspiration.2 
Of course, the "hidden ana.loe:;ies11 are not inherent in the objects, 
and, in fact, are often an·t.i thetical to the observations of re~:~.son . 
But -~hey are, nevertheless, true to nature -...rhile they are impercept-
ible to reason, or false in literal fact, since th~y express the 
truth of the impressions mado by the objects upon a nind untier the 
-;: 
influence of passion and feeling.J 
Hazlitt admired the artistic abilities of the Graeco-
11!Character o1· l-lr. Burke," -t·o:-eks, YII, 312 . 
2110n the English Novelists," VI, 109 .. 
-'For an extension of this argumen·t, see the discussion 
of Hazlitt's conception of ,'}.tsto in bile next chapter. 
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Romans, whose forte, he felt, was "exquisite art and perfect imitat ... 
ion";1 but~ since the two "principles of' imitation and imagination, 
indeed, are not only distinct, but almost opposite,"2 he considered 
their products to be inferior to those which had been made by the 
sculptors of the Elgin Marbles, for instance, or to those poems and 
novels which had been written by the imaginative geniuses of his 
own day. Obviously, llazlitt considered tha-t "art" and "imitatioiJ." 
were functions of systematised thought and developed reason, and that 
\!Iorks of art produced according to their principles 'ftere necessarily 
limited to delineation, deliberate and disin·~erested, of literal 
truth--
The ideas of the ancients vTe:ce too exact ai1.d definite, 
too much attached to the material form. • • • The great 
difference • • • between the classical and the romantic 
style, between ancient and modern poetry, is, that ••• 
the one d\iells more on the immediate impressions of 
objects on the senses--the other on the ideas which .they 
suggest to the imagination.3 
Clearly9 as far as Hazlitt is concerned, the "ancients" were concerned 
only 'dth the fixed, static, external world: tneir consecutive 
reasoning was incapable of grasping the inner significance, the 
"hidden analogies. 11 He acknm-1leclged that the excellence of the 
Graeco- Romans lay in their auperlative use of man's rational faculties; 
the intuitive insight, hovever 9 into imaginative truth, which he 
believed constituted the criterion of great poetry, was beyond their 
1
"Cha::!'acter oi' !•lr. :Burke," VII, 312. 
211 0n .Ancient and .1-Iodern Literature," Lectvres Cld.cfly .£!1 
~ Drama.tic Ltterature .2f. lli 1::££ .Qf. Elizabeth, 1./orks, VI, )JO. 
3Ibid. 
l 
reacll. 
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Description in poetry and allegory in painting, Hazlitt 
contended, are both dependent on reason, and demand progressive 
2 
and logical interpretation to be understood. They are like " the 
pasteboard machinery of a pantomime • • • and have no purchase on 
the imagination, 11 3 whereas "neither a mere description of natural 
object s, nor a mere delineation of natural feelings, ho\4'ever 
distinct or forcible, constitutes the ultimate end of poetry9 with-
out the heightenings of the imagination.lf4 Poetry ' s ultimate truth 
lies not in the imita·Uve repetition of externals, but in the 
intuitive discovery and expression of the "hidden analogies" bet,-reen 
then. In this <.l iscovery anc. expression, the d;ynamic ninstinct of 
imo.gination" infuses motion and vitality into the objects~ which in 
1
'there is an excellent discussion of "Hazlitt's Criticism 
and Greek Sculpture'• by Stephen Larrabee in d!!,l, II (1941), 77-94· 
Hazlitt ' s e~phasis on the importance of the intuitive aspect of the 
poe·tic imagination can be seen in his remark that upoetry, we grant, 
creates a \·torld of its own; but it creates it out o:f existing 
~aterials . Mr. Shelley ••• mistook the nature of the poet ' s 
callinB, which should be bruicted by involuntary, not by voluntary 
impulses." ("Shelley ' s Posthumous Poems," ·works, XVI, 265.) Hazlitt 
found support for his view in Tucker, v!ho, 't-lhile coufinin& the 
sphere of the imagination to the purely fanciful, nevertheless 
Ulderstood by it "that faculty by which different ideas and objects 
••• are present ed to the mind spontaneously, and withou t any effort 
ou her part; and by Understanding I would chuso ·(;o donate ~he .:pm·1er 
we have of voluntarily leading the thoughts into certain trains 
rather than others." (Hazlitt ' s Abridgement .£! the Light .Qf l~ature 
Pursued, pp. 81-82 . ) 
2
see "Conversations as Good as Real, 11 \lorks, X.X., 272, t-rhere 
nTn is Hazlitt and "J" is Northcote. 
311 0n t he Engli:3h Novelists, 11 VI, 127. 
4non Poetry in General," V, 3. 
themselves are essentially fixed and dead . The truths of reason 
are descriptive and l ogical; they depend on a consecutive and orderly 
arrangement of particulars, and "what is mechanical, reducible to 
rule p or capable of demonstrat ion, is progressive, and admits of 
gradual improvement."1 The truths of analogy, which are discovered 
by the imagination and are expressed in poetry, are not "progressive," 
and achieve their effect "by instantaneous sympathy . Nothing is a 
subject for poetry that admits of a dispute . 112 
Thus, in Hazlitt ' s system, reason is a persuasive power, 
which is founded on logical demonstration and which ( though Hazlitt 
does not expressly say so) is destructible by superior logic. It 
cannot, at all events, demonstrate, improve, or modify the truths 
grasped by the imagination . Poetry is not necessarily logical, is 
not "progressive," is not argumentative: "poetry bebl'ins where matter 
of fact or of science ceases to be merely such, and to exhibit a 
further truth, that is to say, the connexion it has with the world 
of emotion."3 The poet and the pai nter, as Hazlitt maintained, 
exercise 11 the powers of reason and intellect combined with nature 
and passion. They treat of the highes t categories of the human soul."4 
Imagination, without which no poet can be great, he sees 
as a facul ty which is instinctive and intuitive in operation. Unlike 
lnwhy the Arts are not Progressive?" The Round Table, 
Works, I V, 161. 
2
"0n Poetry in General," v, 15 n . 
3see above, p. 30. 
4see above, P• 39· 
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reason, it works unconsciously, and seizes the truth not of the 
external forms of objects, but of their hidden analogies. It cannot 
exist in a mind devoid of the basic constituents of the faculty of 
reason, but it can be said to transcend reason in its ability to 
grasp and portray truth, especially those truths of emotion and 
feeling: "for imagination is that po\:rer which represen·ts objects, not 
as they are, but as they are moulded according to our fancies and 
feelings."1 Thus imagination is, beyond all the other faculties of 
the mind, the most convexsant with human life; it "creates a world 
of its own; but it creates it out of existing materials"; its province 
is, to use Keats ' s uords, ttthe looking upon the Sun the Moon the Stars, 
the Earth and its contents as materials to form greater things--that 
is to sa-g ethereal things. 112 
The instinct of intuitive imagination, despite the immediacy 
with which it 6Tasps truth, is founded upon knowledge and experience . 
By an unerring power of association, it synthesises and combines 
particles of past experience and impressions of immediate sensation 
to create something new. The unity and integrity of this creation 
depend on the consistency and intensity of the impressions made on 
the mind by existing materials. Hazlitt rejected Hartley ' s modified 
Hobbesian doctrine that imagination is a passive faculty, associating 
in accordance with stable laws the particles of decaying sense; he 
1
"Schlegel on the Drama," Works, XVI, 63. 
2 Letter to Haydon, 10th-11th May, 1817. The Letters of John 
Keats, 101~-1821, ed. Hyder E. Rollins (2 vols.; C~ridge: at~h~ 
University Press, 1958), I, 143. (Hereafter cited as Rollins.) 
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sal-1 it rather as a dynamic, active, intuitive, synthesising faculty, 
which by a single combinatory but immediate effect cr eates a reality 
which is at once beautiful and utterly true, true to nature. 
It is evident that Hazli tt tries, l'Ti th the constant 
reference to "nature" in his argt!.lllent, to provide an objective norm 
for the evaluation of art , an objective basis which in many respects 
is similar to ~~d goes beyonf. that developed in the eighteenth 
century. Thus, he says that poetry is an imitation of nature, but 
he immediately qualifies this by adding that the imagination and the 
passions are a part of man ' s nature. Nature and the imagination, or 
the objective and subjective features of art, are complementary, 
"parts of one stupendous whole," and it is cha.racteris·~ic of Hazli tt 
to fuse the old with the new. His concept of poetry, as it finds 
expression in the lecture n0n Poetry in General," embraces both the 
general and the particular: 11Poetry is the universal l ant,'Uage -w·hich 
the heart holds with nature and itself," and he shows metaphorically 
how poetry fixes on the concrete universal as uell as the particular, 
for "the light of poetry is not only a di1.•ect but also a reflected 
light, that while it shews us the object, throws a sparkling radiance 
on all around it. 111 
Although many of Razlitt •s quotations on the theoretical 
aspects of art are from Horace and from Pope ' s Essay~ Criticism, 
his most frequent is "and snatch a grace beyond the reach of" art 11 --
which is characteristic of his concept of nature and natural genius . 
1
"0n Poetry in General," V, 3. 
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Like Byron, Hazlitt was able to appreciate and to esteem natura 
naturata, the "lovely texture of the visible world" in Pope ' s 
poetry; but unlike Byron, Hazlitt felt the aw~~eness of natura 
naturans, the informing principle v.dthin it. He distinguished 
between the poet "of natm:·e" and the poet "of art," and his 
distinction shm.rs not only his conception of nature as a literary 
principle, but aJfo the "universal interest" which such a principle 
arouses in the oind of a reader. 
The poet of nature is one vrho, from the elements of beauty, 
of power, and of passion in his own breast, sympathises 
with whatever is beautiful, and grand, and impassioned in 
nature 9 in its simple majesty, in its immediate appeal to 
the senses, to the thoughts and hearts of all men; so that 
the poet of nature, by the truth, and clepth9 and harmony 
of his mind, may be said to hold communion with the very 
soul of nature; to be indentif'ied 1-li th, and to foreknow, 
and to record the feelings of all men, at all times and 
places, as they are liable to the same impressions; and to 
exert the same power over the minds of his readers, that 
nature does. He sees things in their eternal beauty, for 
he sees them as they are; he feels them in their universal 
interest, for he feels them as they affect the first 
principles of his and our common nature . l 
The distinction l<Thich Hazli tt develops betlveen the poet of art and 
the poet of nature occurs frequently in his criticism. The poet Hho 
uses nature as the source of his art speaks through "eternal beauties" 
to the "universal interest" of mankind, and creates "an intuitive 
and nighty ~ympatby with whatever could enter into the heart of man 
in all possible circumstances."2 Thus Shakespeare and Milton are 
poets of nature; they had o. greater depth of insight than l·Fas usual 
1
n0n the Question \¥hether Pope was a Poet, 11 Works, XX, 90o 
211Pope, Lord Byron, and Mr . Bowles, 11 l:orks, XIX, 83 . 
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into "ruling pri nciples." These "ruling principles" of nature are 
not to be equated l'Tith Pope t s "Nature methodiz ' d." Rather, the ereat 
poet finds in nature "the storehouse of lasting truth," and he turns 
to her "inexhaustible varietyn not for "those Rules of old discovered" 
but for her "immediate appeal to the senses, to the thoughts and hearts 
of all men." 
The poet of art, however, derives his inspiration from "the 
works of man," from "those objects and feelings lihich depend for their 
subsistence and perfection on the will and arbitrary conventions of 
man and society," such as an "amber-headed snuff-box, 11 or "the n i ce 
conduct of a clouded cane."1 Fope, Hazlitt felt, trpreferred t he 
artificial to the natural in external objects, because he bad a 
stronger fello\f- feeling '\d th the self-love of the maker or proprietor 
of a ge'\-T- gaw, than admiration of that which was interesting to all 
mankind." 2 The poet of art is "the poet of personality and of 
polished life,'' the master of 11 smooth and polished verse" '\ihich 
depends for its subsistence and perfection on the arbitrary conventions 
of ~an and society. Unlike the poet of nature, the poet of art is 
seldom concerned 1.ii th na·~ural objects of an habitual and universal 
interest. 
Hazli tt felt tha·t the poets of art '\vere of a lower order 
than the poets of nature, for rrthe more our senses, O"t;.r self-love, 
our eyes and ears, are surrounded and, as it were, saturated with 
1
"Pope, Lord Byron, and Mr. :Bowles•" XIX, 74• 
2~. ' p. 83. 
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artificial · enjoyments and costly decorations, the more the avenues 
1 to the imagination and the heart are unavoidably blocked up." 
Nature is thus for Bazlitt the fundamental source of creativity and 
the permanent source of beauty. The artist is enabled, by training 
his imaginative power upon nature, to transcend the boundaries of 
art. Rather than merely holding the mirror up to nature, the great 
artist penetrates behind the mirror into the fecund source of truth, 
and recreates it in his o~m medium. The critic is able, in his 
turn, to use nature as a norm for judging the universal validity of 
the work. 
The beauty of nature i s not to be found by any process of 
rational analysis in ~rhich the imagination remains passive. Reason 
can dissect na ture, but only the imagination acting under the most 
intense impressions can reveal its hidden truths--
Every mind is not a gauge and measure of truth. Nature 
has her surface and her dark recesses . She is deep, 
obscure, and infinite. It is only minds on whom she 
makes her fullest impressione that can penetrate aer 
shrine or unveil her Holy Qi Holies . 2 
Reason always operates in a deliberate process of selection and 
rejection, and is therefore always circumscribed in its ability 
to penetrate truth. Nature's truth is not on the surface, where 
it m~ be readily seen and analysed, but in the recesses of human 
passion and .feeling. It consists in "a.n unusual vividness in 
external objects or in our immediate impressionst exciting a 
111Pope, Lord :By:ron, and I1r. :Bowles, 11 XIX, 79. 
2
•tQn Genius and Common Sense," 'rable-Talkp Works, VIII, 
46- 47· 
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movement of imagination in the mind,"1 and enabling it to grasp the 
hidden analogies beneath external forms. 
No great art 9 Hazlitt insists, is produced by a process of 
rational abstraction and consecutive logic. He professed, and Keats 
put into practice, the belief that 
the arto hold ilnmediate communication "'i th nature, and 
are only derived from that source •••• The arts may 
be said to resemble Antaeus in his $ruggle with Hercules, 
who was strangled when he \<las raised above the ground, 
and recovered his strength when he touched his mother 
earth.2 
\r/here there is no direct communication with nature, \'There logic and 
abstraction rule at the expense of imagination, there can be no 
strength of feeling; where there is no passion, there can be no 
artistic truth. 
The imagination is an associating faculty,' but the 
method of association by \'lhich it operates is not Llechanical, as 
Hobbes, Locke, and Hartley held it to be. Hazlitt is especially 
against Hartley ' s hypothesio that association is the basis of all 
mental activity: "it is an absurdity, and an express contradiction 
to suppose that associa tion is either the only mode of operation 
of the human mind, or that it is the primary and most general 
principle of thought and action. ,A A poet does not merely load the 
1! Letter !2 William Gifford, Esq . , Works, IX, 45. 
2
"Why the .Arts are not P:t'ogressive?" IV, 160. 
3n0n Reason and Imagination," ~ Plain S·peaker, \/orks, 
XII, 51. 4 !!! Essay .2ll the Princi·ples of Human Action, 12, which ~ 
added, ~Remarks .2!1 ~ ~ystems .2f Hartley and Helvetius, 
lvorks, I, 51.. Hereafter cited. as !!!, Essay . 
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rifts of his mind with the ore of fading memory and decaying sen-
sation; he does not merely rearrange his materials; he uses his 
imagination, which, although it necessarily receives its first and 
deepest impressions from the senses , unconsciously yet with intensely 
active effort fuses and "coadunates" those materials to form a ne'\'J 
creation. Fancy perhaps associates and combines sensory impressions 
wit hout re~·d t o t ruth; association in progressive logical patterns 
of demonstrable truth is t he function of reason; but imagination 
moulds into new shapes and combinations; i t· systematises and modifien, 
nidealizes a.nd unifies11 ; and simultaneously it directs its process 
to the discovery and the expression of truth--which is its true 
province , and, of course, that of poetry. 
It is 't·rorthwhile to notice the close resemblance of some 
of Hazlitt 1s ideas on imagination to those of John Fearnt an obscure 
sea-captain turned philosopher, who, according to the ~'s rather 
patronising dismissal, discussed most of the contentious philosoplrlcal 
problens of the day without contributing in any degree to their 
resolution.1 Fearn gives intuition the power of relating not only 
separate sensory impressions bu·~ also "any t 1.-10 other subjects 
2 
what ever." Re deplores the mechanistic insistence on mere sensation 
as the sole origin of ideas. Take, Fearn suggests, a plane s11rface 
1Hazlitt kne\·1 ]'earn (Works, XX, 215), and cites with 
approval on three separate occasions his Essay on Consciousness 
(London: Longman, Hurst, Rees p Orme and :Bro,m, 1811J. 
2John Fearn, First LinGs of the Human Mind (London: 
Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Bro1o1~ WO}, p. 197. Of course, 
many of these ideas '\fere fairly '\'iell established by 'Ghis time , but 
the personal relationship makes the similarity significant. 
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thickly stippled with minute dots of a particular colour. (If Fearn 
had lived a eentury later~ he could very well have instanced the 
rotogravure printing of a photograph onto newsprint.) When the 
surface is viewed from an appreciable distance, the dots will appear 
to have blended into one colour-mass 9 "yet Sense cannot Connect any 
two of these points together •••• It belongs to the faculty of 
intuition ••• to eombine all the sensible points of any sensation 
of coloux into one mass or surface."1 Intuition, the fusing principle, 
unlike simple sensation, grasps unconsciously and 'td thout voluntary 
e.f.fort the relationship betw·een a:ny given set of particulars. The 
colour-mass--or the face in the photograph- -may be said to be created 
by the intuitive ima.gina·tion, sillce the relation between the separate 
points of colour is not inherent in the points themselves, but must 
be supplied by a human agency. (Fearn's illustration is not, of 
course, entirely valid; in such instances it isp in fact, an optical 
illusion ,..,hieh produces the final effect. But once one knows, that 
a newspaper photograph is made up of minute and thinly-separated dots 
of black and grey, hov much of one •· s apprehension of the colour-mass 
as the repJ:"esentation of a face is due to illusion, and hovt much is 
due to intuition and a "willing suspension of disbelief"?) The truth 
of the new creation consists in 11 the truth of human nature"; and 
although the points of colour are necessary to the final illusion of 
surface, they are not recognisable as particulars in the total 
impression they create in the mind. It is the truth of colour which 
1Fearn, First Lines .2f. ~ IIUiilan ~' Il• 198. 
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is constituted by the total impression. 
Hazlitt not only gives the un-rational, intuitive 
imagination the ability to relate the separate points of a single 
sensation, but he also attributes to it the capacity to integrate 
and unify separate sensations into a single totality of impression. 
Tlle results of this operation are in accord with the truth of human 
nature: 
And is there no true ~~d rooted analogy between our 
different sensations, as well as a positive and 
literal identity? ••• The finest poetry, then, is 
not a paradox or a trite paraphrase; but a bold and 
happy enunciation of truths and feelings deeply 
implanted in the mind.l 
Only the imagination can grasp this analogy, since reason9 that 
disentangling end segregating faculty, is subservient to external 
reality, and therefore insists on the literal truth of separate 
sensations. 
Hazlitt admired the artistry of Claude, but thought that 
his l andscapes afforded a good illustration of the maxim that the 
truth of nature is not perceptible through the medium of a;ny single 
sense alone: 
Claude's landscapes, perfect as they are, want guso •••• 
'.flhey do not interpret one sense by another; they do not 
distinguish the character of different objects as we are 
taught 9 and can only be t aught, to distinguish them by 
their effect on the different senses . That is~ his eye 
'\<Tan ted imagination: it did not strongly sympathise "'i th 
his other faculties. He saw the atmosphere, but he did 
not feel it.2 
111Poetry , " 'Works, X..JC, 210. 
2
non Gua·co, '' fu Round Table, vlor-ks, IV, 19· 
It would appear that for Hazlitt the strength of painting or of 
poetry is in propprtion to the totality of impression created by 
the interpretation of one sense by another--by gusto. "In a word," 
he writes, "gusto in painting is where the impression made on one 
sense excites by affinity those of another.n1 Only through the 
process of modifying and coadunation, not by separation and 
abstraction, can the mind create that reality of expression which 
is the power and the truth of art. 
Thus the imagination is not, as sensation ist directed 
tol-rard the external form of objects--which u~ objects are essen-
tially fixed and dead"--but toward that vital and intense creation 
which is formed by the intuitive fusion of the several properties 
of the objects. For the imagination, as Hazlitt envisages it, 
does not disentangle the original sensory impressions while it 
retains the distinction between sense and the outline of form--
while it atomises and wilfully combines these impressions ; it 
obliterates the distinctions, reverses the Hartleyan procedure 
of association, and coadunates the impressions into a single 
creation. The objects and their impressions unite cordially 
together, are melted down in the imagination, and no particular is 
recognisable in its original forrn 
It is of the very nature of the imagination to change 
1
"0n Gusto," IV, 78. Hazlitt is not the first in this 
field; the eighteenth-century associationists had speculated on 
the nature of what we now call synaesthesia, and so did Rousseau, 
Diderot, and Coleridge. The later deliberate and somewhat forced 
confusion o£ the senses indulged by Rimbaud, Baudelaire, and 
Huysmans has a respectable pedigree. 
the order in which things have been impressed on the 
senses, and to connect the same properties with different 
objects, and different properties with the same objects; 
to combine our original impressions in all possible 
forms, and to modify these impressions themselves to a 
ver.y great degree.l 
The impressions are greatly modified because the objects in their 
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first impression on the senses 9 no matter how intense and immediate 
those impressions might be, are "fixed and dead11 without the active 
and intuitive moulding of the imagination--the "heightenings of the 
imagination." (Coleridge ' s theory coincides with Hazlitt's on this 
point, as the Table~ entry for June 23rd, 1834, bears witness; 
therep Coleridge remarks that the imagination "modifies images, and 
gives unity to variety; it sees all things in one, 11 piu ~~ 
2 
lm2•11 ) Mere association, although it too changes the order of 
sense impressions and in this way produces novelty, is unable to 
fuse these impressions into one--since fusion is an active process--
which is the very stuff of great poetry. Association cannot escape 
from the original forms of the sensory impressions which it links, 
and is therefore denied the apprehension of the "power" or "intensity" 
of impression, the creation of which is a primary object of all great 
art: 
Samuel 
1904), 
The poetry of the Bible is that of imagination and of faith: 
it is abstract and disembodied: it is not the poetry of 
form, but of power; not of multitude, but of immensity. It 
does not divide into many, but aggrandizes into one.3 
1~ Essay, I, 27. 
2
see also Lectures and Notes ~ Shakespeare • • • ~ 
Taylor Coleridge (ed.~ Ashe; London: George Bell and Sons, 
p. 220. 
""on Poetry in General," V, 16 . 
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Thus the final product of the imaginative process (although Hazlitt 
would have disputed the applicability of the word "process"), is the 
total impression made by any given phenomenon on the mind. Instead 
of dividing and disentangling the several points of sensations, or 
rearranging ·!;hem, the imagination modifies and unites them by first 
destroying the form of the original sensory impression, and then~ b;y 
intuition and immediate effort, reconstructing them into a unified 
whole . It "dissolves~ diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate.n 
The associative aspect of imagination, then, differs from 
the established precepts of association in that it modifies, moulds, 
and unifies, and also in that what it creates is true, and in its 
highest manifestation not subject to dispute or error. This truth 
springs from the inherent and unstudied agreement between the mind 
and nature, which enables the mind, through imagination~ to grasp 
nature's hidden analogies. Hazlitt agreed with Leibniz that there 
was tta germ or principle of truth, a pre-established harmony bet~1een 
its innate faculties and its acquired ideas~ implied in the essence 
of the mind itselr.n1 In other words 11 and this is an assumption of 
fundamental importance, when nature makes a sufficiently intense 
impression upon a mind endowed with a vigorous imagination9 the mind 
will intuitively and. effortlessly grasp the truth of that particular 
aspect of nature. Hazlitt defined genius as "some strong quality in 
the mind, answering to and bringing out some new and striking quality 
in nature.n2 He contended that great art, \-lhich is a product of 
1
non Locke ' s Essay on the Human Understanding, 11 Lectures~ 
English Philosop~y, Works, II, 166. 
2
n0n Genius and Common Sense,n VIII, 42. 
genius, does not consist in either a mere delineation of sense 
impressions or in abstractions of pure thoueht, divorced from 
sensation; the hidden analogies of nature, he maintained instead, 
can be grasped only by an intimate conjunction of the two mental 
processes--a conjunction confirmed and established in the imagin-
ation. "The arts," he wrote, are conversant both 
with the world of thought uithin us, and with the uorld 
of sense without us--with what '"e knou, and sec) and feel 
intimately. They fl0'\'1 from the sacred shrine of our o\m 
breasts, and are kindled at the living lamp of nature.l 
So tho imagination can create something which is not only novel 
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but unerringly true, but it can do this only by the most vital and 
intimate union of man's "innate faculties" and his "acquired ideas," 
and then only when both agents are operating with extraordinary 
2 intensity. Imagination is a systematising faculty, and in 
creating unity out of variety, it shapes the sensory impressions 
to fit the "germ or principle of truth" inherent in the mind itself. 
"The imagination gives out what it has first absorbed by congeniality 
of temperament, what it has attracted and moulded into itself by 
elective affinity, as the loadstone draws and impregnates iron."3 
For the imagination is not only capable of drawing affinities from 
natural objects, but it also impregnates them with its own being. 
The process depends, in short, on an intimate interplay of the 
principles of external nature agreeing with and conforming to the 
1n-~.;hy the Arts are not Progressive?rr IV, 162. 
2
"0n Reason and Imagination1 11 XII, 51 .. 
3uon Genius and Common Sense," VIII, 47. 
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"moulds" of tru.th inherent in the mind. 
Thus, in Razlitt•s view, although the synthesising and 
creative imagination obtains its materials in the intense and force-
ful sensory impressions of external objects~ its validity resides 
ultimately in the nature of the human mind. vlhile he rejected the 
Kantian philosophy (there is no evidence to show that he really 
understood it) after reading Willich 's translation, IIazlitt never-
theless took over Ka.nt•s dictum, "the mind alone is formative," and 
wove it into the fabric of' his own. Simple sense j~pressions merely 
re:peat and imitate the nexternalityn of objects, but the understanding, 
that faculty of' umultiplying, varying, extending, combining, and 
1 
comparing," can form something new from the impressions~ The 
imagination is also formative , and goes further than the understanding: 
it does not only invent~ but it can "invent according .12 nature,"2 
a nature nseen through the medium of passion .. • • not diverted of 
that medium by mea..lts of li terel truth or abstract reason. u3 F..azli tt 
holds t hat it is the strength of human passion which vitalises objects 
inherently fixed and dead~ and which can grasp nattlre's hidden anal-
ogies. Imagination is the most human of all forms of mental activity, 
since it alone can perceive and then express in poetry the essential 
truth of human feeling. Poetry, the "eloquence of the ims.gination," 
1
.!;! Essay, I, 20. And see 11Madame De Stae!ts Account of 
German Philosophy," Works, XX, 21 9 and Sclmeider, !h£ Aesthetics .2.£ 
William Razlitt, p. 24. 
2
u:Mx. Kean's Macbeth 11 A View· of the English Stage, Horks .. 
' - - - - = .. -== .............. _ .... , 
7. 
.Ju0n Poetry in General," V, 8. 
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is "a fanciful structure; but a structure raised on the groundwork 
1 
o£ the strongest and most intimate association of our ideas"; and 
it is rooted in the very marrow of man's thoughts and feelings. 
Impassioned poetry, the highest eloquence of all the truths per-
ceived, synthesised, and recreated in the alembic of the intuitive 
"instinct of imagination," is "an emanation of the moral and in-
tellectual parts of our nature, as well as of the sensitive--of the 
2 desire to know, the will to actp and the power to feel." It is in 
this sense that Hazlitt contends that whoever has a conteupt for 
poetry, has a contempt for himself and for humanity. 
111 Poetry, 11 XX, 211. 
2non Poetry in General," V, 6. 
CHAPTER III 
Hazlittts first published work was ~ Essay ~ ~ 
Pxinciples ~ Human Action, which appeared in 1805. A dry, repet-
itious discussion of an ethical problem over which he had cudgel-
led his brains since his student days at the Unitarian College in 
Hackney9 the volume• in tho face of widesp~ead public indifference, 
fell "still-born from the press."1 To the end of his life, how-
ever, Hazlitt remained proud of this tortuously-written book, 
'> 
counting it the nost importo.nt of his writings;'" the "original 
discovery" which he announced in it he returned to ancl repeated 
~eny times, 3 and he made the theory propounded in it the 
foundation on which his subsequent literary, political, and e·thical 
opinions were to rest . 
An attempt to refute the ethical principles established 
by those materialist philosophers who supposed mankind to act only 
in obedience to the dictates of innate self- love, the Essay presents 
Razlitt •s earliest and most revealing definition of the sympathetic 
1
"0n the Causes of Popular Opinion," Works, XVII, 312. 
2 11A Reply to Z," \'lorks, IX, 3. 
3see ~· the Preface to his abridgement of Tucker, 1807; 
"On Sel.f-Love" in the Lectures .Q!! English Philosophy, 1812; "A Letter 
to William Gifford, Esq. 9 " 1819; "On Self-Love and Benevolence," 1828. 
The "discovery" is examined vri th reference to Hazli tt ' s theory of 
tragedy in the next chapter. 
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function of the imagination.1 Denying the primacy of the principle 
of self-love 9 Hazlitt contends both that the imagination is a.n 
«efficient and operativen principle of action, 2 and that benevolent 
affections are just as inherent in man ' s constitution as is any bent 
of self-love, while~ if the tru·~h 1-1ere knmm, selfishness loJOUld be 
recognised as the product of habit. 3 In the Essay~ the intuitive 
and synthetic instinct of imagination appears as a faculty which is 
capable of grasping knm<Iledge and truth ·by annihilating the limit-
ations imposed on the individual by the bonds of personal identity, 
and by simultaneously projecting itself into whatever is external to 
it. Keats ' s statement ·to Bailey7 "if a Sparrow come before my 
Windolv I take part in its existince and pick about the G:ravel, ,A is 
one of the most vivid expressions of that poet ' s theory of negative 
capability, vThich is almost identical to Hazli tt 1 s theory of the 
sympathetic imagination. The latter's .insistence on the mind ' s 
capacity for active participation in what is outside its sensuous 
limitations empl1asises what is not only the basis of his ethical 
doctrine but also the substance of his concep·tion of poetic genius 9 
1Herschel Baker s hows how the Essay reflects Hazlittts 
solidly-rooted position in the English tradition of Dissent, and he 
also clarifies its embodiment of Hazlitt ' s radical and optimistic 
attitude to political reform--William Hazlitt (Cambridge9 Mass . : 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 139-152o 
See also VI, P. Albrechtts "Hazlitt t s Principles££. Human Action and 
the I mprovement of Society, n in ll .El: ~ ~: Testament 12, 
Percival ~' ed. A. L. Starrett (Pittsbllrgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1948). 
2 
_!!! Essay, I~ 22. 
'l. 
.Jibid., p. 12. 
-
4Rollins, I, 186. 
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and explains much o£ his influence on Keats* 
Debates on benevolence, on the belief that man could and 
should be moved to good works by natural sympathy with and love for 
1 
man, were common in the eighteenth century. In opposition to those 
trModern Projectors," as Shaftesbury called them, nwho would new 
frame the Human Heart; and have a mighty fancy to reduce all its 
Motions, Balancesp and Weights to that one Principle and Fou~dation 
2 
o£ a cool and deliberate Selfisr..ness,n eighteenth-century thinkers 
often posited the necessary existence of true benevolence in man ' s 
nature. The vie\v that it existed as a reflection of God's beneficence 
and mercy innate in man, and that it was thus mans s grea·test virtue 
while self-love was the root of all vice~ deeply influenced the 
'tvriters of the early nineteenth century, but liazlitt uas especially 
stimulated by the points nade by Butler, and~ to a smaller degree, 
by Shaftesbury. The latter maintained9 according to his disciple 
Charles :Bulkley: that 
not only the benevolent affections • • • are deeply 
inplented in our natures; but they are likewise 
pointed out by a principle of moral approbation 
equally essential to the human mind as the first in 
1
see Fieldingts comments in Tom Jones 9 Bk .. VI 11 ch. 1, and 
Bk, XIII, ch. 5; Amelia, Bk. III, ch. 5; Champion, Dec~ llth9 1739; 
~Patriot, Nov~ 26tht 1745· The debates are carried on in the 
pages of--to mention a fe'\•T of the better knmm--Barrow, King, Adan 
Smith, Stewart, Hume, Beattie, Kames, Alison and Reid, and against 
them, on tha Hobbesia11 side, Mandeville~ Rochefoucauld, Condillac 9 
Helvetius~ et al. 
~Anthony Ashley Cooperv 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury~ 
Characteristicks ••• (London: nop., 1743) 1 Bk. II, pt. 3, sec. 3, 
p. 116. 
";! 
.J [Charles Bulkley] 9 ! Vinuication .2£ & 1.2E Shaftesbury 
(London: n.p., 1751), P• 52. 
worth and excellence, and as those to which all other 
passions and affections are to be made subservient. 
This principle of moral approbation, or, as Shaftesbury termed it, 
this innate "moral sense,tt is essentially intuitive in operation, 
and it infallibly directs one to concern for the public good, while 
"to be well affected," Shaftesbury categorically states, utowards 
the Public Interest and one ' s ownt is not only consistent but 
inseparable . "1 Butler in turn enlarged on Shaftesbury ' s ideas, 
giving to intuition far greater authority and attributing to it a 
more pervasive influence on human action than the latter had ventured 
to ascribe to the "moral sense . " Nonetheless, both Butler and 
Shaftesbury concluded that "Duty and Interest are perfectly coin-
cident . "2 
Hazlitt was well acquainted vTith Butler ' s Analogy, which 
he had read when a boy, and he 1-1as introduced to the Sermons, the 
fullest exposition of Butler' s ethical position, by Coleridge in 
1798.3 Two years before his death, Hazlitt acknowledged that Butler 
1Characteristicks, Bk. II, pt. I, sec . 8, p. 81. 
Shaftesbury ' s followers, with immense significance for the trend of 
Romantic writing, understood the moral sense to imply a measure of 
feeling; the already growing tendency to refer in matters of aesthetic 
judgment to a criterion including emotion thus received a strong and 
respectable impetus from the authority (however broadly interpreted) 
of benevolist and empirical philosophy. 
2~ Works£.£ Joseph Butl er, D.C.L., ed . \l .E. Gladstone 
( 2 vols.; Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1696), II, 76. (Sermon III.) 
C£. Sermon I, pp . 35 ff. 
3My First Acquaintance with Poets' II vlorks' XVII' 113. 
Baker, in his biography (p. 144 n.), suggests that as rmzlitt had 
£ormulated his theory by the time he read the sermons, Butler ' s ideas 
had no influence on it. He overlooks the fact that "On Personal Iden-
tity," subjoined to the Analogy, is a condensation of the central 
problem treated in the first three sermons. 
66 
had been the first to produce a satisfactory rebut tal to the case 
t d b th t . . t 1 presen e y e sensa ~on~s s; Hazlitt's "original discovery," 
the basis for his own theory of benevolence, is founded on exactly 
the same grounds. In the essay "On Personal Identity," appended to 
the Analogy~ Butler had asserted that as man ' s existence is corp-
oreally and actually confined to the present moment, and that iden-
tity as such in any future moment is actually non-existent, man can 
necessarily have no more interest in his own future identity than in 
the future identity of another--
If the self or person of today, and that of tomorrm'i? 
are not the same, but only like persons; the person of 
today is really no more interested in what will befall 
the person of tomorrow, than in what will befall any 
other person.2 
Therefore the very nature of personal identity does not admit self-
love to be the sole principle of human action. Bazlitt takes over 
this theme, and proceeds to insist that imagination is not only 
the basis of all voluntary action, but that it is the cornerstone 
of all morality. 
Hazlitt visualises personal identity as being rooted in 
two faculties, neither of which is operative in the future: in 
sensation, or rather consciousness, and in memory. 3 The phenomenon 
of personality, he suggests, is nnothing more than conscious 
individuality11 ;4 it is "the power of perceiving that you are and 
1non Self-Love and l3enevolence, 11 XX, 162. 
2 
:Butler, Works, I, 393 a 
3~ Essay~ I, 38. 
4Ibid., P• 36. 
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what you are from the immediate reflection of the mind on itfs Olm 
operations, sensations, or ideas. It cannot be affected in the same 
direct manner by the impression3 and ideas existing in the minds of 
others.111 Thus the individual, as the subject of his O\'Tn conscious-
ness, feels himself to be dissociated from ,,hatever is external to 
him. Furthermore, this state of consciousness can be a ttained only 
through the media of sensation and memory, uhich relate only to the 
present and to the pas·t. a11d thus, Hazli tt reasons, personal identity 
cannot relate to the future: 
Suppose a number of men employed to cast a mound into 
the sea. As far as it has gone 11 the \oiorkmen pasa back-
'\ttards and f'oruards on it, it s·l;ands firm in it ' s place, 
and though it recedes farther and farther from the shore, 
i t is still joined to it. A man' s personal identity and 
self-interest have just the same principle and extent, 
and can reach no farther than his actual existence.2 
It is obvious, to go further, that 11 all action under·iiaken with a 
view to produce a certain event or the contrary, nust relate to 
the future, 113 and not only is the future the only subject for 
action, but clearl y it is unreal, or ideal: 
The primary, essential motive of the v·olition of any-
·thing must be the ~ of that thingt and the idea 
solely. For the thing itself, which is the object of 
desire and pursuit, is by the supposition a nonentity. 
It is willed for that very reason, that it is supposed 
not to exiat.4 
Our own future, therefore, is no less unreal than that of another ' s, 
and our interest in it inherently no more aoute.5 All action, 
I, 36. 2Ibid ., P• 40 n. 1!!:! Essay 9 
3uA Letter 
4Ibid. 
to 'vfilliam Gifford, Esq., 11 Uorks, IX, 54 . 
5"0n Self-Love," II, 232. 
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Hazlitt argues, following the theory of the moral sense propounded 
1 by Shaftesbury, is directed toward what is good , and 
there is naturallx no essential difference between the 
moti v-ee by which I am impelled to the pursuit of my O\ffi 
good and those by which I am impelled to seek the good 
of others.2 
If we accept the proposition that the imagination is the only 
efficient and operative cause of action, it follows that the 
limitations of personality or identity can be transcended only by 
that faculty, '1-thich, . liazli tt hcl ds, by a projection of itself into 
the future discovers the personal good uhich is the subject for 
action. An impor·tant corolla:cy to Hazli tt 1 s basic theme is his 
contention that the imagination is able also to project itself into 
the identity of' another individual or object, just as easily and 
efficiently as it can throw itself fon1ard into the ideal future; 
both future and external object are equally ideal to the ima3ination. 
The same faculty, then, which enables a person ·to "throw himself 
forward into the future, to anticipate unreal events, anc to be 
affected by his own imaginary interest," also makes him capable 
"in a greater or less degree of entering into the feelings and 
interests of others."3 
llazlitt thus considers imagination to be the only faculty 
by uhich we can truly knot-r other people and other things. Just as 
our sympathy "is always directly excited in proportion to our 
1An Essay, I, 12. 
2Ibid . , p . 42 . My italics. 
3rb ·, 
-!Q.• ' P • 21. 
knowledge of the pain, and of the dispositions and feelings of the 
su£ferer, u1 so the only perception which another can have of a 
similar s tate of feeling in me is by means of the imagination. 2 If 
this intuitive instinct of imagination is operative to such a degree 
that it not only can identify itself ,.,.i th the sensations and the 
sufferings of others, but can make the mind a conscious repetition 
of these feelings, then "all proper personal distinction would be 
lost either in pure self-love, or in perfect universal sympathy."3 
Shelley was, of course, invoking this belief--almost a Romantic 
slogan--'\lhen he insisted that "a man, to be greatl y good, must 
imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the 
place of another and of many others; the pains and pleasures of his 
species must become his owno 114 The most intense imaginative 
identification, the most complete annihilation of personal identity, 
is a characteristic of the heroic, says Hazlitt, in any sphere of 
activity: 
To play the hero, it is only necessary to be wound up 
to such an unavoidable interest in any thing, as 
reflection, p:rudence, natural i nstinct, have no pol'ler 
over. To be a hero, is, in other words, to lose the 
sense of our personal identity in some object dearer 
to us than ourselves.5 
Hazlitt, it is clear9 holds that true greatness is a product of active 
1~~ Essay, I, 23. 
2r·· · d 3° 
......!?.:!... • ' p • / • 
.?Ibid., P• 38 . 
4see above, p. 29. 
5"Guy ~'aux," \:orks, XX, 104. This is not, of course, 
Hazlitt •s last word on the subject of heroist. . ~ee chapters VI and 
VII for a discussion ot' his conception o.i' the tragic hero. 
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effort by the intuitive imagination, making itself the "conscious 
repetition" of the ideas and feelings of another--not the result of 
a reasonable reflection on values and consequences, not the reward 
of rational prudence. The sympathetic imagination enables the 
individual truly to know the essential character and feelings of 
the other before him, to recreate them within himself; "proper 
personal distinctiontt is obliterated, and, since all voluntary action 
relates to the future and is directed by the moral sense toward the 
good, the individual's actions concerning the other will be morally 
impeccable--if the identification is complete. 
For Hazlitt, greatness in art as well as in morality consists 
in the intense annihilation of personal identity, and the subsequent 
identification of the artist with his subject. Perhaps, he felt, in 
weighing the claims to immortality of the long procession of English 
and French writers of the first rank, perhaps Shakespeare alone had 
this faculty to an extraordinary degree. 1 The great majority of 
artists fail to reach the heights, since it is rarely that a man 
"even of lofty genius will be able to do more than carry on his own 
feelings and character, or some prominent and ruling passion, into 
fictitious and uncommon situations. 112 The superlative quality of 
1
"0n Genius and Common Sense,u Table-~, Works, VIII, 42. 
2Ibid. Compare Coleridge ' s statement that 11it is easy to 
cloathe Imaginary Beings with our own Thoughts & Feelings; but to 
send ourselves out of ourselves, to think ourselves in to the Thoughts 
and feelings of Beings in circumstances wholly & strangely different 
from our own I hoc labor, hoc opus I and who has atchieved it? Perhaps 
only Shakespere. 11 Letter to William Sotheby, 13th July, 1802. Collec-
~ Letters ~ Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Earl Leslie Griggs ( 4 
vols.; Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1956), II, 810. 
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Shakespeare's "instinct of imagination" placed him in the forefront 
of those who had what He.zlitt calls "gusto"--a rare and profound 
e~citation of the imagination, emotional in character, by which in 
its identifying process it is stimulated to apprehend the dynamic 
character of the object, and to express that character in a vivid 
emotional equivalent. The process is not a cloaking of the object 
with the artist ' s feelings, a half-controlled overflow of natural 
sensibility; it is not a projection of the artist's feelings into 
the object which has aroused them, an empathic response; it is 
rather intuition, through sympathy, of the dynamic, informing 
essence of the external object, and is therefore an objective 
process. In grasping the character of the object, the imagination 
grasps a form of truth; in a state of vital and intense sympathetic 
emotion, or gusto, the imagination is able to fuse and quicken into 
a new creation the different sensory and emotional aspects of the 
object. When the artist has gusto, when his imagination ' s fusing 
power comes into play through sympathetic excitement, then all the 
artist ' s senses will be brought into operation--they will receive 
and modify the various sense-impressions of the object, and they 
will involuntarily augment each other, producing such imagery as 
Keats ' s "His soul shall taste~ sadness of her might," or 
I cannot see what flowers are at my feet, 
Nor what ~ incense hangs upon the boughs, 
But, in embalmed darkness, guess each sweet • • • 
In Hazlitt's opinion, Raphael and Titian had gusto, but Claude, 
Vandyke, and West did not; the sculptors of the Elgin Marbles 
had it, but the later Graeco-Romans, as we have seen, did not• 
There is a gusto in the colouring of Titian. Not only do 
his heads seem to think--his bodies seem to feel. This 
is what the Italians mean by the morbidezza of his flesh-
colour. It seems sensitive and alive all over; not merely 
to have the look and texture of flesh, but the feeling in 
itself •••• The gusto in the Greek statues is of a very 
singular kind. The sense of perfect form nearly occupies 
the whole mind, and hardly suffers it to dwell on any 
other feeling. It seems enough for them 1£ ~' without 
acting or suffering. Their forms are ideal, spiritual. 
Their beauty is power. By their beauty they are raised 
above the frailties of pain or passion; by their beauty 
they are deified.l 
72 
In other words, gusto in art "is power or passion in defining any 
object; • • • there is hardly any object entirely devoid of express-
ion," says Hazlitt, 
without some character of power belonging to it, some 
precise association with pleasure or pain: and · it is in 
giving this truth of character from the truth of feeling, 
whether in the highest or the lowest degree, but always 
in the highest degree of which the subject is capable, 
that gusto consists.2 
Thus gusto is both a characteristic of the products of intense feeling, 
and also the intense feeling itself which characterises the creative 
power of the greatest artists. It is an inherent quality, enabling 
the man to concentrate his powers on a given subject and to drain its 
essence into telling expression. Through gusto, the artist is able 
to provide the truth of character of his subject from the intensity 
of his own feeling. In this way his work will reflect a universal 
tteternal character,n a living principle, since he will not only have 
caught with inimitable precision the character of the object (which 
is a concrete and particular point in the wider scheme of nature), 
111 0n Gusto," lli Round Table, Works, IV, 77-79· 
2Ibid., P• 77• 
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but also whatever has aroused his feelings will affect mankind in 
general. 
Gusto, then, has in Hazlitt ' s critical writing a two-fold 
application: it characterises both the intensity of the artist ' s 
feeling, and the object the truth of which the artist has intuitively 
expressed. Great art for Hazlitt is the combination of object and 
feeling, a balance bareen the artist ' s "power and passion" and the 
object ' s internal character. Milton, Hazlitt wrote, had great 
gusto. "He repeats his blows twice; grapples with and exhausts his 
subject. His imagination has a double relish of its objects, an 
inveterate attachment to the things he describes, and to the words 
describing them. 
-- ' Or where Chineses drive 
With sails and wind their m waggons light. ' t,l 
It should be noticed that Hazlitt expressly avoids the equation of 
gusto's validity with the power of natural sentiment: he never 
confuses a trust in the power of the imagination with a trust in 
"natural feeling," that sentimentality which characterises a great 
deal of the popular literature of the late eighteenth and early 
. 2 
nineteenth centur1es . What he termed gusto does not include the 
maxim that "feeling is all," that the end of art (as some of those 
who came after Goethe considered it) is self-expression; he would 
1110n Gustot" IV, 79-80. 
2cr. "On the Character of Rousseau, 11 ~Round Table, \IJorks, 
IV, 88-89, 92; 11Mr. Southey," lli Spirit of lli ~' Works, XI, 80; 
'Mr. Wordsworth, 11 1J21.!!., p. 87; "On the Living Poets," Lectures .2.!1 
~English Poets, Works, V, 162; "Sismondi's Literature of the 
South," \'lorks, XVI, )5· 
) 
( 
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have denied the possibility of the production of great art by any 
artist who carried self-expression to the extreme, typical perhaps 
of nineteenth-century ~-~-siecle writing, in which artistic 
creation is justified and judged on the grounds that it provides a 
cathartic release for the artist. The artist who, in Hazlitt•s view, 
"carries on his own feelings and character" into the work of art and 
is unable to produce an objective emotional equivalent for the 
object he tries to define, generates what Eliot a century later was 
to call a udissociation of sensibility'' in that workz the proper 
equilibrium between subject and object, and between emotion and sen-
sation, will have been destroyed. The writer who presents only what 
he feels diminishes the internal character, the ''living principle'' 
of the object, and therefore detracts from the universality of his 
work. Without imagination and gusto, feeling is circumscribed with-
in the individual. With gusto, imaginations highest form in the 
sphere of art, the bounds of personal identity are obliterated, and 
feeling is carried out of the self by the imagination, which fastens 
onto the essence of the object and empowers the artist intuitively 
to recognise that essence and to express it. It is on these grounds 
that Hazlitt took issue with Mme. de Stael's judgment of Rousseau: 
"Je crois que 1 1 imagination etoit la premi~re de see facultes, et 
qu ' elle absorboit meme toutes les autres.u1 This opinion, Ilazlitt 
remarked, was "radically wron~.n The only quality which Rousseau 
had possessed in an eminent degree, which "raised him above ordinary 
1Quoted by Hazlitt in the Round Table essay "On the Char-
acter of Rousseau,'' Works, IV, 88 n. 
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man, and which gave to his writings and opinions an influence greater, 
perhaps, than has been exerted by any individual in modern times, was 
an extreme sensibility •••• He had the most intense consciousness 
o£ his own existence. 111 For Rousseau, Hazlitt believed, feeling had 
certainly been all; he had been a great writer, but he could never 
"play the hero." 
Hazlitt's praise of Shakespeare rests on his conclusion 
that Shakespeare expressed himself only as the medium of the thougtls 
and feelings of others--he had no personal identity, no self-in~est, 
and his concern was only with the identity of the object of his 
~ediate attention: 
The striking peculiarity of Shakespear's mind was ita 
generic quality, ita power of communication with all 
other minds--so that it contained a universe of thought 
and feeling within itself, and had no peculiar bias, or 
exclusive excellence more than another • • •• He was the 
least of an egotist that it was possible to be •••• 
He had not only in himself the germs of every faculty 
and feeling, but he could foDow them by anticipation, 
intuitively •••• He had only to think of any thing, 
in order to become that thing, with all the circum-
stances belonging to it.2 
A more vividly-detailed consideration of the same opinion is that of 
Keats, who had been attending Hazlitt's Lectures on the English Poets 
in January 1818; as Walter Jackson Bate has pointed out, 3 the influence 
of Hazlitt'a doctrine of the poetical character had crystallised out 
1n0n the Character of Rousseau,'' IV, 88. 
2t10n Shakespear and Mil ton," Lectures .2!! ~ English Poets, 
Works, V, 46-47· 
3rn his Negative Capability: ~ Intu;tive Approach in Keats 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939), pp. 28-33· 
for Hazlitt•s prot~g~ by the following autumnt as his letter of 
October 27th to \ofoodhouse showsa 
As to the poetical Character itself, (I mean that sort 
of which, if I am any thing, I am a Member; that sort 
distinguished from the wordsworthian or egotistical 
sublimeJ which is a thing per se and stands alone) it 
is not itself--it has no self--it is every thing and 
nothing--It has no character--it enjoys light and shade; 
it lives in gusto, be it foul or fair, high or low, rich 
or poor, mean or elevated--It has as much delight in 
conceiving an Iago as an Imogen.l What shocks the virtuous 
philosoper, delights the camelion Poet.2 It does no harm 
from its relish of the dark side of things any more than 
from its taste for the bright one; because they both end 
in speculation. A Poet is the most unpoetical of any thing 
in existence; because he has no Identity--he is contin-
ually in for--and filling some other Body--The Sun, the 
Moon, the Sea and Men and Woaen who are creatures of 
impulse are poetical and have about them an unchangeable 
attribute--the poet has none; no identity--he is certainly 
the most unpoetical of all God's Creatures •••• It is a 
wretched thing to confess; but is a very fact that not one 
word I ever utter can be taken for granted as an opinion 
growing out of my identical nature--how can it, when I 
have no nature? \{hen I am in a room with People if I ever 
am free from speculating on creations of my own brain, 
then not myself goes home to myself: but the identity of 
every one in the room begins to to press upon me that, I 
am in a very little time annihilated--not only among Men; 
it would be the same in a Nursery of children.3 
For Hazlitt, as for Keats, the poetical character is not intent 
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1cr. Hazlitt•s remark that "there was no respect of 
persons with Shakespeare • His genius shone equally on the evil 
and the good." ("On Shakespear and Milton," V, 47.) 
2
cf. 11 0n Genius and Common Sense," VIII, 42:~hakespeare 
was a man with] a perfect sympathy with all things, yet alike in-
different to all: who did not tamper with nature or warp her to 
his own purposes •••• Genius in ordinary ••• is just the 
reverse of the cameleonJ for it does not borrow, but lend its 
colour to all about it." 
3Rollins, I, 386-387 . Woo~house ' s comments on this 
letter, expressed in a note to Taylor, are also illuminating: "I 
believe him to be right with regard to his own poetical character--
and I perceive clearly the distinction he draws between himself 
and those of the Wordsworth School •••• The highest order of 
11 
upon itself but on its subject; it does not attempt to present its 
own peculiar· identity, but makes the mind the "conscious repetition11 
of the identities of others. 
Poetry of sentiment, the poetzy written by men who, like 
Rousseau, are able to carry only their own feelings and character 
into fictitious and uncommon situations, may be termed poetry£! 
identity, since its excellence depends upon the greatness of the 
poet's personality, on the stature of his ~conscious individuality"; 
if his feelings and character or hie passions are sufficiently 
pronounced and interesting, he may become a great poet, but he can 
never "play the hero." Hazlitt considered that Wordsworth had a full 
measure of poetic genius, but that it was inferior to Shakespeare's: 
Mr. Wordsworth • • • is the greatest, that is, the most 
original poet of the present day, only because he is the 
greatest egotist •••• Whatever does not relate exclusively 
and wholly to himself, is foreign to his views . He 
contemplates a whole-length figure of himself, he looks 
Poet will not only possess all the above powers but will have as 
hit) l an ima.~ that he ''fill be able to throw his o-vm soul into any 
object he sees or imagines, s~ as to feel be sensible of, & express, 
all that the object itself wo see feel be sensible of or express--
& he will speak out of that object--so that hie own self will with 
the Exception of the Mechanical part be 'annihilated.'--and it is the 
excess of this power that I suppose Keats to speaks, when he says he 
has no identity •••• Shakspr was a poet of the kind above mentd __ 
and he 1ias perhaps the only one besides Keats who possessed -this power 
in an extrY degree ••• Let us pursue Speculation on these I>fatters: & 
we shall soon be brot to believe in the truth of every Syllable of 
Keats 1 s letter, taken as a description of himself & his own Ideas and 
feelgs. • • • He has affirmed that he can conceive of a billiard Ball 
that it may have a sense of delight from its ol~ roundness, smoothness 
volubility. & the rapidity of its motion. 11 Rollins, I, 388-389. 
Coleridge, too, believed that the poetical character in its 
highest manifestation was an intuitive , self-annihilating faculty. 
Characteristically, he announced that he had from his youth been 
training his imagination by practising projective sympathy. See 
Bioe;raphia Epistolaris, ed. A. Turnbull (2 vole.; London: George Bell 
and Sons, 1911), II, 153-154· 
along the unbroken line of his personal identity ••• 
his genius is the effect of his individual character.l 
Wordsworth's genius, then, is that of the egotistical sublime--
78 
it is the highest perfection of the poetry of identity. Hazlitt 
held that, in general, the strength and consistency of the 
imagination ( 11 the power of carrying on a given feeling into other 
situations, which must be done best according to the hold which the 
feeling itself has taken of the mind"2 ) was in proportion to the 
strength and depth of feeling. He defined genius, "or originality, 11 
as "some strong quality in the mind, answering to and bringing out 
some new and striking quality in nature,"3 and asserted that the 
"teat and triumph of originality11 was 
not to shew us what has never been • • • but to point 
out to us what is before our eyes and under our feet, 
though we have had no suspicion of its existence, for 
want of sufficient strength of intuition, of determined 
grasp of mind to seize and retain it.4 
Wordsworth's genius and originality, however, consisted in drawing 
the outgoings of his own heart, the shapings of his own 
fancy •••• An intense intellectual egotism swallows up 
every thing •••• The power of his mind preys upon itself. 
It is as if there were nothing but himself and the universe. 
He lives in the bus~ solitude of his own heart; in the deep 
silence of thought.) 
For this reason, Hazlitt felt, Wordsworth had only genius in 
ordinary, which is inferior to true imaginative genius; a more 
obstinate and less versatile gift, it is "exclusive and self-willed, 
1non Genius and Common Sense, 11 VIII, 44. 
2Ibid., p. 42. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid., P• 43· 
5
"Character of Mr. Wordsworth's New Poem, The Excursion," 
Works, XIX, 10-11. 
19 
quaint and peculiar ••• it excels in some one pursuit by being 
blind to all excellence but its own."1 Hazlitt was driven to 
conjecture that Wordsworth had "a repugnance to admit anything 
that tells for itself, without the interpretation of the poet, . . . 
a systematic unwillingness to share the palm with his subject. 112 
Considering as he did that the only feelings Wordsworth knew were 
his own, and the only emotions the "outgoings of his own heart," 
Hazlitt must certainly have remarked with satisfaction how 
Wordsworth's definition of poetry--"the spontaneous overflow of 
powerful feelings; it takes its origin from emotion recollected in 
tranquillity"--seemed to echo his own characterisation of the 
future Laureate's style. 
In contrast, Shakespeare, who 11by an art like that of 
the ventriloquist" throws himself out of himself, obliterates his 
own identity, and so merges himself in the identity of others that 
. 
his ideas seem to be but the "mere conscious repetitions" of their 
most intimate and deeply-felt emotions. nHe appears to have been 
all the characters, and in all the situations he describes. It is 
as if either he had had all their feelings, or had lent them all 
hie genius to express themselves."3 The magnitude of his genius 
is the more remarkable when we realise that each of Shakespeare ' s 
characters "is as much itself, and as absolutely independent of the 
rest, as if they were living persons, not fictions of the mind."4 
1
"0n Genius and Common Sense," VIII, 42-43· 
2
"Character of ••• The Excursion," XIX, 12-13. 
3"Henry IV," Characters .2£ Shakespear's Plays, Works, IV, 284. 
4nschlegel on the Drama," Works, XVI, 91. 
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Dy refusing to obtrude his own identity onto the scene, Shakespeare 
avoided mere description of emotions; he expressed them as vividly 
and with the same intensity as they are encountered in nature. His 
genius consisted in "the faculty of transforming himself at will 
into whatever he chose: his originality was the power of seeing 
every object from the exact point of view in which others would see 
it."1 This genius and power enabled him to express phenomena which 
lesser poets and men of lese intense feeling could only explain or 
2 judbe in the light of their own reflections on the subject. 
From one point of view, therefore, Shakespeare was of all 
poets the most amoral, since he was endowed with the most powerful 
imagination, and, as Keats said, it is in the nature of the poetical 
character to delight equally in conceiving lagos and Imogene. For 
Shakespeare was "a man of genius, raised above the definition of 
genius";:5 he "did not tamper with nature or warp her to his own 
purposes." He had no didactic aim in writing his plays; he was 
content to leave the moralising to hie audiences and readers, and to 
apply himself only to the expression of what really exists in nature--
"he had 'a mind reflecting ages past, • and present:--all the people 
that ever lived are there. There was no respect of persons with him. 
His genius shone equally on the evil and on the good, on the wise 
and the foolish."4 All was in his mind as it was in nature; there 
1
"0n Genius and Common Sense," VIII, 42. 
2Cf'. "Othello," "Henry VI," "The Merry Wives of Windsor," 
Characters .Q£ Shakespear ' a Plays, Works, IV, 200-201, 293, 351; 
"Mr. Kean's Macbeth," !~srflli. Enblish Stage, Works, V, 204. 
3"0n Genius and Common Sense," VIII, 42. 
4"0n Shakespear and Milton," V, 47. 
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was no destructive obtrusion of personal identity. 
This "generic11 quality of Shakespeare's imagination is 
enough to distinguish his poetry from Wordsworth 's and almost every-
one else's--from the poetry of all those ~ho are unwilling or unable 
to share the palm .... rith their subjects. Shakespeare's mind was guided 
by the dictates of an extraordinary power of imagination, and in his 
practice his full attention was elicited by his subjects, and not by 
any impressive "interpretations" which his reason might have form-
ulated.1 
1Hazlitt :felt that Otway, though he had "warmth of genius, 11 
nevertheless 11 i ndulged his mere sensibility too much, yielding to the 
immediate impression or emotion excited in his own mind, and not 
placing himself in the minds and situations of others." ("On the 
Spirit of Ancient and Modern Literature,n Works, VI, 355.) Beaumont 
and Fletcher, too, "with all their prodigious merits ••• thought 
leas o:f their subject, and more of themselves •••• [ They] were the 
first who made a play-thing of it, or a convenient vehicle for the 
display of their own powers." ("On Beaumont and Fletcher, Ben Jonson, 
Ford, and Massinger," VI, 248.) 
Keats's letter to Reynolds, dated February 3rd, 1818, shows 
clear evidence of the poet's appreciation of this point, which 
Hazlitt had recently made in the third of the Lectures on the English 
Poets--a course at which Keats had been an enthusiastic member of the 
audience. He writes 11It may be said that we ought to read :from our 
Contemporaries. that Wordsworth &c should have their due from us. but 
for the sake of a few :fine imaginative or domestic passages, are we 
to be bullied into a certain Philosophy enBendered in the whims of 
an Egotist." Rollins, I, 223. 
While he ackno1-rledged that Hordsworth was a great poet, 
and the founder not only o:f a new school but also of a new genre of 
poetry (Hazlitt does not connect poems like The Excursion with the 
fairly long tradition of confessional poetry;:-Hazlitt was positive 
and immovable in his insistence that Wordsworth held the mirror of 
poetry not up to nature but up to himself, and that this was the 
over-riding weakness of his work. "Vanity," he wrote, "and 
imagination are two incompatible qualities." ("Travelling Abroad," 
Works, XVII, 338. And see "On Genius and Common Sense,", VIII, 45.) 
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Shakespeare's imagination owes its pre-eminence to its 
consummate ability to seize and express poetic truth. Poetry, 
Hazlitt said, is the language of the imagination, and its proper 
scope is the expression of those truths which imagination grasps. 
Just as the imagination differs in its operations from reason, so 
poetry, its product, differs in its expression from reason's 
products. It is of the very nature of poetic language to exaggerate, 
confuse and distort the objective reality of literal truth. The 
poet, who ttaim.s at e.fJect,"1 tries to recreate in language the 
intense impression made by a phenomenon upon his imagination. In 
order that he may recreate and express this immediate impression, 
his imagination must "aim at aggrandizing some one object, person 
2 
or thing at the expense of all others." But the language of poetry, 
Hazlitt said, 
is not the less true to nature, because it is false in 
poin·t of fact J but so much the more true and natural, 
if it conveys the impression which the Qbject under the 
influence of passion makes on the mind.~ 
It is the intensity of the final effect or impression which "pushes 
the poet over the verge of matter-of-fact, and justifies him in 
111Coriolanus," Characters.£! Shakespear 's Plays, \·forks, 
IV, 214. 
2~ne Life of Napoleon Euonaparte, .~orka, XIII, 51, n.l. 
Poetry, Hazlitt says, "signifies the excess of the imagination 
beyond the actual or ordinary impression of any object or feeling.a 
("On Poetry in General," V, 3.) Cf . "The imagination is serious, 
even to passion, and exceeds truth by laying a greater stress on 
the object. 11 ("Definition of Wit," Works, XX, 360.) 
3"0n Poetry in General," v, 4· 
resorting to the licence of fiction to express what without his 
uwinged words" must have remained forever untold."1 
2 But if poetry is "every thing by excess," the literal 
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absurdity does not make itself apparent, lost as it is in the unity 
and integrity of the final impression it creates. ttin a poetical 
comparison," Hazlitt maintained, "there cannot be a sense of 
incongruity or eurprise";3 the mind must not stop to analyse and 
dissect the particulars of whioh a poetic image is compounded--the 
image must 11evaporate of itself."4 If we compare a giant to a 
tower, the magnitude of wonder aroused by the image compensates 
for the disparity in literal truth: "the intensity of the feeling 
makes up for the disproportion of the objects."5 Thus the medium 
which the poet adopts to reoreate his own emotion at a given 
phenomenon, though false in point of fact , is true to nature only 
i£ it succeeds in its sole intention--the recreation of emotion. 
In this sense, poetry is but an instrument to raise emotion, and 
its validity must be adjudged according to the strength and 
consistency of its final result. 
Furthermore, the poet is justified in creating an intense 
emotional feeling. Hazlitt maintained that the mind not only has 
111Poetry," Works, XX , 211 . 
2 
"Coriolanus," IVt 214. Cf. Keats ' s statement to Taylor 
that r•Poetry should surprise by a fine excess and not by singularity," 
in his letter of 27th February, 1818. Rollins, I, 238. 
3"Defini tion of \vi t, 11 XX, 360. 
411 0n Poetry in General, 11 V, 15. Cf. Keats's assertion that 
"the excellence of every Art is its intensity, capable of making all 
disagreeables evaporate, from their being in close relationship with 
Beauty and Truth." Rollins, I, 192. 
5non Poetry i n General," v, 4. 
"a germ or principle of truth" but has also implanted in its core 
"a craving for strong excitement." "I affirm, Sir," he wrote to 
Gifford, 
that poetry, that the imagination, generally speaking, 
delights in power, in strong excitement, as well as in 
truth, in good, in right, whereas pure reason and the 
moral sense approve only of the true and good.l 
This intense emotional reaction, moreover, is part of the whole 
truth of a phenomenon, since that is only a half-truth which is 
the delineation of an object abstracted from its effect on the 
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observer. Indeed, this strong excitement, inextricably interwoven 
with the threads of immediate sensation and past experience, forms 
the substance of the imagination. Imagination, in Razlitt's view, 
is that dynamic, vital energy, which, after the mind has grasped the 
essence of an object by its sympathetic identification with the 
object, modifies, coadunates, and synthesises its impressions into 
a new reality--a reality as true as nature itself. And it this 
whole intuitive, sympathetic, synthetic process, integrated by strong 
emotion, which enables the highest order of poet to grasp and 
express the fundamental truths of human nature or of any other phen-
omena. For, unlike reason, which when it analyses life oan see it 
only as a series of statio impressions, imagination can perceive the 
underlying and ceaselessly fluid truth of nature. Poetry, says 
Hazlitt, "describes the flowing, not the fixed • • • throws us back 
upon the past, forward into the future"; 2 the imagination perceives 
111Letter to William Gifford, Esq., u v/orks, IX, 37. 
2
"0n Poetry in General, 11 V, 3-5· Keats's article on Kean in 
the Champion, Dec. 21st, 1817, has clear echoes of this passage. 
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that the whole truth consists not in the delineation of the immediate 
surface and momentary contours of anything, but in its reation with 
what has been and what is to come, as well as with what 1!• For this 
reason, therefore, poetry is superior to painting, since 
painting gives the object itselfJ poetry what it implies. 
Painting embodies what a thing contains in itself: poetry 
suggests what exists out of it, in any manner connected 
with it . But this last is the proper province of the 
imagination.l 
Although the hidden analogies are not, as we have already seen, inherent 
in the object itself, nevertheless they comprise the whole truth of 
that object and can only be perceived by the imagination. 
Thus, for Hazlitt, the imagination (which is essentially 
vital, while objects as objects are fixed and dead) is directed in 
its intuitive working to the fluctuating character of nature. Above 
all, it takes as its exclusive province the elusive and hidden energy· 
and movement of human nature and emotion. "Shakespear ' s mastery over 
his subject," Hazlitt averred,''wae owing to a knowledge of the conneet-
2 ing links of the passions," and it was in this knowledge and in hie 
ability to express it that his superlative skill resideds 
The dialogues in Lear, in Macbeth, that between Brutus and 
Cassius, and nearly all those in Shakespear, where the 
interest is wrought up to its highest pitch, afford examples 
of this dramatic fluctuation of pattern. • • • In Shakespear 
1
"0n Poetry in General," V, 10. Compare Coleridge ' s 
"painting cannot go beyond a certain point; poetry rejects all 
control, all confinement. 11 Lectures ~ Notes ~ Shakspere 2 
Other English Poets, ed. T. Ashe (London: George Bell and Sons, 
1904), P• 92. 
2 
"Lear,tt Characters .2f Sbakespear's Plays, Works, IV, 260. 
; 
[ the interest] is like the sea, agitated this way and that, 
and loud-lashed by furious storms.l 
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In his plays, Hazlitt observes, there is a "continual composition 
and decomposition ••• a fermentation of every particle in the 
2 
whole mass . " It is this movement, this fluctuation of all the 
elements, which comprises the essential metabolism of all life . 
Fee lings and emotions are nat static, nor reducible to photographic 
description; they are in a constant ferment, always taking on new 
forms, and giving rise to new reactions. Only Shakespeare has been 
able to express, without pausing to describe, the essential truth 
of human passion, the 
ebb and .flow of the feeling, its pauses and feverish 
starts, its impatience of opposition, its accumulating 
force when it has time to recollect itself, the manner 
in which it avails itself of every passing word or 
gesture, its haste to repel insinuation, the alternate 
contraction and dilatation of the soul . 3 
It is in the understanding and portrayal of man' s strongest feelings 
and passions that the greatest strength of genius resides.4 It is 
1non Shakespear and Milton, 11 V, 52. 
2Ibid., p. 51. Cf. Keats: "The innumerable compositions 
and decompoSitions which take place between the intellect and its 
thou.sand materials before it -arrives at that trembling delicate and 
snail-horn perception of Beauty •• •" Rollins, I, 265. 
3"Lear," IV, 259· 
41lli.., p . 271, and "On the German Drama,» Lectures Chieflz 
~~Dramatic Literature £1 ~ ~ of Elizabeth, Works, VI, 362 . 
C£'. Keats: "There is an ellectric fire in human nature tending to 
puri.fy--so that among these human creature there is continually some 
bir th of new heroism. • • • May there not be superior beings amused 
wi th any grace.fult though instinctive attitude my mind m[a] y fall into, 
as I am entertained with the alertness o.f a stoat or the anxiety of a 
Deer? Though a quarrel in the streets is a thing to be hated, the ener-
gies displayed in it are fine; the commonest Man shows a grace in his 
quarr el--By a superior being our reasoning may take the same tone--
though erroneous they may be fine--This is the very thing in vrhich 
consists poetry. 11 Rollins, II, 80-81. 
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only by the most unusual development of the instinct of imagination 
--the most eloquent expression of which is to be found in the tragedies 
of Shakespeare-- and by the most perfect integration of all its 
faculties of sympathetically grasping and intuitively synthesising the 
truths of immediate sensation and past experience- -only by this extra-
ordinary capacity that a man, as a moral agent or as a poet, can "play 
the hero" by grasping the highest truth of nature, the truth of human 
feelings. "This is the t:rue imagination," says Ha.zlitt, "to put 
yourself in the place of others, and to feel and apeak for them. "1 
Only great poetry can adequately express this truth, and therefore it 
is the most "heroic" of all the arts. 
1 H~he Drama: No. VII," Works, XVIII, 545. 
P.ART II 
TRAGEDY 
CHAPTER IV 
A slight acquaintance with the works of the major Romantics 
leads all too frequently to the assumption that these men were, in 
general, so vitally concerned with questions of natural beauty, the 
sensibility of the imaginative reader, and the psychology of the 
poetic process, that they were to a more or lese culpable degree un-
concerned with the intellectual and emotional currents underlying 
the political and social controversies of their day. Nothing, of 
course, could be farther from the truth; almost without exception, 
the great poets and critics of the fifty years preceding the first 
Reform Bill were "committed" to an extent seldom equalled by English 
artists in any period. Living through an age in which society, and 
ways of looking at society, were decisively changed by the rise of 
modern democracy and the development of industrial technology, they 
regarded their artistic theory and practice as simply one aspect of 
the wider issues of the time--as personal expressions of the 
fundamental attitudes generally exercising the minds of the thinking 
public . The two generations of Romantic writers produced men who 
not only wrote political and social comment in addition to their 
poetry and criticism, but who also acted purposefully upon their 
political beliefs . It is facile to characterise Shelley's distribut-
ion of pamphlets, Byron ' s part in a political war, and Coleridge ' s 
early involvement with the French Revolution merely as part of the 
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Romantic revolt against conformity; these activities, and those of 
a similar nature of their contemporaries, should rather be seen in 
the light of a widespread unity of purpose foreign, at first glance, 
to twentieth-century notions of the relative isolation of the 
Romantic artist from his environment--notions nourished, paradox-
ically enough, by imperfectly understood interpretations of Romantic 
statements about the Artist as Antenna of the Race. In fact, the 
political and social activities and attitudes of the Romantic writers 
had a substantial connection with the personal experience upon which 
their poetry and their aesthetic drew~ "a conclusion about personal 
feeling became a conclusion about society, and an observation of 
natural beauty carried a necessary moral reference to the whole and 
unified life of man."1 The Romantic impulse toward drama, and more 
especially toward tragedy, is less obsoure if we understand the 
implications of this fact. And the nature of Hazlitt•s view of the 
values which tragedy assumes, a view which is informed and shaped 
by the moral attitude which he adopted, is clarified when his opinions 
regarding man's position amid his fellows are known. 
Hazlitt•s position in the English tradition of Dissent has 
been exhaustively investigated by his latest biographer, 2 and the 
effect upon his political attitudes (which at every point permeate 
his criticism of literature) of the radicalism to which throughout 
his life he passionately adhered has been rather more superficially 
1Raymond Williams, Culture~ Society 1780-!22Q 
(London: Chatto and Winnus, 19)8), p. 30. 
2Herschel Clay Baker, William Hazlitt (Cambridge, Mass.: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962). 
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treated.1 In this chapter, further investigation of that political 
theory will illustrate the basis of Hazli tt' s "tragic vie\'lt1 in an 
age traditionally labelled "optimistic" and by virtue of this 
optimism, "non-tragic." 
The Project £££ a New Theo;y ~ Civil ~ Criminal LeGis-
lation occupied Razlitt's mind for over thirty years. He first 
conceived it in 1792, while a student at Hackney, and he states that 
it took its origin in a discussion of the Test and Corporation Acts 
--measures naturally regarded by Dissenters as unjustly discriminat-
ory. On internal evidence, the essay ' s final form may be dated to 
2 1828, two years before its author ' s death, and it was first 
published by his son in 1836. 
It is material to recapitulate the social conditions 
under which Hazlitt came to write the essay, since it is apparent 
that a theorist ' s ideas are not only shaped by the prevailing 
currents of thought--whether he synthesise those currents or react 
against them--but just as directly by the character of the events 
through which he lives, and which he believes, as Hazlitt did, 
spring in some measure from those currents. 
Before the close of the eighteenth century, and until 
well after the termination of the war with France, conditione in 
England were extremely unstable. The Reign of Terror had galvanised 
Burke into an eloquence which swayed many against the revolutionary 
1By Crane Brinton, ~Political Ideas£!~ English 
Romanticists (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), pp. 122-146. 
2Project ••• , \vorks, XIX, 303, and pp. 366-367 n. 
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spirit which they had formerly applauded; the doctrine of the Rights 
of Man was, in England at any rate, officially almost discredited; 
the country was teetering on the brink of social and economic 
collapse. In addition to the high taxes imposed owing to the 
exigencies of the war, poor harvests were experienced, with a result-
ant climb in the price of wheat. The situation of the working man 
was precarious. During the war itself, industry was frequently 
disrupted by the legalised depredations against trade which were 
necessary to sustain hostilities; and after the war was over, the 
distress of the labouring class became even more severe because of 
the breakdown of the home and foreign markets, which was caused by 
the growing discrepancy between demand and production. The labour 
market was flooded by demobilised soldiers, wages lagged far behind 
prices raised by the Corn Laws, and depreciation of currency brought 
starvation into the homes of the artisans, who were already depres sed 
by the introduction of more efficient labour-saving machines, and of 
the farmhands, whose traditional position of smallholder had been 
undermined by a laissez-faire economy and by over three thousand 
Enclosure Acts in sixty years. 
As a consequence of the fear of civil commotion prevalent 
among the members of the establishment, legislation was enacted to 
restrain the labouring class by curtailing its rights. The Habeas 
Corpus Act was suspended in 1794 and again in 1817; in 1795 Bills 
were passed through Parliament which prohibited public meetings; 
societies of working-men were suppressed and their leaders prosecuted, 
and the Combination Laws of 1799 and 1800 prohibited strikes. The 
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Poor Laws, enacted in 1601 to provide for the needy from parish 
funds collected by levy from property owners, had by the close of 
the eighteenth century decayed into a system which provided for 
little short of slavery. The Enclosure Acts deprive~ the poor of 
their former facilities for farming and grazing, and the 
"Speenhamland .Act, 11 in adjusting the labourer's wage in proportion 
to the price of wheat, and providing that the discrepancy between 
this theoretical wage and that actually paid be made up from the 
Poor Rates, served to cast the worker on the pariah for subsistence. 
The generally-accepted concept of morality which lay behind 
the temporarily expedient measures taken by the government stemmed 
originally from the natural-right theory first systematically 
formulated by Hobbes and modified by Locke. Hobees postulated a 
11 state of nature" in which man has certain natural rights, including 
the right to property, to the pursuit of happiness, and, most 
important, to self-preservation. It is reason, working from self-
interest, which dictates man's voluntary actions. (Reason, of course, 
operates only on the data presented by the senses.) In the state 
of nature, the individual's rights are constantly invaded by the 
self-interested actions of other individuals. Because man naturally 
seeks pleasure and turns from pain, and because he wishes to carry 
on his existence with the greatest degree of profit and pleasure 
possible, the rational individual, calculating the effect of certain 
causes upon his continued existence, will conclude that if he is to 
safeguard his rights he must allow others the same measure of 
liberty against himself as he would wish against them. ]'urthermore, 
he will realise that in order to safeguard this balance of rights 
and interests, he must surrender to the commonwealth his powers 
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of sanction. In Hobbes's scheme, and, for the most part, in 
Locke's, morality implicitly becomes a matter of rational prudence 
and calculation of self-interest. The fundamental principle 
underlying the whole fabric is the right to self-preservation, 
and it is from this that the concept of political justice is 
deduced. 
Hazlitt, as we have seen, stood opposed to self-interest 
and to reason as the basis of action, both in morality and in 
art. But in his concern to find an answer to the old,thorny 
question of the liberty of the individual and the authority of 
the state, he proceeds upon premises similar to those just 
outlined. That these premises were not absolutely valid, and that 
the theory he built on them was imperfect, he fully realised; 
and it is in this realisation and the concept with which he tried 
to make good the imperfection that his view of man in society, 
and by extension his view of tragedy, is based. It is, moreover, 
in this view of man that he is perhaps most characteristically a 
Romantic. 
In the Project, while he accepts the necessity of the 
commonwealth ' s demand for some form of tributary payment in 
return for the supervisory function which it performs, llazlitt 
attempts to show how the position of the individual may be 
strengthened in order that the payment of that tribute, or the 
mere obedience demanded, shall not impair the natural rights of 
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of the individuals who constitute the commonwealth. In addition, 
and as corollaries to his main argument, Hazlitt speaks out in 
favour of universal euffrage, trade unions, and the right of 
labourers to strike, and he illuetrat~s the injustices inherent in 
the system of property representation. 
Hazlitt begins the Project with the definition of a 
right: it is simply that which the individual thinks is good and 
useful, and which has the sanction of his will as such. Rights 
originate in the will, since men have differing ideas on what is 
good and what is u8eful. In a state of nature the limitations of 
rib>'bts are determined by force, but in society we have poli tieal 
justice, or law, ae the agent which assiGns to t t em their bound-
aries. Tl.Le most desirable agent, Hazlitt acknowlede>es, would bo 
moral justice, which in r .&lation to individual questions is based 
on the sympathetic ~agination, and in general questions upon 
experiential reason; "morals has a higher standard still, and 
ought never to appeal to ' force in any case whatever~ lienee I 
always found aometbing wantin£ in Mr. Godwin's Enquiry concerning 
Political Justice ••• for he makes no distinction betveen 
political justice, which implies an appeal to force, and moral 
justice."1 Razlitt however realises tha-t men being what they are, 
moral justice is likely to give way to selfishness, and so political 
justice with its recourse to force is the only practical alternative. 
His criticism of Godwin's failure to distinGUish the two is the 
1Project, XIX, 304. 
basis of Hazlitt 1s condemnation of the Godwinian benevolent comm-
unity as mere wishful thinkint; and hopelessly unrealistic. 1 
Thus, the Pro.ject characterises la1'1 as sometn.in,; by which 
to ascertain the bounds of the ori6inal rig.tJ.t, and it arises from 
the necessity to maintain the equal ric;hts of everyone . It follows 
that the right to make laws is the aggregate of all the individual 
rights of the members of society, and not t he result of a social 
compact, since each person has natural rights which he is bound to 
defend without askinc permission to do so, or else the riehts would 
always be at the mercy of ,.,hoever chose to invade them, and the 
redress which society could afford would be useless because too 
late. In addition, society has no right to interfere with the 
r.ights of its members except as these latter rights are forfeited 
by interference with one another. Hazlitt reinforces this 
arbument by asserting that each man ' s will is sovereign to himself 
as long a.s he does not interfere with others . The 1-Till of society 
is not sufficient t;round for the curtailment of his rights, since 
this vlill is made up of the wills of the members of society, and 
where one has not interfered vli th the rights of others, their wills 
too have not been tampered 1:fi th. 
1The problem of God1-Tin ' s union of moral and political 
justice and Hazlitt ' s distinction between them is interestinb. Godwin 
held that individuals actinc on association and reason would necess-
arily move toward an identification of interests. He did not dist-
inguish, in fixing upon "the eternal principle of ;;ood, 11 behreen 
Reason and ~!ill. In fact, the "universal principle" on which he bases 
his t heory of rational morality is utility. \~hat is good. is \fhat is 
useful: experie nce i s tl1e deciding factor. Hazlitt did not allow that 
utility could carry this burden: as a basis for morality "it is praiT-
matical, and put tin{;· an imaginary for a real state of things. 11 (l?ro;ject, 
XI X, )04.) Ha zlitt had also a basic distrust of government ' s a agreg-
ative powers, as the Project shows. 
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Neither is the probable good accruing to society sufficient ground 
for the curtailment; the members of society are bound merely to do 
no harm to it, or "to be barely just: benevolence and virtue are 
voluntary qualities.111 He asks himself whether it would not be 
possible to frame a system of laws which would be confined to 
punishment of infraction of natural rights, and which would leave 
everything else to mutual agreement. 
Summing up and amplifying his original arguments, Hazlitt 
emphasises that there is nothing to restrict or oppose the will of 
one man but the will of another meeting it. Introducing a perenn-
ially pertinent note, he warns that while society circumscribes the 
original rights of man by entrenching equal and mutual rights, the 
members of society must be careful lest they destroy those rights 
with habitual abuse of the very agent set up to preserve them. 
Power, he reiterates, rests with the people; but in the exercising 
of it, it can be turned against the people ' s rights. The principle 
upon which the idea of property rests is identical to that supporting 
1Hazlitt differs in an important respect from Locke on the 
question of the social compact. While the two agree on the utilitarian 
basis of government, Locke believes that it is the social compact it-
self which marks the transition from a state of nature to a state of 
society, wlrile Hazlitt maintains that the difference lies in the mere 
curtailment of individual rights which automatically occurs on an 
individual's entrance into society. To Locke, the social compact is 
indispensable as being the ground for the commonest rights, but 
Hazlitt holds that individual rights are supported essentially by 
natural law. He does, however, acknowledge that members of society 
voluntarily agree to abide by society ' s laws on the •'do as you would 
be done by" principle--which rests, of course, on both reason and the 
sympathetic imagination. Hobbes, it is sug~ested, and Locke after 
him, reversed this principle to 11 do not do as you would not be done 
by," a narrower and more negative maxim, based on self-preservation. 
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the concept of personal liberty: one man has no right to the product 
of another ' s labour, but rather each man has a rie;ht to the benefit 
of his own exertions and the use of his natural and inalienable 
powers--unless he waive this right for a supposed equivalent and by 
1 
mutual consent. 
In the Project society is compared to a mosaic in which 
each member is a tile. Each tile fits tightly in its place and can 
not encroach on ita neighbours or be encroached upon by them. As 
each individual has the right to do as he pleases within the bounds 
of his will, and to preserve this will as intact as the tile in the 
mosaic, there are several natural rights which exist for all men, 
simply by virtue of their being men . The moot point is the 
determination of the distance to which the individual may go in 
preserving these rights, and t o which society may go in limiting 
them. 
There are four things, Hazlitt says, over which each man 
is especially master: his person, his actions, his opinions, and his 
property. These are for Hazlitt the origins of man ' s natural rights; 
it is tl1e invasion of these--with the exception of opinion--which 
cannot on any supposition go unpunished; they are inherent, he 
1 Thus for Hazlitt slavery is a political illogicality. 
Locke, of course, on the ground that God is the ultimate owner of 
the body, says that a man has no right to make himself a slave or 
to take a slave, and also that slaves may rebel since the master-
slave relationship is "a state of \>larre • 11 (Second Treatise, ch. IV, 
sec. 24 . ) But compare his justification of slavery in the Fundamental 
Constitutions 2f Carolina, 1669, as the continuance of a state of 
war between lawful conqueror and captive. llazlitt justifies a slave ' s 
rebellion on the theory that if a man acquire a right over another, 
the latter automatically acquires a richt over the former. 
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he SUGGests, in the human beinL• 
As far as personal riJhts are concerned, liazlitt believes 
that the natural right to defend the person fron bodily harm and from 
nuisance arises out of the incontrovertible fact that the individual 
has the greatest , if not the sole , interest in and idcnti ty l>Ti th his 
0'\<.'11. body. I may justly defend myself a6ainst your attack bece.use 
the pain and discomfort which you inflict upon me neither assist me 
nor yourself. (Locke justifies self-defence on the assumption that 
the attacker allO'\iS no time for recourse to justice under lau, and 
he also condemns assault and battery as offences a~ainst God ' s property.) 
For Hazlit t the test as to nuisance is the motive behind 
the a.ct. 11alice aforethought is the decidint; facto:L~. If a man beat 
a druo outside my uindow I am justified in complaininG, since his 
action is unnecessary and malicious ; but if my neighbour play a 
trumpet in his home he does so pres~ably for his otm edification, 
and since I would wish to retain this privileGe for myself also, I 
have no rieht of complaint . Thus cases of assault and battery and 
of nuisance are infringements of personal, or natural, rib·hts, and 
are punishable by law. Injury by libel or slander or mere expression 
of opinion does not transGress this natural law since it does not 
injure me, and thus it should not be legally punishable. No- one is 
bound to respect me; opinion is free, and being founded on rea.son 
it should not be answered with force. 
11s everyone has the richt to use his natural powers in any 
vTay as long as he aG<'S not interfere wi t h the rights of others, there 
can, asserts liazlitt, be no law re&~latinc morals, since morals have 
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to do with the will and the affections. Drunkenness, gambling, and 
incontinence are the concern solely of the individual, provided, of 
course, that they do not infringe the rights of others. Hazlitt 
asserts that a man has no political obligation to maintain his 
family; his drunkenness, profligacy, cr adultery should not be 
punished by law since he and he alone is the natural and legal 
guardian of his family. He agrees with Locke, however, that moral 
obligations are involved in oases of this nature, and he goes on to 
say that a man deviating from the moral standards accepted by society 
may justifiably be excluded from the benefits which society has to 
offer. As far as suicide is concerned, Hazlitt holds that it is 
entirely within the rights of the individual as long as the act 
does not endanger the lives of others. (Locke expressly condemns 
suicide as usurpation of God's rights over the person.) 
Rights .of property are necessary since no man can enjoy 
security or exercise freedom of action unless he can appropriate 
certain things necessary to his own comfort and subsistence. These 
rights are set up by prior claim or by labour, since everyone has 
a right to the fruits of his own work. They are also constituted 
by inheritance, gift, or sale. According to Hazlitt, man in a state 
of nature has a right to all he can lay his hands on, and the great 
difference between this solitary independence and society is that 
society is simply a limitation of this right by the assertion of 
other equal rights. According to Locke, whose idea of equality in 
the state of nature is practically identical to Hazlitt 1 s, property 
exists antecedent to the formation of society, which is devised 
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chiefly to protect it. For Hazlitt the object and principle of the 
law of property is the supply of what is necessary to individuals 
and society; the securing of an equal share to each individual, 
other circumstances being the same; and the maintenance of peace 
and promotion of industry and plenty by proportioning each man ' s 
share to his own exertions or to the goodwill and discretion of 
others. Clearly, Hazlitt, who wishes to equalise distribution under 
a system of common property, is against Godwin's proposal for the 
establishment of a common stock. Hazlitt acknowledges that the amount 
of food and of other necessities of life available to the proprietary 
class and that available to the labourers is merely an arbitrarily-
arrived-at ratio designed by the former, whose share, he says, should 
be limited so that tj1e amount remaining for wages and so forth could 
be increased, and extremes of wealth and poverty avoided. The best 
vray to effect this, he believes, would be by combina·tion among the 
\iorkers, who would then be in a position to bargain--the rie;ht to 
bargain resting on the same basis as the right to property and personal 
liberty. 
Hazlitt speaks out for universal suffra{:;e, and attacks rep-
resentation by property on the ground that it creates a monopoly, and 
lays open to abuse the possession of power. The worse the law, the 
better for the lawmaker. In the last forty years, he says, the upper 
classes have doubled in number and have become richer, while tlLe lab-
ourers have remained relatively stable in population and have steadily 
become poorer. The individuals compris ing the governing class have 
thus infringed upon the property rights of the poor. But Hazlitt 
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goes on to justify the existence of the Poor Laws, and their 
continued application, albeit as a temporary measure, because 
although everyone should have equal opportunities to work and to 
enjoy the fruits of that work, the labouring class has been deprived 
of its opportunity by the employers' abuses and t herefore assistance 
is still called for: 
The greater part of a community ought not to be paupers 
or starving; and when a government by obstinacy and mad-
ness has reduced them to that state, it must either take 
wise and effectual measures to relieve them from it, or 
pay the forfeit of ita own wickedness and folly.l 
Government, Hazlitt sums up, is not necessarily founded on common 
consent, but on the right which society has to defend itself a6ainst 
at;gression. ''Laws are, or ought to be, founded on the supposed 
infraction of individual rights," 2 and while the individual is not 
bound "to pay or support" the government for defending him against 
injustice, the protection of the law may be withdrawn from him if he 
refuses. If these rights are always clear, and if the government is 
always just, then "every government might be its own lawgiver"; but 
as nei·ther of these propositions is borne out by experience, 
it is necessary to recur to the general voice for 
settling the boundaries of right and wrong, and even more 
for preventing the government, under pretence of the 
general peace and safety, from subjecting the whole 
libert ies, rights and resourQes of the community to its 
own advantage and sole will.3 
This, then, is Hazlitt's attempt to solve the problem concerning 
1Project, XIX, 319. 
2I bid., p. 320. 
3l bid. 
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the limits of the individual's actions and the limits of the state's 
authority. The Project is less a theory of legislation than a 
vindication, in the face of the near statism which so gradually 
softened into the austere concessions of 1832, of the position and 
potential of the individual as opposed to the power of the realm. 
As such, it is radical, and consonant with at least one of the view-
points subsumed under that omnibus-word "Romanticism." 
Its outstanding weakness as a feasible theory of legislation 
is inseparable from its method of composition. Hazlitt was no "bookish 
tbeoric"; he tends continually in all his writing toward the empirical. 
In the Project, however, he moves, as Locke did, demonstratively. 
The essay is logical, reasonable, and without any anchor in human 
experience. As Crane Briaton has pointed out, there is implicit 
throughout the work the understanding that if the demands men make 
on society are refused, men will at some point revolt: 
The first purpose, however, of both practical and theoretical 
politics, is to locate this point .2£ revolt ••• Hazlitt 
••• places these natural rights, this point of revolt , at 
an absurdly high level. For men sell all but the innermost 
ward of their citadel and are often content with slavery. If 
the point of revolt of a given society is very low-- that is, 
if its members will submit to a very great deal of degradation 
of their manhood before protesting--it is of little use to 
maintain, as Hazlitt did, that it ought to be very high.l 
Now, while this point of revolt may differ vastly from class to 
class and from country to country, and while the Project may be 
evidence of Hazlitt ' s incompetence in the field of theoretical 
politics, two things are clear: Hazlitt does not look on man as 
1
..!!1.£. Political Ideas .Q.£ 2 Enj-jlish Romanticists, p. 129. 
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subservient to society, and he does not see man as quietistic. He 
asserts with a tone which sometimes approaches shrill defiance that 
man is better than society and that it is natural for man to revolt 
when external forces threaten him. This view is not of course in 
itself a 11 tragic" one. It is however fundamental to an understanding 
of the material in which tragedy deals, and it is alien to the 
comparative complacency and quietism which Hobbes's theory supported. 
Because Hazlitt never wholly escaped from empiricism he 
remained, behind the facade of his carefully-constructed theory, 
suspicious of abstract reasoning as a practical basis for action. 
Although he predicated a selfish f oundation for natural and political 
rights, he did not believe that these rights could ever be exploited 
for the good of society or of the individual on selfish motives. 
That he was aware of this clash between belief and theory while he 
was \iri ting the Pro;ject is indicated by his qualification in the 
final paragraph: "It seems, ' then, that a system of just and useful 
laws may be constructed nearly, if not wholly, on the principle of 
the right of self-defence, or the security of person, liberty, and 
1 property." If the Project. ,roP_tnlates a world which in one sense is 
. 0 is that narrow, anti-tragic universe bequeathed by the philos,her of 
Malmesbury, a world in which man acts on, and in which his freedom 
is defined by, a purely rational calculation of self-preservation 
springing from enlightened self-interest, then Hazlitt's other exam-
inations of man in society and of the motives behind actions assert 
1Project, ~IX, ) 19. 
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~ that disinterested benevolence, based upon the intuitively-operating 
sympathetic imagination, is at the very least as natural a foundation 
for action. Poaitics , which proaeeds from reason, "lays down a rule 
to curb and measure out the wills of individuals in equal portions," 
and thus confines man to actions baaed on self-interest; t'morals has 
a higher standard still, and ought never to appeal to force in any 
case whatever." Morality is based upon the mind ' s ability to 
identify sympathetically with others through the imagination--
~~. Burke contemptuously defines the people to be ' any 
faction that at the time can get the power of the sword 
into its hands. ' Nos that may be a description of the 
Government, but it is not of the people. The people is 
the hand, heart and head of the whole community acting 
to one purpose, and with a mutual and thorough consent. 
The hand of the people so employed to execute what the 
heart feels, and the bead thinks, must be employed more 
beneficially for the cause of the people, than in 
executing any measures which the cold hearts, and contriving 
heads ••• may indicate.l 
The ideal society will base its laws upon "the aggregate amount of 
the actual, dear-bought experience, the honest feelings, and heart-
felt wishes of a whole people, informed and directed by the great-
est power of understanding in the community, unbiassed by any 
2 
sinister motive." It is not enough to contemplate men acting in 
society, and to regulate their lives, on the basis of political 
justice alone: f'men act from individual impressions; and to know 
mankind, we should be acquainted with nature. Men act from passion; 
and we can only judge of passion by sympathy."' 
XII, 45· 
111What is the People?" Works, VII, 267. 
2~., P• 268 . 
3 .. on Reason and Imagination," ~ Plain Speaker, \iorks, 
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The "original discovery" ~rhich the Essay .2.!1 _ill Principles 
££ Human Action announced was actually based on a clearly-defined 
tradition of speculation regarding the nature of sympat~ and 
benevolence. But the construction which Hazlitt put on the theories 
he used was original, and forms an integral part of his view of 
man. v!e have seen that he rejected the sensationist psycholo.:;y in 
his insistence upon the cognitive ability of the imagination; that 
psychology reduced man to a passive machine, directed hither and 
yon in the search for pleasure and the avoidance of pain by the 
stimuli of sensory impressions. Hazlitt ' s theory of disinterested 
benevolence working through the sympathetic imagination assumes 
that the mind is not a mere instrument of sensation, a half-blind 
agent of external matter. He deduces, on the basis of his theory, 
the rules of moral duty--if not political duty--from nature 
apprehended by sympathy; he founds his concept of morality not 
on self-preservation alone, not on a world of efficient causes 
only, but on nindividual impressions" and "passion." If his f;reat 
discovery ~ras in one sense merely another synthesis, it was in 
another an innovation in the emphasis which it placed upon man, 
and more specifically upon the individual, and his feelings and 
capacity for intuition as the highest authority. 
When he commented on the utilitarian theory of morals, 
Bazlitt complemented the view of man expressed in t he Project with 
the view implied by his metaphysical discovery. He denies that 
the purely rational calculation of consequences can be "the sole 
and unqualified test of right and wrong; for we are to take into 
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the account (as well) the re-action of these consequences upon the 
mind of the individual and the community. In mor als, the cult-
ivation of a moral sense is not the last thing to be attended to--
nay, it is the first. 111 It is his insistence on the inadequacy 
of abstract reason alone as a basis for action and for self-real-
isation which marks Hazlitt as a Romantic, and also as a social 
critic whose undoubted noptimism14 nevertheless contains, when it 
is seen in relation to the thought of his age, the grounds for a 
view of life which comprehends the tragic experience. We can accept 
Brinton's statement that Hazlitt ' s theory "is the old doctrine of 
2 the natural goodness of man" only if we perceive that it is a 
generalisation which fails to account for two important points. 
On the one hand, Hazlitt frequently made it clear that 
he regarded perfectibilitarian schemes as chimerical and based on 
imperfect knowledge of human nature. It is this attitude which 
lies behind his rejection of Godwin's Political Justice and of 
3 Malthus ' e system of checks. Individualist and radical though he 
was, he understood that the modification (not to say perversion) 
after Rousseau of those attitudes to man ' s potential for develop-
ment which inspired eo n1any of the thinkers of his day had little, 
1
"0n Reason a.nd Imagination, " XII, 49· 
2The Political Ideas of the English Romanticists, p. 129. 
3For pointed discussion--not always favourable to llazlitt--
of this rejection, see \1. P. Albrecht's 11Hazlitt a.nd Nalthus, 11 MLN, 
LX (1945), 215-226, his "Hazlitt's Principles .Qf Human Action and 
the Improvement of :3ociety, n in llll !£E.!. !!:,i: Testament 12 
Percival~' ed. A. L. Starrett (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1948), and his brief note on "Godwin and Malthus, 11 
~' LXX (1955), 552-555· 
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if any, foundation in reality: 
For this purpose, we think several things necessary which 
are impossible. It is a consummation which cannot happen 
t ill the nature of things is changed • • • All things move , 
not in progress, but in a ceaseless round; our strength 
lies in our weakness; our virtues are built on our vices; 
our faculties are as limited as our being; nor can we lift 
man above his nature more ·than above the earth he treads .1 
This is hardly the run-of-the-mill Romantic optimism. 
On the other hand, Hazlitt ' s stress upon the value, the 
very intrinsicality, of imaginative sympathy in man ' s complexion 
posits, not animate, rational bipeds functioning with machine- like 
predictability according to the enlightened deliberations of a self-
regarding reason, but human beings. 11 A calculation of the mere 
ultimate advantages, without any r egard to natural feelings and 
a£fections, may improve the external face and physical comforts of 
society, but will leave it heartless and worthless in itself.u2 
Hazlitt recognises that man strives perpetually towards improvement, 
towards the truthi he tempers the more usual romantic exaltation of 
this insieht by hie perception that man is in his very nature limited 
in his aspirations to fulfilment, and by his postulation not of purely 
rational and selfish men testing t heir ways merely towards self-defence, 
but of real men aspiring to self-realisation. "If we are imbued, " he 
writes, 111-Ii th a deep sense of individual weal or woe, we shall be awe-
struck at the idea of humanity in general." It is llazlitt •s essentially 
sober and compassionate view which sets him apar t from so many of the 
political and social commentators, and theorists of tragedy, of his day. 
1
"0bservations on Mr . \lordswor th' s 
Round Table, Works, IV, 119. 
2110n Reason and Imagination," XII, 
Poem The E:x:cunton," ~ 
CHAPTER V 
A problem which exercised the minds of most of the 
eighteenth-century theorists of tragedy concerned the nature of 
1 
t h e pleasure experienced by the reader or spectator. Tragedy 
deals in calamitous and catastrophic events; violent death and 
wretched anb~ish are its staples; and even if it was only on 
occasion that the eighteenth century saw man as "Plac'd on this 
isthmus of a middle state, A being darkly wise and rudely great," 
t he writers and playgoers of the time recognised that the world 
of tragedy is one in which the odds are fatally weighted against 
the protagonist. The paradox that a form which represented 
unpleasant events could arouse pleasure called for explanation, 
and it became common for critics to define tragedy through the 
ef£ect it has on its audience. 
One theory widely accepted in England during the early 
eighteenth century was that which attempted to explain the pleasure 
of tragedy by clarifying the psychological and physiological basis 
of pleasure itself. The foundation of this theory had been laid 
by Descartes in 1649, when he wrote in Les Passions de 1 1 Ame that 
1Apparently the debate is still open. See Roy Morrell, 
"The Psychology of Tragic Pleasure," g, VI (1956), 22-37. N"o-one 
attempting a conspectus of the various theories could ibllore Earl 
E., wasserman ' s .fine article ''The PleasurA of Tragedy, 11 ELH, .XIV 
(1947), 283-~07, to which I acknowledee inuebtedness fo;-Bome of 
the historical background. 
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la cause qui fait que pour l ' ordinaire la joie suit du 
chatouillement est que tout ce qu ' on nomme chatouillement 
ou sentiment agi.·eable consiste en ce que les objets des 
sens excitant quelque mouvement dans lea nerfs qui serait 
capable de leur nuire s ' ils n ' avaient pas assez de force 
pour lui resister ou que le corps ne fut pas bien dispose ; 
ce qui fait une impression dans le cerveau, laquelle etant 
instituee de la nature pour temoigner cette bonne dispos-
ition et cette force, la r epre sente a l ' ame comme un bien 
qui lui appartient, en tant qu ' elle est unie avec le corps, 
et ainsi excite en elle l a joie. C' est presque la meme 
raison qui fait qu ' on prend naturellement plaisir a Be 
sentir emouvoir a toutes sortes de passions, meme a la 
tristesse et a la haine, lorsque ces passions ne sent 
causees que par lea aventures e tranges qu ' on voit repres-
enter sur un theatre, ou par d ' autres pareils sujets, qui, 
ne pouvant nous nuire en aucune fa9on, semblant chatouiller 
notre ame en la touohant.l 
Thus, the mere stimulation or movement of the emotions, in those 
instances where such movement is harmonious and does not damage the 
nervous system, gives rise to pleasure, since the movement is pre-
sented to . the mind as a "good" which pertains to it just as much 
as to the body. Sadness and hate, pity and fear, although they are 
powerful emotions, produce pleasure when they are aroused by a 
spectacle which we know is artificial and without real moment to 
ourselves, since their movement is moderated into harmony by the 
artificiality. 
These emotions, or, as Descartes calls them, these passions, 
are distinct in nature and sphere of operation from the "emotions 
interieures qui ne sent excitees en 1 1 ame que par 1 1 ~e meme."2 The 
former are subject to excitation by external stimuli, while the 
1nesoartes: ~uvres et Lettres, ed. Andre Bridoux 
( 11 Bibliotheg_ue de la Pleiade"; Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1952), 
pp. 739-740. (~Passions~ l ' Ame, art. 94.) 
2~., pp. 765-766. Article 147. 
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latter are concerned solely with the inner virtue and vice of the 
individual; there is no causal relationship between them. The 
interior emotions may thus be directly opposed to the passions, 
but as long as the latter do not take from the former, the move-
ment of the passions, even though they are contrasted with the 
emotions, may give an intellectual joy to the mind: 
Et lorsque nous lisons des aventures etranges dans un 
livre, ou que nous voyons representer sur un theatre, 
cela excite quelquefois en nous la tristesse, quelquefois 
la joie, ou l'amour, ou la haine, et generalement toutes 
lee passions, selon la diversite des objets qui s'of frent 
a notre imagination; mais avec cela nous avons du plaisir 
de les sentir exciter en nous, et ce plaisir est une joie 
intellectuelle qui peut aussi bien naitre de la tristesse 
que de toutes lee autres passions ••• pourvu que notre 
ame ait toujours de quoi se contenter en son interieur, 
tous lee troubles qui viennent d'ailleurs n'ont aucun 
pouvoir de lui nuireJ mais plutot ils servant a augmenter 
sa J01e, en ce que, voyant qu'elle ne peut etre offensee 
par eux, cela lui fait connaitre sa perfection. l 
John Dennis was an early importer into England of the Cartesian 
theory, which he probably met in the works of Rene Rapin. Rapin 
accepted without reservation Descartes ' assertion that agitation 
of the passions is pleasurable, and he explicitly linked this to 
tragic pleasure; fear and pity, he held, were the passions which 
made the strongest impressions on the heart of man, and "in effect, 
when the Soul is Shaken, by Motions so Natural and so Humane , all 
the Impressions it feels becomes [ sic] Delightful; its Trouble 
pleases , and the Emotion it finds, is a kind of Charm to it ••• 
In this Agitation consists all the Pleasure that one is capable 
1Desoartes: ~Juvree ~ Lettres, p. 766. Articles 147-148. 
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' 1 to receive from Tragedy." Dennis took this over, but he insisted 
that fearful and pitiable events in real life were painful. 
Pleasurable pity and fear are the province of the drama, and what 
distinguishes the dramatic experience is that we realise, as we 
watch the action, that it is an imitation at a remove from reality; 
we ourselves are safe, and the passions aroused by the events on the 
sta0e are vicariously experienced. ~hese passions are nevertheless 
violently agitated, because we see in the protagonist an image of 
ourselves; but because the pity and fear do not run counter to our 
will they are pleasurable. Reason , in short, keeps a watching 
brief in our minds, and because the tragic events on the stage are 
fictional, the agitation of the passions is moderated into harmony, 
and we experience pleasure both through the agitation and through 
2 
the quiet certainty that we ourselves are safe. 
Dennis ' s works, although they were of sunlcient importance 
to earn the antagonism of Pope at the time they were written, did 
not enjoy very much of a vogue and exerted little influence later in 
the century. Further developments of the Cartesian theory came to 
England from the work of the Abbe du Bos and from Fontanelle. The 
former went as far as to say that mental lassitude is unequivocally 
the least desirable of mental states since it implies the absence 
of any motion of the passions. From this state, the mind naturally 
strains toward any object or experience which will agitate the 
1Quoted by Wasserman, p. 289. The connection between the 
crm·ring taste for terror and the rise of feeling has been vrell covered 
by Monk, and by Boulton in the introduc·t.i!.!n to his edition of Burke 's 
~nguiry. 
2The Critical Works of John Dennis, ed. E. N. llooker (2 vola.; 
London: Oxf~ University Pres;; 1939-1943), I, 150, 151, 165, 264. 
passions, and, although feer and pity are painful emotions, the 
movement caused by ~-~:edy outweighs the pain with pleasure . 
Fontanelle also agrees that the heart by its very nature enjoys 
agitation. The substance of tragedy, if witnessed in real life, 
would evoke pain in the spectator, but since tragedy is only an 
imitation of an action, the audience is aware--however dimly--
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that what is presented to it is a fiction, and the agitation of the 
passions called up by the action is moderated by this knowledge 
into pleasure. 
Mark Akenside predictably combined the increasingv per-
vasive 'benevolism of his day with the Cartesian theory in his 
treatment of the subject. Any f orm of emotional agitation is 
pleasant, he says, if it is a release from the atrophy-like 
condition of mental indolence. But, like Descartes, he modifies 
this with the assertion that the movement of the passions is 
pleasurable as long as those passions do not take from the inner 
virtue of the individual. If the individual is mentally conscious 
of the virtue of his own "interior emotions," then any passion, by 
its motion, will augment this feeling of satisfaction with the 
pleasure which the motion brings. And pity and fear, whioh although 
they are essentially painful passions, yet afford pleasure to the 
mind, are pleasurable in another way . They are socially-oriented 
passions, since their effect is a moral one in that through pity 
and fear for others our benevolence is aroused. Since God has 
ordained this moral cause and effect, the evocation and the ag~tation 
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of pity and fear are pleas~rable indeed. 1 
Another major theory was that which originated in Hobbes's 
mechanistic and "egotistic" explanation of the operation of the mind. 
For him, the passions are 
motion in some internal substance of the ~; which 
motion B£1 stopping there, but proceeding to the heart, 
of necessity must there either help or hinder the motion 
which is called vital; when it helpeth, it is called 
delight, contentment, or pleasure, which is nothing 
really but motion about the heart • • • but when such 
motion weakeneth or hindereth the vital motion, then it 
is called pain. 2 
While the pleasure might be nothing but a motion about the heart, 
this motion was not for Hobbes, as it was for Descartes, the f inal 
cause of that pleasure. With vast consequences for the philosophy 
of the century which succeeded his, he found the source of emotional 
pleasure--in fact of any pleasure--to lie in the efficacy with which 
our self-love, manifested in our appetites, mental and sensual , is 
satisfied: 
This motion, in which consisteth pleasure or pain, is 
also a solicitation or provocation either to draw~ 
to the thing that pleaseth, or to retire from the thine 
from the thing that displeasethJ and this solicitation 
is the endeavour or internal beginning of animal motion, 
\·Jhich i·Then the object delighteth, is called appetite. 3 
That which satisfies my self-centred desires is pleasurable, and 
that which frustrates them is painful.4 Hobbes does not deal 
1~ Pleasures of~ Imagination, II, 157, and 11. 155-159, 
709-711 . 
2Human Nature, VII, sec. 1. The Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. 
Sir William Molesworth (12 vole.; London: John ~ohn, 1840), IV, 31. 
3~., sec. 2. See also sec. 8, p. 34. 
4Thia view is a major factor in the sensationist explanation 
of the nature of good and evil, which is briefly discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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specifically with the pleasure of tragedy, a.nd nei·ther does he 
attempt to explain in detail the nature of terror, but pity in 
his philosophy is "imagination or fiction of future calamity to 
ourselves, proceeding from the sense of another man's calamity."1 
It is thus a painful passion. Hobbes asks what the emotional basis 
is of the pleasure which men experience \Then they "behold from the 
shore the danger of them that are at sea in a tempest, or in fight, 
or from a safe castle • • • behold two armies charge one another in 
the field?112 
It is certainly, in the whole sum, ~ [ and joy is that 
pleasure which is no·t sensual but is rather the "delight 
of the mind 11] ; else men would never flock to such a 
spectacle. Nevertheless there is in it both j£z and ~ief: 
for as their is novelty and remembrance of our own security 
which is delight; so there is also ~' which is grief; 
but the delight is so far predominant, that men are usually 
content in such a case to be spectators of the misery of 
their friends.3 
This type of experience is clearly analogous to the tragic, and so 
it seems justifiable to assume that had Hobbes discussed tragedy 
he wocld have explained its pleasure by pointing to the delight 
Hhich it affords through novelty and remembrance. Curiosity for 
Hobbes was nappetite of knowledge,"4 and thus any experience which 
satisfies curiosity is pleasurable, and furthermore, "because 
curiosity is delight, therefore also novelty is so, but especially 
IV, 44 . 
1 lluman Nature, IX, sec. 10. The Works Q[ Thomas Hobbes, 
2Ibid., sec. 19, pp . 51-52. 
31" . ' 
--!lli!.· 
4~., sec . 18, p . 50 . 
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that novelty from which a man conceiveth an opinion true or false 
1 
of bettering his own estate. 11 Thus in tragedy the pity whicll is 
aroused causes pain to the spectator, but this pain and grief is 
mingled with, and counterbalanced by, the egocentric satisfaction 
of his desire for knowledge, and also by "remembrance," which 
moderates the effect of pity by reminding him that what he sees is 
a fiction--by calling to mind his naecurity present." For Hobbes, 
then, the actual emotions of pity and fear are painful; but tragedy 
is presumably pleasurable (not for itself, it should be noted), 
because it satisfies in several to~ays our self-love. 
Addison. who does discuss tragedy, puts forth a theory 
t>Thich is almost a repetition of Hobbes 1 s own. The etTents Hhich call 
forth pity and fear are in real life inescapably painful, because 
they are so near to us and so momentous that we are unable to turn 
from our involvement with the suffering of the victim to a contem-
plation of our own felicity and security. Tragedy, however, pleases 
because we admire the skill of the dramatist and because our emotions 
are agitated. Up to this point, Addison is merely repeating the 
French theory .. He goes further in maintaining that the act-ual effect 
of tragedy is painful; and the accents of Hobbes are unmis-l;akeable 
when he says that what cancels this pain is our own safety, which t<Te 
1Human Nature, p. 51. Compare The Answer of ~1r . Iiol:bes to 
Sir Vlilliam Davenant 1 s Preface before Go"iciibert, p.453in tne sa,; 
~ume of Molesworth ' s edition: "That "';Thich giveth a poem the true 
and natural colour, consisteth in two things; which are, to ~ well, 
that is, to have images of nature in the memory distinct and clear; 
and !£ ~ ~· .. . A sign of the latter is novelty of expression, 
and pleaseth by excitation of the mind; for novelty causeth admirationJ 
and admiration curiosity, which is a delightful appetite of knowledge." 
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realise when we compare t~e predicament of the tragic protagonist 
with our own position. Again, it is the reinforcement of our self-
1 love which is the cause of pleasure . There is very li t·~le advcw.ce 
on Addison in Dr. Johnson's theory. 
One of the most important theories in the Hobbesian tradition 
was that of David Hume . Although it found few supporters, it was widely 
known, and the theories of men like Hazlitt were in part answers to 
it. In the Treatise £! Human Nature, Hume had proposed in orthodox 
fashion that tragic pleasure originates in the spectator ' s perception 
of the fictional nature of the representation, and that this realisation 
moderates into pleasure the mental and emotional stimulation experienced 
by the spectator . In the second book of the Treatise, llume proposed 
a sympathetic explanation: the pleasure of tragedy derives from the 
intensity of the emotion caused in the spectator ' s breast by his 
identification with the protagonist. 
But Hume found the latter explanation unsatisfactory, and 
in "Of Tragedy, 11 in Four Dissertations, he revised it extensive1.~. 
He accepted du Bos' theory as being "in part satisfactory"; and 
Fontanelle's modification also appeared to him to have some truth 
in it . Fontanelle had recognised that du Boa had made an inadequate 
distinction between the emotional effects of art and of real life--
he had seen the effect of the latter as more violent and longer 
1
rt has been discussed by J . Frederick Doering, "Hume and 
the Theory of Tragedy," .PML.A, LII (193'7), 1130-1134, and by Halph 
Cohen, "The Transformation of Passion: A Study of Hume ' s Theories 
of Tre.5edy," ~' XL (1962), 450-464. 
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lasting, not as different in kind. But to Hume, Fontanelle's theory 
was also inadequate, since it took no cognizance of the fact that art 
can be composed from actual events, and in such instances the pleasure 
cannot be explained as stemming from a fiction: 
The epilogues of Cicero are • • • the delight of every reader 
of taste; and it is difficult to read some of them without 
the deepest sympathy and sorrow •••• The pathetic descrip-
tion of the butchery made by Verres of the Sicilian captains 
is a master-piece of this kindz But I believe none will 
affirm, that the being present at a melancholy scene of that 
nature would afford any entertainment. Neither is the sorrow 
here softened by fiction: For the audience were convinced of 
the reality of every circumstance.l 
The truth of the matter is that our emotions are transmuted into 
aesthetic emotion. All passions, excited by eloquence, are agreeable, 
since pain is overpowered by artistry, "the exercise of noble talents," 
and is converted into pleasure. This transformation originates in 
the fact that the work of art transforms the actual experience--.,The 
impulse or vehemence, arising from sorrow, compassion, indignation, 
receives a new direction from the sentiments of beauty. The latter, 
being the predominant emotions, seize the whole mind, and convert the 
former into themselves, or at least, tincture them so strongly as to 
totally alter their nature.n 2 In addition, imitation is itself 
agreeable, and the fact that we are aware of the skill of the author 
adds to our enjoyment. 
Hume's theory is clear evidence that he was moving towards 
a much-needed distinction between the actual and the aesthetic, a 
1110f Tragedy,"~ Dissertations (London: Printed for A. 
Millar, 1757), P• 190. 
2Ibid., PP• 191-192. 
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distinction which remained blurred, however, as long as ita adum-
brations were couched in the sensationiat vocabulary. In Hume's 
view, the work of art subordinates, controls, and channels the 
emotions it arouses towards an end which is perceived by the imagin-
ation. Although our passions are "involved, 11 our imagination, a 
separate and higher co-ordinating faculty, is more or less distanced, 
and through it we are conscious that the passions are ordered in an 
artistic context. Since they elicit a different response from that 
which reality would evoke, our sympathy with the sufferer on the stage 
is limited and moderated by a measure of disinterest, and we thus 
achieve the distance which is necessary for aesthetic appreciation: 
We may observe, that every work of art, in order to produce 
its due effect on the mind, must be surveyed in a certain 
point of view, and cannot be fully relished by persons, whose 
situation, real or imaginary! is not conformable to that 
required by the performance. 
As the century passed the mid-way mark, the doctrine of 
sympathy was more and more frequently used in explanations of the 
pleasure of tragedy. The theories which we have noted all imply a 
measure of detachment from the tragic action and characters, even if 
it is a detachment which is necessary solely for our appreciation of 
the fact that the action is a fiction or that imitation itself is a 
pleasing process. Also, the Cartesian theory demands and gives 
impetus to a type of tragedy which will be sufficiently formal and 
artificial to reduce the emotional agitation from pain to pleasure, 
1
"0n the Standard of Taete,n ~Dissertations, p. 224. 
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while the Hobbesian demands a tragedy which will be sufficiently 
unreal to remind us of our own security. But as early in the century 
as Shaftesbury, the implication is made that the spectator himself 
experiences, through sympathetic identification, the emotions which 
the tragic character udergoes, and t~at this very identification 
is delightful. As sympathetic theorias multiply and become more 
closely detailed, the former implicit assumptions of artificiality, 
formality, and unreality are gradually superseded by a criterion of 
probability and verisimilitude. Both in the plays themselves and in 
dramatic theory, fable and event become less important than character, 
and indeed by Hazlitt's day it was accepted that one of the aims of 
drama was the presentation of character in depth--not so much in action.1 
Burke's treatment of the problem in the Enquiry is a store 
of the points wluch later writers were to use. He divides the passions 
into two categories, those pertaining to self-preservation, which 
turn mostly upon pain and danger, and those pertaining to society, 
of which the chief is sympathy. When pain and danger are distanced 
and modified, they beoome delightfulJ and what is more, 
whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of 
pain, and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any 
sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, 
or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source 
of the sublimeJ that is, productive of the strongest 
emotion which the mind is capable of feeling.2 
111Unreality11 is used here in a relative sense. The growing 
interest in character can easily be traced in the essays in Eiehteenth 
Century Essays~ Shakes earet ed. David Nichol Smith (2nd ed.; Oxford: 
at the Clarendon Press, 1963 • 
2Edmund Burke, ! Philosophical Enquiry iai£ the Origin ££ ~ 
Ideas£!~ Sublime~ Beautiful, ed. J. T. Boulton (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1958), P• 39· 
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For this reason, "objects which in the reality would shook, are in 
tragioal, and such like represent~tione, the source of a very high 
1 
species of pleasure." Because of sympathy, we can never be indifferent 
to the actions and circumstances of those about us; therefore, sympathy 
oan "partake of the nature of those passions which regard self-
2 preservation, and turning upon pain may be a source of the sublime." 
It is through sympathy that the "affecting arts" engraft 
pleasure upon wretchedness, misery, and death itself. Our knowledge 
that what passes before our eyes on the stage is a fiction, is not 
sufficient to account for the pleasure of tragedy, and the theory that 
the pleasure stems from our realisation of our own safety is simply 
fallacious. What is true is that we take a certain pleasure in the 
real misfortunes of other people; there can be no other explanation, 
holds Burke, for the human predilection for watching executions, 
conflagrations, or the after-effects of calamities such as earth-
quakes. If the sufferer is illustrious, our pleasure is even greater, 
and it is increased if his fate appears unmerited, "for terror is a 
passion which always produces delight when it does not press too close, 
and pity is a passion accompanied with pleasure, because it arises 
from love and social affection."3 Furthermore, the sympathetic bond 
is part of the Divine Plan: 
Whenever we are formed by nature to any active purpose, 
the passion which animates us to it, is attended with 
1Enguiry, p. 44. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., P• 46. 
delight, or a pleasure of some kind, let the subject 
matter be what it will; and as our Creator has designed 
we should be united with the bond of sympathy, he has 
strengthened that bond by a proportionable delight; and 
there most where our sympathy is wanted, in the distresses 
of othera.l 
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But the pleasure aroused by another's suffering is not unalloyed; 
it is "blended with no small uneasiness"--the pain prompts us to 
relieve ourselves by relieving others, and this sympathetic drive 
is intuitive and immediate, pre-rational. 
The only difference between reality and "imitated 
distresses" in the matter of pleasure is that imitation itself is 
ple.asurable. Burke avoids the detachment implicit on this point in 
the earlier theories by asserting that our apprehension of the 
fictional nature of the events is not the result of a rational 
process but of intuition. This additional pleasure is really a 
comparatively slight one, because the nearer the representation 
approaches the reality, ttand the fUJ.ther it removes us from all 
idea of fiction, the more perfect is its power. 112 (Sympathy is, 
in Burke's philosophy and in those of his successors, a "passion" 
designed primarily for the real relationships of society; it is 
an extension of this basic assumption that the greater the veri-
similitude and probability, the more powerfully affecting and 
therefore the better the drama will be.) Even the most realistic 
tragedy, however moving it may be, is far from equal to "the thing 
it represents"; if the very best tragedy were to be presented under 
1E . 46 • ngu~ry, p. • 
2Ibid., p, 47. 
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the most favourable conditions, and it were to be announced just 
before the curtain rose that a notorious criminal were to be executed 
in the next square, the audience would leave the theatre and ":proclaim 
the triumph o.f the real sym:pathy."1 The true answer to the question 
why we feel pain at the reality and pleasure in the representation 
is that "we delight in seeing things, which so far from doing, our 
heartiest wishes would be to see redressed." We do not, in other words, 
desire tragedy to occur, but when it does, we are :pleased by our 
2 
sympathy with the sufferers. 
Lord Kames, whose Elements £!Criticism went through a 
large number of editions after its publication in 1762, was a little 
more conservative than Burke was in discussing the pleasure of tragedy. 
In addition to accepting the well-worn argument that artistry and 
imitation are pleasing .in themselves, he goes back to the old theory 
of the agreeable agitation of the passionel "objects that strike 
terror in a spectator, have in poetry and painting a fine effect. 
The picture, by raising a slight emotion of terror, agitates the 
mind; and in that condition every beauty makes a deep impression."3 
Kames also accepts the notion that our realisation of our present 
security is pleasurable in contrast to the action represented by the 
tragedy, but, like Burke, he holds that the intuitive nature of our 
perception of the fiction is immediate and leaves no "leisure for 
1Enguiry, p. 47· 
2Ibid. 
3 Henry Home, Lord Kames, Elements ]i Criticism ( 5th ed.; 
2 vols.; Edinburgh: A. Kincaid & W. Creech~ !l•t 1774) II, 365. 
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reflection. 111 Pity , which is always painful and y3t always 
2 
agreeable, is t he spring of the lasting pleasure which tragedy 
offers. \f.hen we are faced by distress and painfully-affecting things, 
the benevolence of our nature gives a very different 
direction to the painful passion of sympathy, and to 
the desire involved in it: instead of avoiding distress, 
we fly to it in order to afford relief; and our sympathy 
cannot be otherwise gratified but by giving all the 
succour in our power. Thus external signs of distress, 
tho' disagreeable, are attractive .3 
\<1 hat restrains us from rushing onto the stage and assisting the hero 
is, of course, our intuitive realisation that we are watching a 
fictional representation. Specifically, tragedy is pleasing in 
spite of the painful nature of its subject because "Sympathy, tho' 
painful, is attractive, and attaches us to an object in distress, 
instead of prompting us to fly from it.n4 
Hugh Blair's theory is somewhat more thorough-going than 
Kames •s.5 Tragedy deals in pity and terror, but we experience a 
measure of relief from these passions by our pleasure in the 
dramatist 's artistry and our apprehension of the fictional nature 
of the drama. Tragedy raises the highest emotions, those which 
are virtuous--"love and admiration of virtuous characters, compassion 
for the injured and the distressed, and indignation against the 
authors of their suffering, are the sentiments most generally raised 
6 by tragedy." Therefore tragedy is moral in its effect. ~lair even 
1Elements ££Criticism, I, 95-96. 2Ibid., I, 110. 
3Ibid., I, 447· 4Ibid., I, 447-448 n. 
5rt is very close to George Campbell'n. See The Philosophy 
of Rhetoric (2 vola.; London: W. Strahan ~ al., 1776), Bk. I, ch. xi. 
6Lecturee ~Rhetoric~ Belles Lettres (8th ed.; 3 vola.; 
London: T. Cadell, W. Davies, and w. Creech, Edinburgh, 1801), III, 274. 
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rejects Aristotle's theory of catharsis, and asserts that the true 
function of the form is the improvement of our 11 virtuoue sensibility." 
On this basis, the natural and the probable must always 
be the distinguishing marks of tragedy, in order that the 11 tender 
passions" may be moved. "Passion can be raised, only by making the 
impressions of nature, and of truth, upon the mind."1 Because the 
best tragedies, by this definition, are the closest to reality, real 
distress is often occasioned to the spectators; what then is the 
nature of tragic pleasure? It lies, says Blair in the Burkean 
tradition, in the very operation of sympathy: "By the vise and 
gracious constitution of our nature, the exercise of all the social 
passions is attended with pleasure •••• Whenever man takes a strong 
interest in the concerns of his fellow creatures, an internal 
satisfaction is made to accompany the feeling. Pity, or compassion, 
2 
••• is attended with a peculiar attractive power." But pity 
includes a degree of distress because of the sympathy with the 
sufferer which it involves; ho~er, as it includes benevolence and 
friendship it "partakes of their pleasing nature," and pleasure is 
its dominant effect. 11 At the same time," says Blair, 
the immediate pleasure, which always goes along with the 
operation of the benevolent and sympathetic affections, 
derives an addition from the approbation of our own minds. 
We are pleased with ourselves, for feeling as we ought, and 
for entering, with proper sorrow, into the concerns of the 
afflicted.) 
1tectures £n Rhetoric ~ Belles Lettres, III, 276. 
2~., pp. 293-294· 
3Ibid., p. 294· 
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By the time Hazlitt formulated his theory of the pleasure 
of tragedy, the doctrine of sympathy had, as we have seen, achieved 
a dominant position in aesthetics as well as in ethics. It had 
given impetus to and maintained the progress of the sentimental drama, 
and had contributed significantly to the emergence of the pathetic, 
or "middle-class" tragic hero. Lord Kames had distinguished the 
different types of tragedy according to the different ends they aimed 
at. Pathetic tragedy, he concluded, simply moves the passions and 
exhibits pictures of virtue and vice; moral tragedy, the category 
described by Aristotle, is designed to illustrate some moral truth. 
Both types "tend to a habit of virtue, by exciting us to do what is 
1 
right, and restraining us from what is wrong." Pathetic tragedies 
evoke pity, while moral tragedies arouse fear also. The best subject 
for a pitiful effect "is where a man of integrity falls into a great 
misfortune" as a consequence of his essentially innocent action. Moral 
tragedy turns upon some "misfortune" which "must be occasioned by a 
fault incident to human nature, and therefore in some degree venial," 
and 
when a misfortune is the natural consequence of some wrong 
bias in the temper, every spectator who is conscious of such 
a bias in himself, takes the alarm, and dreads his falling 
into the same misfortue [ sic] a and by the emotion of fear 
or terror, frequently reiterated in a variety of moral 
tragedies, the spectators2are put upon their guard against the disorders of passion. 
But of all the passions, sympathy is the most valuable and the most 
1Elements £[Criticism, II, 374. 
2 . ~., PP• 376-377, 378. 
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agreeable, and sympathy is most efficiently aroused by "the mis-
1 fortunes of virtuous persons, arising from necessary causes," or 
by the presentation of 'a perfect ·character, suffering under mis-
fortunes." In short, for Kames, and for many other people of the 
period, the end of tragedy--the moat effective kind of tragedy--is 
2 
"to rouse our sympathy, tho' [it] inculcate no moral.n Blair adds 
to this that there is no need for the tragic hero to be illustrious 
in order that our sympathy be raised; he must merely be worthy of 
our moral approval, for the intention of tragedy is the improvement 
of our virtuous sensibility.3 The doctrine of sympathy had. by the 
end of the eighteenth century, effectively consolidated the dominance 
of the sentimental drama. It had minimised the tragic irony, since 
tragedy was now to be designed simply toarouse sympathetic amotions; 
it denied what many earlier critics and playwrights had taken to be 
a positively moral function of the genre, since it made unnecessary 
the inculcation of moral lessons through the agency of pity and fear--
now the mere experience of sympathy was a moral experience; and it 
undermined the Aristotelian concept of purgation of the emotions by 
pity and fear, 4 and substituted the evocation of compassion as an 
end in itself, for, as Kames indicated, the sympathetic emotions are 
1Elements £!Criticism, II, 381. 
2
_lliS. ' p. 380. 
3Lecturea 2a Rhetoric ~ Belles Lettres, III, 274-275 . 
4I understand Aristotle's doctrine of catharsis to mean that 
the painful element inherent in the emotions of pity and fear as ex-
perienced in real l ife is purged by the tragic experience, resulting 
in the distinctive pleasure of tragedy--a blending of the two emotions 
in an essentially aesthetic effect . 
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capable of refinement and improvement by exercise.1 The doctrine of 
hamartia was replaced in popular taste by the concept of the perfectly 
innocent hero, whose su£ferings are brought about by external forces 
over which he has no control whatever; and as the tragic action and 
characters had to approach as closely to reality as possible in order 
that the most intense sympathy might result, the tragic character 
was frequently represented as a man whose distinction from the audience 
existed not so much in his high estate or personal greatness as in 
the nerve-racking situations into which he was plunged. The purpose 
of the dramatist had become the promotion of pity, the refinement 
of sensibility, and verisimilitude, while the test of his work was 
not so muoh its artistry as the intensity of the emotions it raised. 
For the critic, character-depiction was the criterion of dramatic 
skill, and character moved out from its old integration with plot and 
action to become the drama itself. 
Hazlitt •s explanation of the pleasure of tragedy is to be 
found in scattered remarks throughout his work. It is on two or three 
occasions only that he deals with the problem explicitly, but never-
theless a coherent theory does emerge, and it is the best basis for 
explaining Hazlitt •s theory of tragedy itself . 
He acknowledges that objects in themselves disagreeable or 
indifferent often please in the imitation. One source of this pleasure 
is "undoubtedly the surprise or feeling of admiration, occasioned by 
1Elements of Criticism, II, 377-378. 
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the unexpected coincidence between the imitation and t he object."1 
But this pleasure does not inhere only in the novelty of the 
experience, since it endures beyond our first exposure to the 
imitation, and is evoked each time we confront the work of art. 
Hazlitt falls back upon a modified version of the Hobbesian idea 
tha~ the mere satisfaction of our desire for knowledge is itself 
pleasant: 
Imitation pleases ••• because, by exciting curiosity, 
and inviting a comparison between the object and the 
representation, it opens a new field of inquiry, and 
leads the attention to a variety of details and distinct-
ions not perceived before. This latter source of the 
pleasure • • • has never been properly insisted on.2 
But the pleasure which Hazlitt here characterises does not stem 
simply from our perception of literal similarity between object 
and representation. There can be no dispute over the fact that 
Hazlitt ' s distinction between imitation and copying is far less 
clear and less systematically worked out than that of Coleridge; 
the former often uses the words synonymously, and frequently, as 
in the passage quoted above, seems to move toward a position in 
which the validity of artistic imitation is apparently held to 
consist in the faithful and literal representation of detail. 
But it should be remembered that Hazlitt felt that art provides 
the spectator with a new experience of reality, the "truth" of 
which consists in truth to feeling rather than in literal 
imitation. The pleasure we experience in the imitation of objects 
1
"0n Imitation, " ~ Round Table, \o/orks, IV, 72. 
2Ibid., p. 73. 
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in themselves disagreeable is pleasure "in proportion to the insight 
we acquire into the distinctions of nature and of art." It is, 
however vaguely Hazlitt expresses it, aesthetic pleasure; art has 
given us new eyes with which to see the object. This represents a 
clear advance on the Burkean conception of the distinction between 
art and reality, in which it is implied that the fundamental 
difference is little more than art ' s comparative lack of immediacy. 
"Art, 11 says Hazlitt, "may be said to draw aside the veil from 
nature," and 
renders an object, displeasing in itself, a source of 
pleasure, not by repetition of the same idea, but by 
suggesting new ideas, by detecting new properties, and 
endless shades of difference, just as a close and con-
tinued contemplation of the object itself would do. Art 
shows us nature, divested of the medium of our prejudices.l 
It gives us knowledge, and knowledge is pleasure. 
Hazlitt accepts also the venerable theory which holds that 
the excitement of intellectual activity is itself pleasing, but in 
his hands it becomes a far more sophisticated piece of psychology. 
He sounds fairly orthodox when he writes that "it is not the quality 
eo much as the quantity of excitement that we are anxious about: we 
cannot bear a state of indifference and ennui: the mind seems to 
2 
abhor a vacuum as much aa ever matter was supposed to do." But 
the more our minds are stimulated, the more our knowledge grows,3 
and of course poetry is interesting because "it relates to what-
1
"0n Imitation," IV, 73-74• 
2
n0n the Pleasure of Hating," ~ Plain Speaker, il[orks, 
XII, 128. 
3"0n Imitation," IV, 76 . 
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ever is most interesting in human life."1 On this basis Flazlitt can 
assert that the poet is superior to the scientist or the philosopher, 
as he exercises reason and intellect combined with nature and passion. 
Ona source of the pleasure of tragic poetry, then, is the stimulation 
it gives to our curiosity and the addition it makes to our kno,-tledge 
of man ' s nature , while at the same time it enables us to feel more 
deeply and to exercise our imaginative faculties . 2 The dramatic 
presentation of evil--the character of Iago, let us say--is thus 
attractive rrfrom the interest it excites, the sharper edge which it 
sets on our curiosity and imagination. "3 
"Without something to hate,•: 1iazlitt says of life in 
general, "we should lose the very spring of thought and action. Life 
would turn to a stagnant pool, were it not ruffled by the jarring 
interests, the unruly passions of men."4 This dark statement leads 
him on to the attitude which he expresses in several other essays 
and which is at the heart of his explanation of the pleasure of 
tragedy, and of ita moral function. "There is a hankering after 
evil in the human mind, and ••• it takes a perverse, but a 
fortunate delight in mischief, since it is a never-failing source 
1
"Lear," Characters of Shakespear ' s Pla:rs, \-larks , IV, 271. 
2The whole question of the pleasurable nature of imaginative 
activity is related to the Romantic stress on the importance of 
suggestion, which enables the reader to "fill out the mould11 of the 
work with his own feelings and thoughts. 
3non Mr. Kean 1 s Iago,'1 ~Round Table, \·Iorks, IV, 1~> . 
4non the Pleasure of Hating, 11 XII, 128. In "11ore on Hazlitt 's 
Preference .for Tragedy," m!, LXXIII (1958), 443-445, Sylvan Barnet 
takes this attitude to be evidence of Hazli tt 1 s 11 cynicism'1 and his 
malignity. \1/i th due respect, 110n the Pleasure of llating" is not wholly 
serious, and in any case the view Hazlitt expresses appears to me to 
be more realistic than malignant. 
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of satisfaction. Pure good soon grows insipid, ''ants variety and 
spirit . Pain is a bitter-sweet, which never surfeits . " Not only 
do painfully-affecting objects and events, in real life and on the 
stage, lift us out of a disagreeable mental or emotional vacuum, 
and provide that variety which is the spice of life, but the very 
pain is somehow pleasing in the excitement of feeling and passion 
which it causes. All poetry, and especially the dramatic, has 
amonest its aims the excitation of passion, and the closer it seems 
to reality the more intensely will the passions be aroused--11 the 
greatest strength of genius is shewn in describing the strongest 
passions: for the power of imagination, in works of invention, must 
be in proportion to the force of the natural impressions, which are 
the subject of them."1 
Pain "never surfeits"; like Burke, and actually referring 
to him, Hazlitt cites the perennial interest men take in barbarous 
sports, exhibitions of cruelty, newspaper accounts of dreadful events, 
and so forth . This interest, which Hazlitt is surely not wrong in 
thinking to be almost inseparable from man ' s nature, springs from 
the "tendency in the mind to strong excitement, whether good or evil; 
and in truth, evil has this advantage over good, that it is the 
strongest [sic] excitement of the two." 2 On this assumption, Hazlitt 
ca.n insist that 
the pleasure • • • derived from tragic poetry, is not any 
1
"Lear," IV, 271 . 
2The Life ££ Napoleon Buonaparte, Works, XIII, 134. 
thing peculiar to it as poetry, as a fictitious and 
fanciful thing. It is not an anomaly of the imagination. 
It has its source in the common love of strong excitement. 
As Mr. Burke observes, people flock to see a tragedy; but 
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if there were a public execution in the next street, the 
theatre would very soon be empty. It is not then the 
difference between fiction and reality that solves the 
difficulty •••• We are as prone to make a torment of our 
fears, as to luxuriate in our hopes of good ••• we 
cannot help it . The sense of pover is as strong a prin-
ciple in the mind as the love of pleasure. Objects of terror 
and pity exercise the same despotic control over it as those 
of love or beauty . It is as natural to hate as to love, to 
express our hatred or contempt, as our love or admiration.l 
The delight in strong excitement does not, hov1ever, blind us to what 
is good and what is bad on the moral plane. While the spectator 
does not exult when the fire he has run to •mtch is extinL,ruished 
(even though he knows uit is better to have it so"), since his 
"feelings" take part with his upassions" rather than with his 
uunderstan<iing, ,?-yet 
in reading we always take the rig·h t side, and make the 
case properly our own •• • • Our own passions, interests, 
and prejudices out of the question, or in an abstracted 
point of view, we judge fairly and conscientiously; for 
conscience is nothing but the abstract idea of rie;ht and 
wrong •••• On the stage, every one takes part with 
Othello against Iago. Do boys at school, in readin.g 
Homer, generally side with the Greeks or Trojans?3 
In fact, while we naturally derive pleasure from the strong emotional 
excitement which evil or things disagreeable in themselves can arouse, 
we find that the representation of such things in art calls into 
operation our sympathy, which is unerring in its distinctions and 
1 non Poetry in General, '1 Lectures .2.!! lli, :SnrdisL. :'c.;~Js, 
v/orks, v' 7. 
2 
"On the Pleasure of Hating," XII, 128. 
3~., PP• 136-137 n . 
134 
intuitive in its action, and evil is defined before us. The question 
does not turn upon a paradox; it is 
not that we like what we loathe; but we like to indulge 
our hatred and scorn of it; to d'vell upon it, to exasperate 
our idea of it by every refinement of ingenuity and 
extravagance of illustration; to make it a bugbear to 
ourselves, to point it out to others in all the splendour 
of deformity, to stigmatiae it by name, to grapple with it 
in thought, in action, to sharpen our intellect, to arm our 
will against it, to know the worst we1have to contend with, and to contend with it to the utmost. 
It is this recognition of evil, and the power over it which the 
recot,rni tion affords us, ~rhich give another dimension to a facet 
of Hazlitt ' s explanation of the pleasure of tragedy, which would 
otherwise seem to be little more than a repetition of the Hobbesian 
concept of our own safety. If "the imagination of a poet brings 
such objects before us, as when we look at wild beasts in a menagerieJ 
their cla,v-s are pared, their eyes glitter like harmless lightning," 
nevertheless "we gaze at them with a pleasing awe, clothed in 
2 beauty, formidable in the sense of abstract power. " 
On one or two occasions Hazlitt's remarks would appear 
to suggest that he also considered tragedy to afford a kind of 
nervous relief from the troubles of everyday existence . He writes 
that tragedy "tugs at the heart-strings; loosens the pressure about 
them," 3 and again that through it we have "the loaded bosom ' cleansed 
of that perilous stuff that weighs upon the soul, ' by witnessing 
the struggles and the mortal strokes that 'flesh is heir to . •" 4 Tie 
1
"0n Poetry in General," V, 7. 
211 0n Chaucer and Spenser,n V, 26- 27 . 
3"0n Poetry in General," V, 6. 
4nThe Dramaa No. IX," 'Works, XVIII, 362. 
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does not pursue this line, fz~itful as it had been in discussions 
of catharsis before him, because in his view the true relief is 
emotional and sympathetic, and therefore, as the next chapter will 
show, moral . we go to tragedies, and enjoy cruel sports, because 
of the natural tendency in our minds to strong excitement. 11\-ihenever 
this principle is not under the restraint of humanity or the sense 
of· moral obligation, there are no excesses to which it "VTill r1.ot of 
itself give rise, without the assistance of any other motive"; 1 but, 
as we have seen, tragedy, through sympathy, supplies the restraint 
of humanity and the sense of moral obligation. 
If tragedy arouses intense sympathy, and if 11 a sense of 
compassion is involuntarily excited by the immediate appearance of 
distress • • • a violence and injury is done to the kindly feelings 
by withholding the obvious relief, the trifling pittance in our 
power112--if this is so, what is there to stop us from rushing onto 
the stage to see that right is done? Earlier, theorists had said 
that the restrictive agent was the quiet insistence of reason on the 
fact that the events before the spectator were fictitious, but there 
is little room in Hazlitt's aesthetic theory for that rational 
faculty which stresses personal identity at the expense of sympathetic 
identificatjon. The answer lies in the nature of dramatic illusion, 
which Hazlitt felt had not been fully exploredt 
There are different degrees and kinds of belief . The point 
1
ut:lr . l{ean 1 5 Iago,"!! ~ _Qf ..:Jill! English StaRe , Works, 
V, 213 . Cf. "On Depth and Superficiality,"~ Plain Speaker, \io~ks, 
XII, 346 . 
211 0n Reason and Imagination,~' XII, 49· 
is not whether we do or do not believe what we see to 
be a positive reality, but how far and in what manner 
we uelieve in it. ~e do not say every moment to our-
selves, ' This is real ' : but neither do we say every 
moment, ' This is not real. ' The involuntary impression 
oteals upon us till we recollect ourselves. The appear-
ance of reality, in fact, is the reality, so long and 
in far as \Te a.re not conscious of the contradictory 
circumstances that disprove it. The belief in a well-
acted traJedy never amounts to what witnessing the 
actual scene would prove, and never sinks into a mere 
phantasmagoria. l"ts power of affecting us is not, ho,'l'-
ever, taken a"\>Iay, even if we abstract the feeling of 
identity; for it still suggests a stronger idea of what 
the reality would ~' just as a picture reminds us more 
powerfully of the person for whom it is intended, though 
we are conscious it is not the same.l 
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And the same answer covers the question whether we actually suffer 
with the tragic hero when we watch his progress . ~e believe according 
to and in proportion to the intensity of the feeling which the 
tragedy excites . To ask " 1vrhy that which is painful in i taelf, pleases 
in works of fiction, '" is, for Hazlitt, nnot a fair statement of the 
question," because "that which is painful in itself, pleases not the 
sufferer indeed, but the spectator, in reality as well as in works of 
fiotion . " 2 Until we "recollect oureelves, 11 our craving for strong 
exci·tement is indulged, and we do suffer by sympathy, although our 
suffering never attains the intensity of personal, real experience; 
and tragedy "exhausts the terror or pity by an unlimited indulgence 
of it," loses 11 the sense of present sufferina- in the imaginary 
e:x.alsoera!;:im· of it," and "brings every moment of our being or object of 
1 
... c.r~arc.cteristics, CCLXXXIX . ';Jorks, IX, 209 . This book was 
published in lu(:j. ilazli tt seems to be una\o~are of Coleridt.~e 1 s or Lamb 1 s 
ideas on tne sub~ect. 
2A Letter to \-lilliam Gifford, Esq., \'i o::-ks, IX, 48. 
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nature in startling review before us; and in the rapid whirl of 
events, lifts tiS from the depths of woe to the highest contemplations 
on hUlllan life. 111 what is important, then, is that through our own 
suffering--interrupted though it may be- -and our pleasure, we gain 
in knowledge of the human condition, and our perspective is broad-
e:ned and deepened to include, through the picture of tLe tr·agic 
protagonist, a definitive depiction of mankind in the strugsle 
a~ainst evil. Sympathy is the faculty by which we attain to this 
k:nowledt;e, and it is the sympathetic imagination which gives to 
tra6 edy its moral force: 
The circumstance which balances the pleasure against 
the pain in tragedy is, that in proportion to t he 
breatness of the evil , is our sense of the opposite 
good excited; and that our sympathy with actual 
suffering is lost in the strong impulse given to our 
natural affections, and carried away with the swelling 
tide of passion, that gushes from and relieves the 
heart . 
Hazlitt sees the real pleasure of tragedy as a moral one. If his 
explanation of that pleasure is little more than a synthesis of 
t h e main points of the theories current toward t he end of the 
eighteenth century, his view of the substance of the form - ,o~hich 
produces it is, as we shall now see, surprisingly modern. 
111 0r.. Poetry in General," V, 5. 
2 
"Lear,u IV, 271-272 . 
CHAPTER VI 
Poetic truth in Hazlitt 's theory is in one sense the 
fidelity with which the poet renders the intense impression which 
an object or experience has made upon his mind. This truth augments 
the aesthetic pleasure we take in the artist's formal skill: 
Truth ••• doubles the effect of beauty, which is mere 
affectation without it, and even reconciles us to deformity. 
Nature, the truth of nature in imitation, denotes a given 
object, a 'foregone conclusion' in reality, to which the 
artist is to conform in his copy. In nature real objects 
exist, real causes act, which are only supposed to act in 
art; and it is in the subordination of the uncertain and 
superficial combinations of fancy to the more stable and 
powerful law of reality that the perfection of art exists • 
• • • The difficulty and the charm of the combination 
begins with the truth of imitation, that is, with the 
resemblance to a given object in nature, or in other words, 
with the strength, coherence, and justness of our impress-
ions, which must be verified by a reference to a known and 
determinate class of objects as the test. Art must anchor 
in nature.l 
Art embodies and re-presents the ideas which are conveyed by natural 
objects, and it expresses the feelings which those objects cause. 
"The capacity of expressing these movements of passion is in pro-
portion to tl»e power with which they are felt, 112 and this capacity 
depends upon the poet 's sympathetic imagination. In his insistence 
on naturalism, on the value in art of the concrete and the particular, 
Hazlitt is not, of course, rejecting as lacking in artistic truth 
1
"Madame Pasta and Mademoiselle Mars,"~ Plain Speaker, 
Works, XII, 534. 
2Ibid. 
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those works which treat of subjects outside the personal experience 
of the spectator. A narrow critical relativism such as that is 
entirely foreign to him. What he does insist upon is that while the 
poetic imagination is able to create, to perceive the hidden analogies, 
it mus.t necessarily start in its creative process from nature and not 
from abstraction. Equally necessarily, the imagination proceeds from 
experience, since it is in experience that the impressions of nature 
are stored. It is the triumph of orighality or genius "not to shew 
us what has never been, and what we may therefore very easily never 
have dreamt of, but to point out to us what is before our eyes and 
1 
under our feet." The poet's experience, like the reader's, is com-
posed of innumerable gestures, looks, tones, effects, feelings, and 
impressions, in innumerable circumstances, variously modified; the 
"sum total of such unconscious impressions in the ordinary occurrences 
of life, as they are treasured up in the memory, and called out by 
2 
the occasion," is what Bazlitt calls common sense. Every impression 
of which common sense is compounded is coloured by the association of 
ideas that was produced by the circumstances surrounding the original 
experience, and when the poet undergoes a new but analogous experience 
which arouses him to the creative state, "the tide of passion ••• 
overflows and gradually insinuates itself into all nooks and corners 
of the mind •••• The springs of pure feeling will arise and fill 
the moulds of fancy that are fit to receive it.113 According to the 
1nen Genius and Common Sense," Table-,!ill, Works, VIII, 43. 
2Ibid., P• 32. 
3Ibid., P• 41. 
-
r 
140 
associationists, any impression in a series can recall any other 
impression in that series without going through the whole in order; 
the mind can drop the intermediate links, and pass on immediately 
from the impression to its most striking emotional effect: 
In other words, the feeling of pleasure or of pain, of 
good or evil, is revived, and acts instantaneously upon 
the mind, before we have time to recollect the precise 
objects which have originally given birth to it •••• 
By doing this habitually and skilfully with respect to 
the various impressions and circumstances with which our 
experience makes us acquainted, [the mind] forms a series 
of unpremeditated conclusions on almost all subjects that 
can be brought before it, just as they are of ready 
application to human life, and common sense is the name 
of this body of unassuming or practical wisdom.l 
There is clearly a difference between the reality and the poetic 
representation of it. Hazlitt says that while the poet must 
anchor his feelings in nature, "perverse fidelity of detail" 
makes, in art, "that which is literally true" seem •'naturally 
false. 112 Emotional correspondence is the criterion. While 
there is necessary a literal disproportion between reality and 
work of art--between, say, reference and metaphorical referent--
"the intensity of the feeling makes up for the disproportion of 
the objects. 11 3 It is the intensity and the "truth of feeling11 
which both enables the poet to transform the matter of fact into 
art, and the reader to recreate in his own mind the poet's 
original impression and to feel on his own pulse and in his own 
experience its truth. Great poetry is true, then, because it 
1
"on Genius and Common Sense," VIII, 34-35. 
211Madame Pasta and Mademoiselle Mars," XII, 333. 
311 0n Poetry in General," Lectures .2a ~English Poets, 
Works, V, 6. 
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faithfully recreates the impression which the poet's mind has 
received from nature. 
But clearly it is true in a deeper and more permanent 
way as well. "Neither a mere description of natural objects, nor a 
mere delineation of natural feelings, however distinct and forcible, 
constitutes the ultimate end and aim of poetry, without the' height-
1 
enings of the imagination." The poetic imagination, under the 
stress of passion, intuitively draws for its materials upon common 
sense, and "represents forms chiefly as they suggest other forms; 
2 feelings, as they suggest other forms or feelings." Passion is 
the catalyst in the creative experiment, enabling the imagination 
to adduce from common sense ' s store the "other f orme" and "other 
feelings" the habitual and experiential nature of which confirms 
and strengthens the fidelity to the momentary impression. "lm-
passioned poetry," of which the highest form is tragedy, is true 
because it is grounded firmly in experience; this foundation, since 
man ' s capacity to feel changes little from age to age, gives to 
impassioned poetry its timelessness and its universal validity: 
the storm of passion lays bare and shews us the rich 
depths of the human soul; the whole of our existence, 
the sum total of our passions and pursuits, of that 
which we desire and that which we dread, is brought 
before us.3 
I n contrast to impassioned poetry, there is 11 poetry of sensibility," 
which appeals solely to our power to feel. Tragedy "is an emanation 
1n0n Poetry in General," V, ). 
2lli.£. 
3Ibid., p. 6. 
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of the moral and intellectual part of our nature, as well as of the 
sensitive--of the desire to know, the will to act, and the power to 
feel; and ought to appeal to these different parts of our constitution, 
1 in order to be perfect." Poetry of sensibility lacks the informing 
power Df passion, and is "immediate, personal, instead of being per-
2 
manent and universal." It does not draw on or appeal to the 
validating force of common sense, which 
is an impartial, instinctive result of truth and nature, 
and will therefore bear the test and abide the scrutiny 
of the moat severe and patient reasoning. It is indeed 
incomplete without it. ~y ingrafting reason on feeling, 
we 'make assurance double aure.•3 
Passion is not only intense feeJing, but it is also a means of 
revealing truths and correspondences which are available to the 
moral and inte!ectual part of our nature. Since the poetry of 
sensibility appeals only to our power to feel, it is narrower, 
and less true, than tragedy. 
The domestic or prose tragedy, which ie thought to be the 
most natural, is in this sense the least so, because it 
appeals almost exclusively to ••• our sensibility. The 
tragedies of Moore and Lillo, for this reason, however 
affecting at the time, oppress and lie like a dead weight 
upon the mind, a load of misery which it is unable to 
throw offa the tragedy of Shakspeare, which is true poetry, 
stirs our inmost ~ctions: abstracts evil from itself by 
combining it with all the forms of imagination, and with 
the deepest workings of the heart, and rouses the whole 
man within us. 4 
Mere sensibility implies, as Hazlitt's strictures on Wordsworth, 
lno.n Poetry in General," V, 6. 
2
"Mr. Southey," ~Spirit£!~~' Works, XI, 80. 
3"0n Genius and Common Sense," VIII, 35-36. 
4"0n Poetry in General," V, 6. 
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Rousseau, and Southey, the Laureate, show, a tendency on the poet ' s 
1 part toward egotism. We have already examined Hazlitt's concept of 
the sympathetic nature of the imagination, and his belief that 
through sympathy it is possible to escape from one ' s own identity 
and, to use Keats ' s words, take part in the "existince" of other 
individuals, ·and even of external objects. On this basis, as well 
as on the grounds of passion, a poet's ability to express truth 
will be severely hampered if his imagination is introverted. Clearly, 
the ·degree of poetic truth will be higher in proportion as the poet 
is able to express emotion, rather than describe it. If the in-
tuitive power of the imagination enables him to annihilate his own 
identity and to identify with others, he will, in proportion as his 
common sense is developed and augmented by this process of cognition, 
be able to efface himself from his work and produce a more intense 
perception of the truth and reality of his subject. Shakespeare, 
for example, was "the least of an egotist that it was possible to 
be," and "the striking peculiarity" of his mind was its "generic 
quality, its power of communication with all other minds--so that 
it contained a universe of thought and feeling within itself ." Again, 
"by an art like that of the ventriloquist, he throws his imagination 
1But Hazlitt believed, and seldom failed to state, that 
Wordsworth ' s weakness was also his strength. No-one before him had 
had the power of sensibility to such a degree "as to lend to it the 
voice of inspiration, as to make it the foundation of a new school 
in poetry • • • • He has opeaed a new avenue to the human heart, has 
explored another secret haunt and nook of nature, 'sacred to verse, 
and sure of everlasting fame.'" ("On Genius and Common Sense, 11 VIII, 
45.) 
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out of himself, and makes every word appear to proceed from the 
mouth of the person in whose name it is given. His plays alone are 
l properly expressions of the passions, not descriptions of them." 
Passion and sympathy thus provide from the depth of his 
common sense the poet's working materials. The instrument which 
combines them is gusto, which gives "truth of character from the 
. 2 
truth of feel~ng." Through gusto, the poet fuses together all the 
elements of poetry which appeal to our moral, intellectual, and 
sensitive powers, in a npassionate interp.retation of ( nature) to 
accord with his own feelings. 113 The more intensely the poet feels, 
and the more deeply his imagination or sympathy is excited, the 
more inclusive and efficacious will be the fusion that gusto brings 
about, and the greater will be the number of hidden analogies which 
he will express from his experienoe. In fact, Hazlitt writes, "the 
infinite quantity of dramatic invention in Shakspeare takes from 
his gusto. The power he delights to show is not intense, but 
discursive. He never insists on anything as much as he might, 
except a quibble.n4 This remark gives some indication of the other 
important aspect of the concept of gusto. We have seen that when 
an artist ' s gusto operates, all his senses are brought into play, 
receiving and modifying the impressions of the object, augmenting 
1
"0n Shakspeare and Milton, 11 V, 50. 
2 
"On Gusto,"~ Round Table, Works, IV, 77. 
3rbid. 
4Ibid. 
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each other, and, specifically, f~stening upon some impressions as 
being more germane to the ultimate effect than othera.1 Thus gusto 
not only enables the writer of impassioned poGtry to invest his work 
with universal validity, but it also enables him to make that work 
more true, more telling, and more intensely moving, because through 
its operation the poet will introduce those correspondences which 
are most vividly expressive of his feeling, and those correspondences 
only. Gusto enables him to be selective--but intuitively, not by 
any rational process. 
The truest poetry, then, is impassioned poetry: it depends 
upon the poet's imaginative ability to annihilate his own personality 
and to identify with others, participating in their experience and 
enriching his own; it depends on his ability to appeal through passion 
not merely to feeling, but also to morality and the intellect; and it 
depends on the universal quality of his material and his treatment of 
it. All poetry describes in one way or another " the feelinbs of 
pleasure or pain, by blending them with the strongest movements of 
passion, and the most striking forms of nature"; 
Tragic poetry, which is the most impassioned species of it, 
strives to carry on the feelin~ to the utmost point of 
sublimity or pathos, by all the force of comparison or 
contrast; loses the sense of present suffering in the imag-
inary exaggeration of it; exhausts the terror or pity by an 
unlimited indulgence of it; grapples with impossibilities in 
its desperate impatience of restraint; throws us back upon 
the past, forward into the future; brings every moment of 
our being or object of nature in startling review before us; 
and in the rapid whirl of events, lifts us from the depths 
of woe to the highest contemplations on human life.2 
1
"0n Gusto," IV, 79. It is because Claude ' s pictures lack 
gusto that they "lay an equal stress on all visible impressions." 
2 110n Poetry in General," V, 5. 
146 
Thus of all the arts, impassioned poetry, or tragedy, 
expresses for Hazlitt most completely that which is universal in 
nature and in life itself. It abstracts from life, in its rev-
elation of the eternal and universal, that which is temporary and 
accidental, and places before us the permanent possibilities of 
1 human nature . Fundamentally, it deale in facts, bu·~ it transforms 
those facts into truths. Its essence is a strict linkage of cause 
and effect in more or less clear connection, not only in action 
and plot but in character too. In fact, because the tragic poet 
is able to discriminate between the materials available in common 
sense to his imagination, the characters he portrays and the action 
in which they are involved observe a more rigorous probability than 
that which seems to obtain in reality. The probability which 
llazlitt demands is by no means a narrow vraiseablance, limiting 
the poet to actuality's more trivial data; the events depicted in 
tragedy, when measured against everyday existence, might appear 
~probable or even false. It is the emotional effect of the whole, 
the truth to feeling, which validates the literal falsity. The 
structure of the tragedy itself must cohere and maintain an internal 
consistency; while it is grounded in nature, it transcends fact, and 
presents "a stronger idea of what the reality would 12.2,o 11 "The flame 
of the passions," Hazlitt says, "communicated to the imagination, 
reveals to us, as with a flash of lightning, the inmost recesses of 
2 thought, and penetrates our whole being," and again, 
1 Cf . Aristotle, Poetics, IX, 1-2. 
2
"0n Poetry in General," V, 3. 
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Poetry is only the highest eloquence of passion,the 
most vivid form of expression that can be given to 
our conception of any thing, whether pleasurable or 
painful, mean or dignified, delightful or distressing. 
It is the perfect coincidence of the image and the 
words with the feeling we have, and of which we can-
not get rid in any other way, that gives an instant 
'satisfaction to the thought .• l 
Tragedy affords, in other words, the form whi9h answers to the 
idea. Its truth is essentially different from that of fact, and 
because of the nature of poetic truth, the world which tragedy 
depicts is more intelligible than the world of real experience . 
Its materials are permanent and universal, abstracted from those 
elements vrhich obscure our ordinary comprehension of real human 
behaviour and our perception of the causal relationships of real 
events. In tragedy, we discover the universal through the 
particular, the permanent in the concrete; and we perceive this 
on our own pulses. 
In its presentation and ordering of insight into the 
human condition, and its artistic definition o£ our inmost 
knowledge of that condition, tragedy has a pleasurable effect upon 
us. Hazlitt is not very far from saying that the end of tragedy 
is the production of a pleasurable effect on the spectator ' s mind. 
This attitude is foreign to a large body of modern critical opinion, 
which holds that the end of a work of art is formal perfection, 
or the consummation of the autonomous, objective character of the 
lvorlc ~ art; the work is self-suSficient, and its effect is not 
connected with it as a work. Hazlitt once pointed out that the 
1 
" On Poetry in General," V, 7• 
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end of an object is inherent in that object, and is reached when 
the object achieves its peculiar excellence and fulfils itself--
"a thing is not more perfect by becoming something else, but by 
being~ itself."1 If he could say this, why could he not perceive 
that art attains its end not through some external effect but in 
being most completely itself? If, as he appears to believe, the 
end of poetry is the emotional effect which poetry has on its 
audience, he must have been more than slightly obtuse not to have 
realised that this theory, logically extended, would make the . 
success of a poem an entirely subjective matter, dependent upon the 
accidental complexion of the hearer's mood and emotions at the time 
of listening to the poem. 
There is little ro~m to doubt that Hazlitt is here gui~ 
ot inconsist ency. One implication of his theory is that generally 
the end of art is immanentJ another indicates that it is transcendental, 
ul timatel y subjectiTe, inhering in the pleasure felt by the spectator. 
Per haps the contradiction arises out of his critical practice: his 
method is largely the observation and recording of the emotional 
effect which particular works have on him, and it is quite possible 
that he stresses the emotional effect of art unduly. But it shoul d 
be noted that he considers drama to be the most objective form of 
poetry, since the dramatist does not aUempt to set down his own 
feelings, imitating as he does through the medium of the sympathetic 
imagination the fundamentals of human existence. In that state of 
1
"The Ideal," Works, XX, )0). 
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strong emotional excitement which Hazlitt calls gusto, the poet's 
~gination calls forth into uniquely telling language the essence 
of hie material. Hazlitt•s insistence on the value of emotional 
excitement on the part of the poet is eo vehement that it sometimes 
obscures the fact that he refers to emotion directed not inward 
but outward, toward the subject. But as far as the end of art is 
concerned, Hazlitt•s theory appears at first glance to assume that 
the artist writes with his audience's emotions always in mind as 
the final criterion, and that hie aim is achieved when his work 
arouses pleasure. The poem, almost by definition, is something 
designed to appeal to the emotions and the imagination of the reader, 
and its success as art depends on the reader's subjective response. 
It is noteworthy, however, that all Hazlitt•s practical 
criticism, and the examples with which he illustrates his more 
theoretical discussions, are designed to fix the emotional effect 
of works of art by reference to the works' content--to what they 
are about. He discusses them in terms of the emotional effect which 
they produce because he sees them and their effect as inseparable. 
And this emotional effect does not depend upon the accidental com-
plexion of the reader's emotionSJ while it is necessarily subjective--
it can hardly be anything else--it is solidly based on that sum of 
experience which Hazlitt calls common sense, and it is therefore 
objectively valid. In the last chapter, the groundwork of Hazlitt 1 s 
theory of tragic pleasure was examined, and it emerged that what-
ever the origin of that pleasure, he saw it as characteristic of 
tragedy. For him, the end of tragedy is not--as it might first seem 
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to be--simply some vaguely pleasurable feeling in the mind of the 
reader or spectators it is the specific tragic pleasure, the pleasure 
which distinguishes and defines the form. Thus, though the aim of 
the tragedian is the production of a particular emotional effect, 
that effect is not divorced from the experience which tragedy embodies. 
Tragedy "is human nature tried in the crucible of affliction,"1 and, 
as "Aristotle has long since said • • • purifies the mind by terror 
and pityJ that is, substitutes an artificial and intellectual interest 
for real passion."2 What we enjoy in tragedy, says Hazlitt, is the 
characteristic response, moral in its direction, which, through pity 
and fear tragedy and only tragedy provides. In his theory as in his 
practical criticism, the test of a good tragedy is ultimately the 
degree to which it achieves this characteristic end. 
Hazlitt sees evil as the informing element of the tragic 
experience. If the eighteenth century had, broadly speaking, rested 
secure in an optimism based upon confidence in the order of the 
universe and in man's ability to apprehend and submit to that order, 
Hazlitt, in so many ways an eighteenth- century man out of his time, 
took a darker path and saw that "evil • • • is a fated, inevitable 
necessity hanging over us . It follows us wherever we go: if we fly 
into the uttermost parts of the earth, it is there: whether we turn 
1
"Sir Walter Scott, Racine, and Shakespear," ~Plain 
Speaker, Works, XII, 346. 
2 
non Modern Comedy,"~ Round Table, Works, IV, 13. 
151 
to the right or the left, we cannot escape from it."1 Pope had said 
that 
All Nature is but art, unknown to thee; 
All chance, direction, which thou canst not see; 
All discord, harmony not understood; 
All partial evil, universal good • • • 
which neatly summed up the pleasant belief of his time that rational 
apprehension of the Divine Plan which ordered the universe would lead 
to right action and the perception that the apparent irrationalities 
of life were necessary rubs, insignificant against the tremendous 
significance of a fundamental Order and Decorum. Hazlitt, who unlike 
many of the sensationist thinkers of his day does not confuse good 
and evil with mere pleasure and pain, but views them as "properly 
that which gives the mind pleasure or pain on reflection, that is, 
which excites rational approbation or disapprobation,"2 rejected such 
easy, deistic faith in the order of nature . Like Swift, Butler, and 
Johnson--but without their religious conviction--he saw that "evil 
is inseparable from the nature of things,"' and he was unconvinced 
by the attempts of rationalist theologians to argue evil into a 
disguised harmony in the universal frame: 4 
The theological writers ••• affirm, I think erroneously, 
that God or the first cause is the sole agent in the 
universe, to which all second causes are to be referred as 
1
"Mind and Motive," Works, XX, 52. 
2 
"On Liberty and Necessity," Lectures .Q.!! English Philos:phy, 
Works, II, 260. 
3uMr. Southey," ~Spirit of the~' Works, XI, 79. 
4cf. Locke's ~Reasonableness of Christianity; Matthew 
Tindal's Christianity~~ as Creation; and John ~eland's Christianity 
!Q! M.ysterious. 
instruments, having no real efficacy of their own. 
If so, all events are produced immediately by the divine 
agency, that is, all second causes are parts of the 
divine essence, and in all that we see or hear or feel, 
~e must conceive of something far more deeply interfused, 
a spirit and a motion that impels all thinking thingsi all 
objects of all thought, and rolls through all things. 
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For Hazlitt man is a free moral agent, 2 able to determine his own 
destiny by choice and consequent action. But he is limited by his 
very humanity; he is 
an intellectual animal, and therefore an everlasting 
contradiction to himself . Hie senses centre in himself, 
his ideas reach to the end of the universe; eo that he 
is torn in pieces between the two, without a possibility 
of its ever being otherwiee.3 
1
n0n Liberty and Necessity," XX, 267-268 . Hazlitt actually 
considered that the passage from Tintern Abbey reflected what he 
called a Spinozist pantheism, and was a fine illustration of the 
doctrine of philosophical necessity. His use of it here, unacknowledged 
and in this context, is uncharacteristic . 
211 The true hero devotes himself [ to his cause] of his o'WD. 
accord, and from an inward sentiment. The service on which he is bound 
is perfect freedom. He is not a machine but a free agent . " ("Guy Faux, 11 
Works, XX, 106 . ) 
3characteristics, CLVIII. IX, 192 . The passage recalls Pope ' s 
lines about the "being darkly wise and rudely great . " But in spite 
of this darkening of mood, Pope and many of his contemporaries felt 
on the whole that 11 spite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite, / One 
truth is clear, Whatever i!• is right.~ They were not so much 
pessimistic as gently melancholy, in regard to the human condition: 
Behold the child, by Nature's kindly law, 
Pleas'd with a rattle, tickled with a straw: 
Some livelier plaything gives his youth delight, 
A little louder, but as empty quite: 
Scarfs, garters, gold, amuse his riper stage, 
And beads and pray'r-books are the toys of ages 
Pleas'd with this bauble still, as that before; 
Till tir'd he sleeps, and life's poor play is Q 1er. 
Hazlitt, in spite of maintaining that evil is a pervasive influence, 
rejects the concept of original sin (in common with many of his time); 
but he does so because its only object appears to him to be the 
coercion of "the headstrong propensities to vice,u and it denies the 
"natural disposition to good in the mind, which [i ;J is possible to 
improve, refine, and cultivate." (Characteristics, CXXXVIII-IX, IX, 189.) 
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Hazlitt is also unorthodox in his rejection of poetic justice as 
the proper close to tragedy. A work in which poetic justice is 
triumphant will not produce the pity and fear which together con-
stitute the peculiar pleasure of tragedy, and, furthermore, such 
a work is unnatural because, contrary to experience, it assumes 
that right vanquishes evil as a matter of course. Thus Hazlitt 
refers to Lillo's George Barnwell as none of the most improbabl~ 
and purely arbitrary fictions we have ever seen. " The play is 
dismissed as na caricature on the imbecility of goodness, and of 
the unprovoked and gratuitous depravity of vice"J it supposes that 
virtue is relinquished and vice adopted 11without common sense or 
reason, for the sake of a Christmas catastrophe, of a methodistieal 
moral," and instead of drawing from nature, it drags the theatre 
"into the servi.ee of the conventicle."1 Because of its assumption 
that the ascendance of evil and irrationality is temporary and 
terminable by a rational instrument such as the law, George Barnwell 
affords no play to the moral and intellectual parts of our nature, 
and appeals only to our sensibility. For this reason, although it 
may affect us while we watch it, in the long run it does nothing 
but "oppress and lie like a dead weight upon the mind, a load of 
2 
misery which it is unable to throw off." 
In spite of this vehemence, Hazlitt does occasionally 
incline towards poetic justice as a cathartic function of tragedy. 
1
"George Barnwell, •• ! ~ £.! ~ En&lish Stage, \lorkE, 
v, 268- 269. 
2 
r• On Poetry in General, u V, 6. 
154 
Tragedy, he writes in discussing Othello, "excites our sensibility 
by exhibiting the passions wound up to the utmost pitch by the power 
of imagination or the temptation of circumstances; and corrects their 
fatal excesses in ourselves by pointing to the greater extent of 
1 
sufferings and of crimea to which they have led others." But this 
is more a tendency to poetic justice than an acceptance of it, 2 since 
it does not imply a fundamental assumption that virtue will necessarily 
be rewarded or vice necessarily punished. It is, however (and the 
importance of this will become apparent in due course), an emphasis 
upon the moral function of tragedy. In general, Hazlitt's view of 
life, a view which he realises he shares with the writers of great 
tragedy, is one in which evil is mysterious and irrational, beyond 
the consolations of philosophy or religious faith. Evil is not total 
or overwhelming, but it is real and threatening and ineluctable, and 
while "the habitual belief of a universal, invisible Principle of 
all things" may rest on faith in order and justice, experience tells 
us that no belief can always dissipate the "vastness and obscurity 
which confounds our perceptions," 3 and through which justice is at 
best infrequently dealt out to those who would seem to deserve it. 
It is with~ this universe that tragedy places its char-
acters, Hazlitt ' s criticism suggests. The tragic hero must be capable 
of some great action which will enlist the audience's admiration: 
To impress the idea of power on others, they must be 
1
"0thello," Characters .2.£ Shakespear's Plays, Works, IV, 200. 
2Pace Professor Albrecht. See his "Hazlitt's Preference for 
Tragedy," PMLA, LXXI (1956), P• 1049· 
3"Schlegel on the Drama," \>lorks, XVI, 66. 
made in some way to feel it. It must be communicated 
to their understandings in the shape of an increase 
of knowledge, or it must subdue and overawe them by 
subjecting t heir wills. Admiration, to be solid and 
lasting, must be founded on proofs from which we have 
no means of escaping •••• No act terminating in 
itself constitutes greatness . l 
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What impels him to this action may be "distinct and pointed • • • 
2 
causes of complaint,•• like Othello ' s, or "injuries ••• without 
provocation, and which admit of no alleviation or atonement," 
like Learts. The latter are 
strange, bewildering, overwhelming: th~wrench asunde~ 
and stun the whole frame: they accumulate 'horrors on 
horror's head,' and yet leave the mind impotent of 
resources, cut off, proscribed, anathematised from the 
common hope of good to itself, or ill to others- -
amazed at its own situation, but unable to avert it, 
scarce daring to look at, or to weep over it.3 
It is when "this load of disabling circumstances" oppresses the 
hero that the dramatist is best able to bring out "the action of 
the mind ••• in the most masterly and triumphant manner."4 The 
suffering which the hero undergoes is part of an isolation which 
defines the ambiguity of his position, and it is not mere physical 
suffering. 5 The dramatist must not describe the a~sh of his 
1
"The Indian Jugglers," Table-~, Works, VIII, 85 . 
2 
nThe Drama: No. VI," Works, XVIII, 332. 
3~. 
4Ibid. 
5see "Mr . Kean' s Bajazet and The Country Girl, 11 '.Vorks , 
XVIII, 205, where Hazlitt censures Rowe 's Tamerlane for its display 
of mere "physical passion and external energy." Cf. also "Miss 
O'Neill's Belvidera, 11 ! ~of~ English Stage, Works, V, 261: 
"The intention of tragedy is to exhibit mental passion and not bodily 
agony, or the last only as a necessary concomitant of the former." 
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hero, for description implies the selective, guiding influence of 
the author, limiting--be it never so slightly-- the sympathy of the 
audience; "it is during the progress, in the interval of expectation 
and suspense, while our hopes and fears are strained to the highest 
pitch of breathless agony, that the pinch of the interest lies."1 
Hazlitt does not discuss the quastion of choice of action, but he 
does indiate that the action and the consequent suffering involve 
2 
the hero totally. It is in the depth of his isolation that the hero 
is impelled toward action, when he is "abandoned of fortune, of nature, 
~ 
of reason11 ;/ and joining with his sense of injustice, his pride is 
the motivating force . At some stage in his progress, he becomes 11 a 
partaker with his kindn4-- just as the spectator, through sympatheM.c 
identification, does--and he sees that his anguish is the product of 
elements which are not unique to himself . ~he dramatist must build 
up his action on this principle, realising that "it is the business 
of poetry, and indeed of all works of the imagination, to exhibit 
the species through the individual. Otherwise, there can be no 
opportunity for the exercise of the imagination, without which the 
descriptions of • the poet are lifeless, unsubstantial, and vapid."5 
The pride or "sense of merit"6 which is essential in the 
1 non Poetry in General," V, 10. 
2
see "The Drama2 Ho. VI," XVIII, 332, and Hazlitt ' s dramatic 
criticism in vola . V and XVIII , passim. 
3"The Drama: No . VI," XVIII, 332. 
411 0thello, ~' IV, 200. 
5"Mr. Kean ' s Macbeth,"! lli..!!, .Q!. ~English Stage, Works, V,204. 
6
••0n the Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, n XX, 64. 
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the tragic hero is not, in llazlitt •s vie"'' a "1eakness or a moral 
flaw. It is not prejudged by tragedy. Ha.zlitt \·rould have agreed 
with Arthur Miller ' s statement that it is the hero ' s ''inherent 
umrillingness to remain passive in the face of "That he conceives to 
be a challenge to his dignity, his image of his rightful status."1 
2 Modesty is the lowest of the virtues as far as Hazlitt is concerned; 
pride, which is founded tton the sense of power,tt3 is a natural 
attribute. It "is the great stimulus of exertion,u4 and just as it 
is natural to man, so "the admiration of it in others" is natura1~5 
Tile spectacle of a man's putting a just valuation on his ol'm dignity 
or on an idea and acting to protect it in the face of evil is a stirring 
experience, whereas ttthe tame submission to usurped authority, or even 
the natural resistance to it, has nothing to excite or flatter the 
imagination. "6 Hazlitt suggests that hubris is not sin, but the 
source of the tragic hero ' s action . It is perilous, as his comments 
on Lear and Coriolanus frequently suegest, because it involves a real 
challenge to external and superior powers~ but it is hardly, in the 
objective world of tragedy, either morally good or bad. Through it, 
the tragic character is often led to calamity and destruction, but 
without it no man can fulfil himself; no man can feel, or know, or 
1 Arthur Miller, "Tragedy and the Common l'f..an." 1llu! ~ 
Times Theatre Section (February 27th, 1949), p. 1. 
2
non the Kno\-Tledge of Character," Table-~, \vorks, 
VIII, 304. 
3"0n liovel ty and Familiarity," ~ Plain Speaker, \forks, 
XII, 308. 
,1 
'
110n the Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity." XX, 64. 
r· 
:;"Coriolanus, " ]! ~ .Q.£ .ill. English Stage, \'/orks, V, 348. 
6r- . d ~· 
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act. Pr ide in this sense i s the quality which sets the hero apart 
from lesser meno Milton, in attempting to justify the ways of God 
to man, dr ew the Great villain of his poem as having been cast out 
from heaven because of his pride, and as continuing in sinful pride 
i n his attempts to regain what he thouGht to~as his by right o Hazlitt ' s 
scattered remarks on Paradise Lost show that he - like, one imagines, 
most readers - is blinded to the moral ancl. theological sinfulness of 
::.>atan by the dramatic force o.f the poem, and he points out that Satan 
suffers i nfinite losses, and makes the most desperate 
ef:forts to recover oJ:.~ avence them; and it is the struggle 
vT.i th fa·te and tile :privation of happiness that sharpens our 
desires, or enhances our sympa'l:;hy wi ·th good or evil. 'He 
have littl e interest in unalterable felicity, nor can we join 
vri th hea.r·t and soul in the endless symphonies and e:A'U.l ting 
hallelujahs of the spirits of the blest. 
Tnis "is the true reason and apology for 1-Iil·ton' ~ having unwittingl y 
made Satan the he:t'o o.f ' Paradise Lost.' 111 
In his tragic suffering, the he ro does not abandon li.fe or 
bive up his cause, although he might be driven to a state of despair. 
In his soul ' s dark night, he resists every temptation to compromise 
or to turn back, and though his mind "staggers under its load, it 
does not yielel. 112 "To have an object ahrays in vie'\·1, 11 Hazlitt '1.-Tritesi 
to have an object ahTays in vie\v dearer to one than one ' s-
self, to cline to a principle in contempt of danger, of 
in·iierest ~ of the opinion of the 1-lO:rld, --this is the true 
ideal , tl1e hi~:,·h and heroic s·tiate of mano It is in .fact to 
have a standard of absolute and implicit faith in the mind, 
tha.t a,dmi ts neither of compromise, C:egree, nor exceptiono 3 
J,t;hy the Heroes of llomance are Insipid~" Works, 
.XVII, 254 . ( They are insipid because "instead of acting, they 
are acte<J. upon. 11 p . 2)2) o 
211
:t1he Drama: No. VI," XVIII, )j2. 
3
"Guy :B'aux, 11 XX, 99. 
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This determination and s t eadfastness i s another factor loJhioh 
di stinguishes t he hero from t hose about him. BecausG of hi s nhigh 
principle of enthusiasm and disinterested zeal for truth,"1 what 
would break l esser men reveal s positive moral qualities i n him, 
and he rises Bbove personal anguish and remorse . Macbet h , f or 
i nst ance, pushes on wit h his purpose "and banishes remorse f or his 
past,"2 Richard I II "in the busy t urbulence of his projects never 
loses his sel f - possession , and makes use of every cir cumst ance that 
happens as an ins t rucent of his long-reaching designs."; 
Coriolanus has an ,.inflexible sternness" of will and an admirable 
magnanimity;4 and Lear ' s character 
is cemented of human strength and human wealcnesses (the firmer 
for the mixture): ••• [and is) sustained, reared to a majestic 
height out of the yal'ming abyss, by the force of the affections, 
the imagination, and the cords of the human heart--it stands 
a proud monument, in the gap of nature, over barbarous cruelty 
and filial ingratitude.5 
Rough and uncertain though his path may be, the tragic character 
gains in spiritual poise and perspective. ITis suffering (though it 
is never completely stilled and remains, as we saw concerning Lear, 
without provocation and admitting of no atonement, out of proportion 
to his deserts), affords him--and gives the audience through their 
sympathetic identification with him-- a deeper knm·Tledge of what it 
is to be a human creature. It yields him a new perspective into 
human experience, because in his aaony he has found, for himself and 
llkk.£. 
2 Macbeth , IV,l9~. 
'ma· 
4"Coriolanus," V, 217. 
r; 
:;"The Drama: No . VI," XVIII, 332 . 
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for those watching him, his strengths and his limitations. His 
progress toward this knowledge is tragic because the suffering it 
entails is so disproportionate; that suffering is tragic because of 
its intensity; ~~d the hero's destruction is tragic because it is 
the destruction of a great and admirable man, and also because it 
is a necessary condition of existence.1 Thus llazlitt says that 
Cleopatra "had great and unpardonable faults, but the grandeur of her 
death almost redeems them. She learns from the depth of despair the 
strength of her affections. She keeps her queen-like state in the 
last disgrace."2 In the final analysis, uhat forms "the perfection 
of tragedy, whether in acting or \-Tri ting" in Hazli tt' s theory is 
"that terrible reaction of mental povmr on the scene"--11those reaches 
of the soul, in ,.,hich it looks down on its sufferings, in which it 
rises superior to nature and fortune, and gathers strength and 
grandeur from its despair. 115 Impassioned poetry is "an emanation of 
the moral and intellectual parts of o~r nature, as well as of the 
aensi·tive--of the desire to know, the will to act, and the power to 
feel; and ought to appeal to these different parts of our constitu-
tion, in order to be perfectu; in our sympathetic identification 
with the tragic hero, our passions are aroused, and in such a 
1Northrop Frye, "A Conspectus of Dramatic Genres, 11 
Kenyon Review, XIII (19?1) takes an appreciably similar stand. 
2 
"Antony and Cleopatra," Characters .2! Shakespear's 
Plays, \1/orks, IV, 2 30. 
:;"Miss O'Neill" Works, XVIII, 196. 
be made with D.G. James, Scepticism~ Poetry 
Allen & Unwin Ltdo, 1937), p. ll8, '\·rho arrives 
similar conclusion. 
Comparison should 
(London: George 
at a strikingly 
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condition of imaginative excitement we perceive, tl1rough the whole 
action of which he is a part, ~hat the chaos, incoherence, and 
darkness inseparable from life have been placed in a clearer perspec-
tive. Tragedy is a progress toward value. "It is this moral and 
intellectual perspective ••• in its full signification and extent 
••• t hat gives a proportionable superiority in \-Teight, in 
compass, and dignity to ••• the tragic Muse.n1 
1
"Sir Walter Scott, Racine, and Shakespear," 
XII, 336-337 • 
CHAPTER VII 
In general, Hazlitt sees tragedy and the tragic 
:prota.(.,onist as affirming moral qualities v1l1ich are more positive 
tHark mere remorse or endurance. Al tnough on occasion his remarks 
concerning the function of tragedy incline toward the unnatt:.ra.lly 
nea t balance and didacticism of poetic justice, his theo:ry as a "'hole 
is in some respecto similar t o Blair ' s, ·ho dismissed poetic justice 
~ f 11 . t• 1" t• l as an unnecessary anu. a ac~ous ra ~ona ~sa ~on. l:'or Hazli tt as 
for the Bdinburo'h professor, the function of tragedy is "to afford a 
probable representation of the state of human life, where calamities 
often bef~ll the best, anu a mixed proportion of cood and evil is 
appointed for all. 112 But Hazlitt would have chant;ed the emphasis in 
:Blair ' s additional statement , that the end of tragedy is "to affect 
us w:i.. th pity for the virtuous in distress, 11 because 11e saw, as his 
c:J:'i ticism makes clear, that our sympathy for the hero is likely t o 
be norc intensely aroused if the hero is closer to our own "middle 
state" than perfect vir·tuc would allow. And he t1ould perhaps have 
re-worded Blair ' s sentence to bring out his o1:n bel ief that the 
calami ties und the mixed proportion of {>'Ood and evil vthich trae;edy 
1
"It is not necessary ••• that poetical ;justice, as it 
is cal led, should be observed in the catastrophe of the Piece. 
This has long been expl oded t·rom Tr·e.gedy ( the academic t-Tas sadly 
out oi touch with actuality] , the end of which is, to affect us 
\ ·Ti th pity for the virtuous in distress.," (Lectures on Rhetoric 
and Belles Lettres, III, 274-275.) --
:::.1 . . d ~· 162 
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depicts are usually undeserved by the hero, and that the fate which 
they thrust upon him is out of all keeping with his stature. 
In the light of his ubi~uitous insistence upon the 
neces::ll ty for sympathetic identification ui th the tragic character, 
it io not surprisinG that Huzlitt ' s idea of the hero ' s stature is 
conditioned by his esti~ate of the horo ' s capacity to invite iden-
tification. If it is the hero ' s action, capacity fer suffering, 
knouledge , and his insight and raoral qualities which set him apart 
and define rris greatness and make him heroic, it is his likeness to 
uL ·uhich first calls forth our sympathy 'vi th him and allous us to 
se~ h . t• f, •t 1 ~m as a par ~san o · numan~ y. He is above us, distanced from 
us 5 in his moral heroism; he is one with us in his limited nature and 
nis mortality. On this t,l:ou.nd, Tiazli tt frequently stresses the 
essential likeness of the tragic character to ourselves. I·t is 
in this sense, for cxe..mple, that Hamlet 11 is as little of the hero 
2 
ao a man can \tell be," and tha. t "it is we who are Hamlet." 
3 Lear is a "poor old king," but it is not his kincship so much as 
his human nature that dra.vrs us to him--"he is a poor crazy olo. man, 
~·ihO has nothing sublime about him but l!.is afflictions, and 1-:ho dies 
1
•rLis is not, after all, very C.lfferent frcrr. Greic; ' s 
standpoin·i;: "The tragic \·1ri ter· ••• raises llis hero above the 
level of coilllllon nutla:aity, so that the aucicncc shall respond to 
hiD! not simply us ·Lo one like unto themselves, but as to one 
greater than ·t:twmsel ve:J in those capacities they yet share with 
him." J.-:e.T. Greig, The Psychology.£!. Laughter~ Comedy (London: 
Geor£;e Allen & Umlir1 Ltd., 1923), p. 195. 
2 
"Hamlet, 11 CJ:aracters £! Shake spear ' s Plays, \:orks, 
IV, 233 and 232. 
311Lear, 11 ' ' _l_•a-""ac·te"''P- of S'•"'lr .,. e"r ' " Pl.., ' ·r k IV 258 v .... ... - l.c~ _e .... p (..!, .... c;;;,ys' wcr -s' ' • 
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1 
of a broken heart." Aristotle considered that tragedy should 
portray characters who are morally gTeat, and who are illustrious by 
birth or position--the representation of the narrow lives of obscure 
persons not being capable of striking out an action of sufficient 
magnitude for tragedy. This was extended by critics after him to 
limit the tragic character to one of royal or noble birth. 2 But 
for Hazlitt, illustrious station is not necessary. It is true, as 
Albrecht points out, that in speaking of Coriolanus Hazlitt says that 
"'uong dressed out in pride, pomp, and circumstance, has more attrac-
tion than abstract right, 113 but the reason for t his attraction is 
not necessarily the pride, pomp, and circumstance--"the love of po'\trer 
in ourselves and the admiration of it in others are both natural to 
man," and "it is the assumption of a right to insult or oppress 
others that carries an imposing air of superiority i.J"ith it. He had 
rather be the oppressor than the oppressed;"4 and from the tone of 
Hazlitt ' s statement it is clear that he regrets this. Hazlitt is 
well in that tradition, nourished by men like Lord Kames, Burke, and 
Blair, which sanctioned the gradual introduction of the bourgeois 
or pathetic hero, who by Hazlitt ' s time was fairly in command of the 
stage. Also, Hazlitt was a radical, and his democratic political 
1
"0n the Spirit of Ancient and Modern Literature," 
Lectures chiefly~~ Dramatic Literature£[~ Age of Elizabeth, 
Works, VI, 348. 
2Aris totle's successors in classical times used this 
limitation primarily to distinguish tragedy from comedy; neo-
classic French critics saw it as a characteristic of tragedy. 
z 
Jw.P. Albrecht, "llazlitt ' s Preference for Tragedy," 
~' LXXI (1956), 1051. 
4"Coriolanus, 11 Characters of Shakespear ' s Ple.;ys, Uorks, 
IV, 215. 
convictions sometimes shaped his literary judgments to the degree 
that he was able to make such statements as "the chief cause of most 
o£ Lord Byron's errors is, that he is that anomaly in letters and in 
society, a Noble Poet. It is a double privilege, almost too much 
for humanity."1 Hol'iever it is not only this levelling sentiment which 
leads Hazlitt to write of Richard II that 
we feel neither respect nor love for the deposed monarch; 
for he is as wanting in energy as in principle: but we 
pity him, for he pities himself. His heart is by no means 
hardened against himself, but bleeds afresh at every new 
stroke of mischance, and his s~nsibility, absorbed in his 
own person, and unused to misfortune, is not only tenderly 
alive to its own sufferings, but '\-Tithout the .fortitude to 
bear them. He is, however, human in his distresses; for 
to feel pain, and sorro"1, weakness, disappointment, 
remorse and anguish, is the lot of humanity, and we 
sympathize -v;i th him accordingly. The sufferings of the man 
make us forget that he ever was a king.2 
What is important to Hazlitt in the character of Richard is that he 
is akin to us in his humanity--"the weakness of the king leaves us 
leisure to take a greater interest in the misfortunes of the man,") 
and we are therefore able to exercise our sympathy and identify with 
him all the more easily. 
Hazlitt places such emphasis upon the importance of 
sympathy in the spectator's reaction to tragedy because, as we have 
seen, he believes that the exercise of sympathy is essentially a 
pleasurable activity. But his primary reason for doing so is his 
fundamental conviction regarding the real value of sympathy. 
111Lord Byron," The Spirit .Q.f ~Age, \>larks, XI, 77. 
2
"Richard II, 11 Characters of Shakespear ' !¥ Plays, Works, 
IV, 272-273· 
3Ibid. p. 272. 
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The sympathetic ima~Sination is not merely the only true means of 
knowing the feelings of others nor the only basis of all voluntary 
action: it is for Hazli·t·t; the basis of highest form of morality itself. 
"I would not," he says, "wish a better or more philosophical standard 
of morality, than that we should think and feel to\'rards others as 
\>le should, if it \'!ere our O\-I'U case. Ii' we look for a higher standard 
than this, \'ie shall not find it; but shall lose the substance for t he 
1 
shadow!" luld if 
we must have some outstanding object for the mind, 
as well as the eye, to dwell on and recur to--something 
marked and decisive to~ve a tone and texture to the 
moral feelings • • • "because-. not only is the attention 
thus roused and kept alive; b;t what is most important 
as to t he _pr~nciples of action, the desire of cood or 
hatred of evil is po-vrerfully exci ted--2 
then great tragedy, if we accept Hazlitt ' s theory, will most amply 
fill that need. He sees the theatre as a school of instruction, 
which "not only refines the manners, but ••• is the best teacher 
of morals , for it is the truest and most intelligible picture of life. 
I-Ii stamps the image of virtue on the mind by first softening the rude 
materials of which it is composed, by a sense of pleasure. It 
7 
ret;ulates the passions by giving a loose to the imaginationo") It 
is also "a test and school of humanity," for "there is no place 'trhere 
the social principle is called forth with such strength and harmony, 
by a powerful interest in a common object •• A 
1
"0n Reason and Imagination, 11 ~ Plain Speaker, 'it!orks, 
XII, 47-48. 
2Ibid., p. 50. 
3"0n Actors and Acting," ~Round Table, v!orks, IV, 153. 
411 The Free Admission, 11 \Jorks, XVII, 367-368. 
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Because the creation of dramatic characters requires, 
on the plaY'vright ' s part, the annihilation of his own identity and 
as complete a syopathetic projection into those characters as 
possible, and because the mere exercise of the sympathetic imagina-
tion is moral, the ~criting of a tragedy is a moral experience. In 
addition, the vast sum of experience and knowledge of humanity which 
is the tragedian ' s, and upon \lhich his imagination dra\iS intuitively 
to create character, is another source of the morality of tragedy 
from the point of view of the poet--
I defy any great tragic writer to despise that nature 
which he understands, or that heart which he has 
probed, with all its rich bleeding materials of joy 
and sorrou. The subject may not be a source of much 
-~riumpb to him, from its al terna.te light and shade, 
but it can never become one o£ supercilious indifference. 
He must feel a strong reflex interest in it, corresponding 
to that which he has depicted in the characters of others. 
• • • This is summed up in the wish of the poet--
1 
' To feel lfhat others are, and knol>T myself a nan. ' 
The tragic poet cannot be a cynic, and he cannot be a pessimist. 
Equ~lly clearly, watching or reading a tragedy is a 
moral experience if we are able to identify with the tragic 
characters, and for this reason they must be so shaped by the poet 
that they elicit sympathetic identification. It is a moral 
experience because "tragedy gives us a high and permanent intarest, 
beyond ourselves, in humanity as such," and it "makes man a partaker 
with his kind.n2 Because the tragic hero typifies humanity; and 
1110n Reason and Imagination, 11 XII, 55 · 
2110thello," Characters of Shakespea:r ' s Pla.:rs, \•Jorks, IV, 200. 
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because (in Hazlitt ' s view) he is so like us, we sympathise with him, 
a1rnihilate our real identities, and not only learn more about the human 
condition but are made less self-centred. "It has been said that 
tragedy purifies the affections by terror and pity. That is, it sub-
stitutes imaginary sympathy for mere selfishness."1 
The evil which tragedy sets before us is pleasurable, we 
have seen, because it appeals to our love of strong excitement. But 
it has a far oore important function additional to t his in Hazlitt's 
theory of tragedy. Properly handled, it precisely defines the peculiar 
pleasure of tragedy. In the tragedy of sensibility, evil remains 
chaotic and meaningless, because by definition it is not treated in 
such a way as to arouse the moral and intellectual parts of our nature. 
Its power remains with us when the play is over, and we are oppressed 
by it. In impassioned tragedy, however, evil is placed in perspective. 
We recognise it for what it is, and we see that it plays a major 
part in the destruction of the hero. We sympathise intensely with 
the hero in his fate, and "in proportion as it sharpens the edge of 
2 
calamity and disappointment, ~_tragedy; strengthens the d.esire of good ." 
Thus the true pleasure of tragedy, which the tragic catharsis arouses, 
is for llazlitt essentially a moral one. Not only are we purged of 
our selfishnese , but a more positive aspect is apparent--
1 Ibid. 
2
"0n Poetry in General, 11 Lecture;;; .9.!! §£ EnL;lish Poets, Works, 
V, 6. Cf. Characteristica, CCLXXXVIII, Works, IX, 209; "Mr. Crabbe," 
Works, XIX, 54-55; "Ur. Canpbell and H:r ~ C:ra"obe, 11 "The Spirit .2£ .lli_ ~' 11 
vlorkQ, XI, 167. 
the circumstance which balances the r)least;.re azainst the pain 
in tragedy is, that in proportion to the greatness of the 
evil, is our sense and desire of the opposite good excited; 
and that our sympathy 'd th actual suffering is lost in the 
strong impulse given to our natural affections, and carried 
away with the swelling tide of passion, that gushes from and 
relieves the heart.l 
And in tragedy ' s appeal to our love of strong excitement, and in our 
indulgence of that love , "ve see the thing ourselves, and shew it 
to others as we feel it to exist, and as, in spite of O'xrselves, we 
, 
are compelled to think of it . 11 ,_ Burke au~gested that we do not desire 
tragedy to occur, but that when it does, we are pleased by our 
s~path3 with the sufferers; Hazlitt is on firmer ground when he 
says that 
we do not wish the thing to be so; but we wish it to appear 
such as it is. For knowledge is conscious power; and. the mind 
is no longer, in this case, the dupe, though it may be the victim 
of vice or folly.3 
So 1-re are armed against evil by knowing it; i'Te slake our thirst for 
strong excitement; by our sympathy we are provided with "the 
restraint of hu.mani tytt and the "sense of mora,l obligation" which 
restrain and direct that excitement; and we intuitively desire the 
goodo 
Hazlitt considered that although classical drama differed 
markedly in style from the Elizabe·than and Jacobean, it \'ras in the 
same rank ui th them in regard to artistic •.wrth. Like them, it 
presented persons "speaking, feeling, and acting acco:rding ~ 
nature, that is, according to the impression of given circumstances on 
1
"Lear," \>larks , IV , 271-272. 
2 
non Poetry in General," V 1 8. 
)illS· 
170 
the passions and mind of man in these circumstances."1 It differed 
from the drama of Shakespeare ' s time in its "external form," 
its ritualistic dignity of attitude and expression, its 11 selection 
in the figures," and in a "unity in their grouping" liThich reminded 
2 him of Greek statuary. While he refused to set up on the basis of 
personal preference arbitrary standards of excellenc e by which to 
judge works of art, and felt that both Greek and Elizabethan drama 
l-Tere "founded in essential and indestructible principles of human 
nature," his own taste ran quite clearly to the latter form. 
Sophocles differs from Shakespear as a Doric portico does 
from Westminster Abbey. The principle of the one is 
simplicity and harmony, of the other richness and power. 
The one relies on form or proportion, the other on quantity 
and variety and prominence of parts. The one owes its 
charm to a certain union and regularity of feeling, the 
other adds to its effects from complexity and the com-
bination of the greatest extremes. The classical appeals 
to strength and habit: the Gothic or romantic strikes from 
novelty, strangeness and contrast.3 
The preference is based upon subject as much as on the effect of 
differing techniques. Following Schlegel, Hazlitt in the final 
lecture of the series on the dramatic literature of the age of 
Elizabeth assumes the primary distinction between the classical and 
the romantic to be "that the one is conversant '~i th objects that are 
grand or beautiful in themselves, or in consequence of obvious and 
universal associations; the other, with those that are interesting 
1
"0n the Spirit of Ancient and Modern Literature," V, 347. 
2
,!lli., and see p. 349: " (Schlegel} is right in affirming 
that the true -vray to understand the plays of Sophocles and Aeschylus, 
is to study them before the groupes fsioJ of the Niobe or the 
Laocoon." 
only by the force of circumstances and imaeination."1 Hhile the 
classical tragedians gave as much of the absolute truth of 
imitation as could be given by 1mrds, they had not those '\-rider 
reaches of the imagination open to them that Shakespeare and his 
contemporaries had--
The ideas of the ancients were too exact and definite, 
too much attached to the material form or vehicle by 
which they uere conveyed, to admit of those rapid 
combinations, those unrestrained flights of fancy, 
which, glancinc from heaven to earth, unite the most 
opposite extremes. and draw the happiest illustrations 
from things the most remote.2 
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This, in Hazlitt 1 s opinion, is the fundamental cause of the comparative 
severity and simplicity of the Greek drama, "which excluded every 
thing foreign or v.nnecessary to the subject." It is also, he feels, 
the source of the Unities (Hazlitt does not seem to be aware of the 
already well-established attack by scholarship upon the attribu·tion 
to Aristotle of that doctrine): because the Unities, by imposing 
order and coherence upon the drama, identify the imitation as much 
as possible with the reality. It is also the source of the "beauty 
and grandeurtt of the material presented by the Greek tragedians, for 
"deriving their power over the mind from the truth of the imitation, 
it was necessary that the subject which they made choice of, and 
from l·rhich they could not depart, should be in itself grand and 
beautiful.") And finally, it is the source of their perfection of 
technique. which consisted in giving the utmost harmony, delicacy, 
1110n the Spirit of Ancient and Modern Literature p11 VI, 348 . 
2Ibid., p. 350. 
3uon the Spirit of Ancient and Modern Literature," VI, 350. 
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and refinement "to the details of a given subject." Hazlitt is able, 
given this basis of his theory, to state that Sophoclean tragedies, 
the perfection of th.e classical style, "are hardly tragedies in our 
sense of the ,.,ord": 
They do not exhibit the extremity of human passion 
and suffering.. Firmness of purpose and calmness of 
sentiment are their leading characteristics. Their 
heroes and heroines act and suffer as if they ,.,ere 
ahtays in the presence of a higher pol-re:r, or as if 
human life itself were a religious ceremony, performed 
in honour of the Gods and of the Stute. The mind is 
not shaken to the centre ••• contradictory motives 
are not accumulated, the utmost force of imagination 
or passion is not exhausted • • • the contrast and 
combiF~tion of outward accidents are not called in to 
overwhelm the mind with the 1-1hole rreight of unexpected 
calamity. The dire conflict of the feelings, the 
desperate struggle with fortune, are seldom there. 
All is conducted l'Ti th a fatal composure; prepared and 
submitted to with inflexible constancy, as if Nature 
were only an instrument in the hands of Fate.l 
Hazlitt is not so much concerned with the effect of the Greek 
mythology and ethos upon the aubject matter of their tragedies 
as he is with their effect upon the poets ' range of imagination. 
"The religion or mythology of the Greeks was nearly allied to their 
poetry: it was material and definite,"2 and according to Ha.zlitt 
the effects of this mythology and the viev1 of man l-rhich it implied 
v1ere those which we have just seen outlined. Chrietie~ity, on the 
other hand, nis essentially spiritual and abstracted," and if the 
Greek .mytholog~ resulted in a predominance of form, the result 
of the Christian is "unlimi tad, undefined pow·er": 
1~., PP• 351-352. 
21.1&!1·, P• 353. 
The imagination alone "broods over the immense abyss, 
and makes it pregnant." There is ••• a vastness and 
obscurity which confounds our perceptions • • • A 
mysterious awe surrounds the doctrines of the Chris tian 
faith: the infinite is ever~rhere before us, whether 
we turn to reflect on what is revealed to us of the 
divine nature or our own.l 
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Elizabethan tragedy is informed, if not by the Christian mythology, 
at leas.t by the poets ' versions of that mythology and the moral 
system which it sanctioned; and "religion has contributed to 
enlarge the bounds of ima.gination.,.2 :Both Greek and Elizabethan 
tragedy are founded in nature, and are therefore oumt anding in the 
history of the drama, but the latter i s "emancipated frQm • • • 
precise imitation" 3; both are founded in na ture and are true because 
they deal in human experience and human nature as conceived by the 
respective playwrights, but Elizabethan tragedy is imaginative, and 
"described things • • • for the sake of the associations of ideas 
connected with them.n4 Hazlitt prefers Elizabethan tragedy because 
it is truer: it presents human nature less formally and more 
naturally, and it embodies the insights and truths available to a 
more deeply-probing imagination. 
As his ca.refully-"VTorked out introduction to the lectures 
on the age of Elizabeth shows, Hazlitt firmly believed that great 
drama is written only in periods of extraordinary national energy 
and poHer. Since the early seventeenth century, he felt, the 
distinctive imaginative power which had characterised the dramatic 
1110n 'tihe Spirit of Ancient and Modern Literature," VI, 353. 
2
·-b· d 
.!....L· 
j Ibid., P• 347 • 4-Illi·, P• 350. 
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productions of England ' s greatest ~riters had gradually degenerated 
into a self-rebarding sensibility which was the antithesis of the 
dramatic. The "anchor in nature" which was the outcome in art of 
the exercise of a strong sympathetic imagination upon a deep fund 
of experience had given \·Tay to vapid abstraction; whereas Shakespeare 
had been in one sense the least didactic of all uriters, the dramatists 
from the Restoration until Hazlitt •s own day tended more and more 
to oake their plays the vehicles of their Olin thoughts on matters 
of importance in politics and philosophy--they turned the stage 
into the lecture-hall or the pulpit, and the very na tnre of drama 1vas 
gradually undermined. Accompanying the decay and the distrust of 
imagination, which Hazlitt justifiably considered to progress in 
proportion as the Hobbesian sensationism developed, there 'vas in 
the English temper a growing self-consciousness which he 1.ras con-
vinoed could lead only to a very much less vital art than had been 
produced under Elizabeth and James. 
In the seventeenth century Hazlitt asserted, '*with the 
exception of a single writer, Otway, and of a single play of his 
(Venice Preserved), nl there were no tragedians l-tho could stand 
comparison with "the great men of the age of Shakespear, and 
immediately after." Venice Preserved llazlitt saw as a tragedy 
written upon the "classic or regular model" (classic here is 
synonymous with Shakespearean rather than tti th Greek), and he 
\·Tas sure that its "indisputable excellence and lasting interest," 
1
"G·eneral View of the Subject," Lectures chiefly .2!1 the 
Dramatic Literature £! ~ A{~e ~Elizabeth, Works, VI, 18lo 
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uhich made it as pouerful to read as to 'l.>~'atch, had made it "a proud 
and inseparable adjunct of the English Stage. 111 In The Orphan, 
on the other hand, "there is little else but this voluptuous 
effeminacy of sentiment and mawkish distress, which strikes directly 
at the root of that mental fortitude and heroic cast of thought 
which a l one makes tragedy endurable--that renders its sufferings 
pathetic, or its struggles subl ime . " 2 Addison ' s ~ (which 
if frequency of performance i n the eighteenth century were a 
reliabl e criterion of ~Teatness, would surely merit mention in the 
same breath as Hamlet, Oedipus, and~), is dismissed with a 
tour-de-force of scorn which not only damns the play but gives a 
delightful idea of Hazlitt ' s public manner - nThere is nothing • • • 
in the play to excite ridicul e, or shock by absurdity,rr he suggests, 
except the love- scenes which are passed over as uhat the 
srectator has no proper concern with; and however feeble 
or l anguid the interest produced by a dramatic exhibition, 
unless there is some positive stumbling-block thrown in 
the TJray, or 5""ross offence given to an audience, it is 
~enerally suffered to linger on to a euthanasia, instead 
of dying a violent and premature death. If an aut hor 
(particularly an author of high reputation) can contrive 
to preserve a uniform degree of insipidity, he is nearly 
sure of impunity.3 
Hazlitt also felt that the decline of drama had been hastened by 
nore tangible elements. In his revieus he constantly attacked the 
tl:eatJ.,ica.l nonopoly uhich reserved legitimate drama to Drury Lane, 
Covent Garden, and the Theatre Royal, Haymarket; he complained 
about the size of these theatres, and the coarsening effect upon 
1
non the Spirit of Ancient and Modern Literature,n VI, 354-355· 
2~. 
)Ibid., P• 356. 
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acting which their cavernous interiors had; and he perceived that 
there uas a direct link betv1een the demands made by playing in 
huge, ill-lit audi toria 1·rhich 1-1ere far from being accoustically 
perfect, and the growing vogue for spectacle and effect. He 
pointed out the fact that the patent theatres were run by actor-
mana.Bers Hho selclom accepted ne"T plays unless the plays afforded 
opportunities for the display of their 01m talents, and he attacked 
t11e star system vhioh encouraged would-be dra.me.tists to write not 
£or the ~lay 's sake but for tl1e idiosyncrasies and technicGl devices 
peculiar to particular actors. He also understood that the composition 
of the audiences had changed; whereas in Shakespeare ' s day a plLy 
had been presented to a fair cross-section of the community, in 
Hazlitt ' s time the audience was largely composed of the lower orders 
of society, whose taste for extravaganza and whose boisterous manners 
had driven the better-educated and more refined classes out of ·!;he 
theatre. And even amongst those who did visit the tl.~atre, the novel 
was fast beconing the major focus of leisure-time attention.1 In 
general, drama was fast becoming what it undoubtedly is for many 
people todayz a mere pastime, a pleasurable break from the business 
of living, a.n opportunity to gaze in pleasant a·vre at famous and 
highly paid public figures. 
But Hazlitt did not stop at the empirical facts of the 
1These reasons for the decline of drama have been examined 
and listed by Allardyce Nicoll, ! History ££ 4 lish Drama 1660-1900 (6 vols.; Cambridge: at the University Press, 1955 , vols. 1-4; 
George Steiner, ~ Death .2£ Trag·edy (London: Faber and Faber, 1961) ; 
and U.C . Nat;, 11 The English Theatre of the Romantic Revival," Nineteenth 
Century, CIV (1928), 384-)98. 
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contemporary theatre in his attempts to pinpoimthe causes of the 
malaise. The upheavals following the French Revolution had plunged 
all men into the real stream of current crises: 
That event has rivetted all eyes, and distracted all 
hearts ; and, like people staring at a comet, in the 
panic and confusion in \thich we have been huddled 
together, we have not had time to laugh at one another ' s 
defects, or to condole over one another ' s misfortunes. 
We have become a nation of politicians and newsmongers; our 
inquiries in the streets are no l ess than after the 
health of Europe; and in men ' s faces, we may see strange 
matters written,--the rise of stocks, the loss of battles, 
the fall of kingdoms, and the death of kings . • •• Our 
attention has been turned by the current of events, to 
the general nature of men and things; and we cannot call 
it heartily back to individual caprices, or headstrong 
passions, vrhich are the nerves and sinews of Comedy and 
Tr agedy. • • • \ ole participate in the general progress of 
intellect, and the hugest private sorrow looks dwarfish and 
puerile. • • . • In a word, literature and civilisation 
have abstracted man from himself so far, that his existence 
is no longer dramatic; and the press has been the ruin of 
the stage, unless we are greatly deceived.l 
The general dearth of dramatic talent was betrayed by the 
perpetual search after effect, the premature anc effeminate indul-
gence of nervous sensibility," and writers were no longer aware that 
"vre must get at the kernel of pl easure through the dry and hard husk 
of truth. "We must uait nature ' s time. 112 The general fault of 
contemporary tragedy, even of such popular successes as Matur in ' s 
Bertram, is the result of this indulgence of sensibility--they lack 
business. There is no action, there is no necessary connection 
between w·hat happens, what is said, and 1·rha.t is done; "mere sentiment 
is voluntary, fantastic, self-created, beginning and ending in itself ; 
1 
"The Drama: No.IV, 11 XVIII, 302 ff. 
2
"0n Old English Writers and Speakers," The Plain Speaker, 
Works, XII, 318. 
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true passion is natural, irresistible, produced by powerful causes , 
and impelling the will to determinate actions. The old tragedy 
is a display of the affections of the heart and the energies of the 
will; the modern romantic tra~edy is a mixture of f~~ciful exaggera-
tion and indolent sensibility ••• [ and ) courts distress, affects 
horror, indulges in all the luxury of woe, and nurses its languid 
thoughts, and dainty sympathies, to fill up the void of action."1 
In short, the temper of the age is "critical, didactic, paradoxical, 
romantic, but it is not dramatic,"2 and its reigning spirit is tta 
bias to abstraction" essentially inimical to drama, which is 
"individual and concrete, ••• the closest imitation of nature." 3 
In a state of manners 11vThere the poet and philosopher have got the 
better of the man; where the reality does not mould the imagination, 
but the imagination glosses over the reality," it is impossible 
to write a good tragedy, because the imagination, weakened by 
abstraction from nature and experience, is "bl unted, sheathed, 
and lost, amidst the f lowers of poetry stre'\·Ted over unreal, unfelt 
distress, and the flimsy topics of artificial humanity prepared 
beforehand for all occasions . "4 
A measurable effect of ·these tendencies upon the drama--
was, in Hazlitt ' s opinion, the stimul us given to the adoption by 
British dramatists of certain characteristics o:f Kotzebuean tragedy. 
Although uthe German tragedy" aims at effect, "sets at nought all 
111Bertram " A Vier;i of 
' -- ---
211The Drama: No. IV," 
3Ibid., p. 30). 
4Ibid. 
the En.rdish Stage, 'r!orks, V, 304-305. 
XVII I, 302. 
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the established rules of composition," it is "a good thing": "it is 
a fine hallucination: it is a noble madness, and as there is a pleasure 
in madness, which none but madmen know, so there is a pleasure in 
reading a German play to be found in no other . n1 Hazlitt felt that 
this type of bourgeouis tragedy, while it did not hold the mirror up 
to nature, at least reflected faithfully the spirit of the age in its 
vehemence, hyperbole, appeal to the senses, spectacular scenery, and 
its "g·lol·T of sympathy." Nevertheless, 11 it is a tissue of philoso-
phical, political, and moral paradoxes ••• [ andJ it is the tug of 
war between the inert prejudice [of old opinions and established rules] 
and the startling novelty which is to batter it dovrn • • • that 
2 gives the excitement and the zest." The "natural" man is ahTays 
pitted against the 11 social" man, with the former 'vinning the 
audience•s sympathy. The morality of the genre is based upon 
"the principle of contrast and contradiction": instead of a view· 
of man's lot on earth '\'7hich sees that "the \-Teb of our life is of a 
mingled yarn, good and ill together," the German tra5'edy presents 
black and t-rhi te characters in clear-cut situations v1here virtue is 
always at odds with vice, and where, ultimately, virtue triumphs. 
Eut, says Hazlitt, 
Opinion is not truth: appearance is not reality: pm-Ter 
is not benefice:ace: rank is not uisdom: nobility is 
not the only virtue: riches are not happiness: desert 
and success are different things: actions do not always 
speak the character any more than words. \'le feel this, 
1
"0n the Spirit of Ancient and :t>Iodern Literature--On 
the German Drama, Contrasted vii th that of the At~e of Elizabeth," 
VI , 360. 
2Ibid. 
and do justice to the romantic extravagance of the 
German Muse .1 
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One of the two elements which Hazlitt incessantly emphasises in both 
his theoretical discussions of tragedy and in his practical 
criticism of it is the moral function of the form. Even "German11 
tragedy, with all its faults, affects us vlith its "til01;1 of sympathy," 
although that sympathy is evoked by characters who are not natural 
in the sense that Oedipus, Othello, or Lear are natural. The mere 
excitation of sympathy is a moral event, and the greatest tragedies 
banish, for the moment, our normal selfishness and substitQte the 
mos·t intense desire for "the opposite good." Bazli tt even re-defines 
the Aristotelian doctrine of catharsis to reinforce his theoi·y--he 
accepts that tragedy purifies the affections by pity and fear, but 
he asserts that this enigmatic statement means that "it suba:~i"'liutes 
. 2 imaginary sympathy for mere selfJ.shness. 11 
This is hardly the place in '\>Thich to trace the long line 
of those literary theories vJhich hold tha·t the aim of the wrl ter is 
to instruct, rather than to please, or to instruct by pleasi ne, 
or to instruct whil e he pleases, nor the equally vrell establ ished 
tradition which hol ds that the end of art is a particular pleasure 
ann that instruction is incidental. Suffice it to say that a consider-
able body of modern critical opinion criticises romantic literary 
theory for its wilf~l or its confused conflation of the aesthetic 
and moral questions . \Vi th regard to the t~1eory of tragedy, such 
1110n the S:piri t of Ancient and ~lodern Literature--On 
the German Drama, Contrasted \dth that of the Age of Elizabeth, 11 
VI, }61-362. 
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opinion maintains that it is essentially a misunderstanding of the 
office of art itself to assume that the end of tragedy is to mould 
men ' s lives and to make them better. The character of the tragic 
hero is hardly to be deduced from any ethical mode of conduct; it is 
constructed in order to evoke pity and fear, "hich together constitute 
the characteristic aesthetic pleasure of tragedy. Similarly, the 
moral order--or the lack of it--uhich tragedy may be said to embody 
must not be taken as anything but an objectively-constructed frame 
of reference \Tithin uhich the tragic pleasure may most efficiently 
be attained. No-one would deny that there is more than a grain of 
truth in this attitude. But all too often its proponents forget or 
reduce to insignificru1ce the indisputable fact that great trasedy, 
like all 5Teat art, proceeds from a moral centre. Its subject-matter 
is life, and, as Aristotle said, nli.fe consists in action, and its 
end is a mode of action •111 Tragedy presents a complete action, vrhich 
has magni t;ude--uhich involves the protagonist totally, involves his 
"1·7orld because it calls into question the veJ.'Y basis on which its 
convictions and '\·rays of li.fe are founded, and uhich transcends his 
v:orld in time because his problem, "1-rhich is nothing more than a 
particular instance of the human condition, is by its very nature 
perenuially relevant. U0\:7 Hazli tt did not believe that it wa.s the 
business of the tragedian consciously to teach, but it cannot be 
said that in the final analysis his criterion of excellence is not 
the moral power of the work. When he praises Shakespeare, as he 
1Poetics, VI, 9. 
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often does, for bein~ the least didactic of writers, he does so 
because he feels that by effacing himself from his plays, Shakespeare 
made them mere true, more natural, more internally consistent 1 more 
imaginatively suggestive, and more effectively moral than would 
other;.Iise have been the case. When he attacks German tragedy for 
its improbability, heavy-handedness, and paradox, he does so because 
it is precinely these qualities (not to Eention the vast gulf' beti·Teen 
·the talents of the respective •·n·iters) \Thich prevent it from 
attair..int; to the artistic, and through that the moral excellence of 
Shakespearean tragedy. In other words, 1Iazlitt stands on the border-
line betueen aesthetics and morals. The pleasure of tragedy, as far 
as it is pleasure, is not sufficient for him; ultimately, the true 
pleasure of tragedy is tragedy's positive morality . 
The other element continually emphasised by Hazlitt is 
really inseparable from the morality of tragedy as he sees it. In 
order to call forth our sympathy to the utmost degree, a tragedy must 
be natural, and its character must be as natural and as like us as 
ponsible. The strong connectio:n of fellow-feeling between spectator 
and protagonist must be maintained, for it is along this connection 
that the sparks of pity and fear leap. 
If '·Te accept Aristotle •s definitions of pity and fear, we 
will see that Hazlitt ' s insistence upon the paramount importance of 
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sympathy leads him into a somewhat paradoxical position. Fear, as 
Aristotle implies, is at the bottom a selfish emotion, stemming as 
it does from the apprehension that the trials and suffering experienced 
by another may fall upon ourselves. Pity, which is altruistic, 
becomes fear \>then vte are so closely identified 'td th the sufferer that 
his tribulations appear to be our own. In tragedy, the hero is akin 
to us in his humanity, and 'ttJe pity him his fate and his sufferings 
because we feel that they are disproportionate to his deserts. But 
he is also distanced from us by his station in life, and by all those 
qualities-- including dignity and fortitude--which make him a hero. 
For this reason the fear we experience in tragedy is different from 
-
tile fear which reality enjoins upon us; it is not the paralysing 
misgiving which is caused by an impending personal disaster, but 
a generalised awe excited by the whole action, its ineluctable chain 
of consequences, and our perception that the figure of the protagonist 
typifies the human lot. The almost impersonal fear ''~hich tragedy 
excites intensifies the pity which lie feel for the tragic character, 
and the pity simultaneously intensifies the fearo For Aristotle 
both emotions are necessary, and they are in fact blended into one. 
Hazlitt 1 s accentuation of the likeness of the tragic hero 
to ourselves, not simply in his humanity but in his status also, 
strips the hero of many of those qualities which would set him apart 
from us . But this does not, in Hazlitt ' s theory, make for an increase 
in the immediacy of fear at the expense of pity. It is surely true 
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that there is little place for fear in Hazlitt ' s theoretical dis-
cussions of tragedy. He makes little attempt to explain its nature, 
its function, or its relation to pity, because his emphasis on com-
passion obscures from his view that part ~1hich fear plays. But to 
say that there is little place for fear in his theoretical dis-
cuasions does not mean that there is no place at all for it in his 
theory; he did not consider fea.r to be superfluous, as Schiller, 
for example, in his essay ~r...£ie tragische Kunst su.;gested it uas, 
o ~ ao the closet tragedies of many of Razlitt 's contemporaries im-
plicitly assumed it was. He criticises Moore for glossing over lj_fe ' s 
n sharp calami ties" with Sl'Ieetness--his is "a kind of oos!letic artn ' 1 
he complains that French trae;edy excludes ttthe dark and doubtful 
view of things"; 2 he discusses the influence of the relicious faith 
of the Elizabethans and Jacobea.ns upon their "meams of exciting 
terror1'; j but in ceneral he seems to take tragic fear for granted, 
and there can be no doubt that his theory of sympathy se1~es to 
minimise it. If we 'o~ere carelessly to base our conception of tragedy 
and our reaction to it on Hazlittts theory, we would identify so 
closely with the tragic character that we 'wuld be unable to set 
his suffering in its context--\'1e '·rould be unable, perhaps, to seo 
the wood for what we took to be the largest tree in it. Hazlitt ' s 
underotatement of the function of fear in tragedy is at once a 
consequence of and a factor .contributing to his conviction that 
111Moore and :Byron," \forks, XVI, 413. 
2
"Sohlegel on the Drama," XVI, 89. 
3
"General View of the Subject," VI, p. 185. 
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tragedy must be "natural" in order to support our sympathy. 
In addition, his stress on the morality of tragedy and 
the likeness of the tragic hero to ourselves confuses the great 
irony which tragedy exhibits, an irony in which our pity and fear 
are finally blended into the distinctive universalised sympathy of 
tragedy. The tragic hero ' s fate is ironically inappropriate to 
the hero ' s greatness, and its irony is intensified, not diminished, 
by its inevitability~ Hazlitt's concentration on the character ' s 
essential likeness to ourselves, his references to Lear as a poor 
crazy old man and his statement that Richard ' s sufferings make us 
forget that the man was ever a king, tend to minimise the irony; 
his moral bias tends to a reorganisation of the irony on the lines 
of' poetic justice, as ve savr; both, again serve to exaggerate pity 
at the expense of fear, and to change--even if, in Hazlitt, the 
change is slight--that pity into the tenderness for another's 
distress or suffering which has since the eighteenth century 
gradually come to predominate in dramatic composition. 
Finally, it must be pointed out that although we identify 
ourselves \lli th the tragic hero, and through him t'li th mankind, there 
is a point in the tragic experience at which we perceive that 
mankind is identified with ourselves. We recognise, hovever dimly, 
that we stand together against the apparent order of things, even 
though in the face of its moral inscrutability we might for a 
moment seem to be flies killed for sport o Tragedy demands from i·~s 
spectators so~e inkling of self-consciousness, even if only to 
sharpen by contrast the sympathy upon which its values depend. 
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While Hazlitt ' s magnification of the function and moral effect of 
sympathy may mean that his theory of Tragedy neglects certain aspects 
of the full tragic experience and confuses others, we cannot begin 
to demolish the structure he raises upon the sympathetic imagination 
unless we deny the view of life and the human val ues which tragedy 
presents . 
PART III 
COMEDY 
CHAPTER VIII 
Like theories of tragedy, theories of comedy may be either 
formal or affective, but, springing from the conviction that laughter 
is essential to comedy, and since in any case laughter is an overt 
reaction to comedy, most comic theories have been largely affective. 
It is for this reason, perhaps, that comic theory has usually con-
cerned itself with the determination of the nature of those serious 
attitudes which are expressed by laughter, and two fairly clearly-
defined attitudes toward the problem have developed--a division recently 
summed up in the following manner: nit seems that the main difference 
of opinion concerning the ludicrous has been about the nature of its 
origin. There are those '\>lho say that the ludicrous is born of negation, 
of rejection; and there are those who say it comes from the positive, 
1 from acceptance." 
Classical theories of comedy are predominantly negative, 
perhaps under the influence of Aristotle, who characterises the 
ridiculous as a~ecies of the Ugly, a mistake or deformity "which is 
not painful or destructive," and which 11 does not imply pain."2 His 
1Shlomo Zemach, "A Theory of Laughter,n JAAC, XVII (1959), 
311. "Negative" laughter is "laughter at, 11 or laughter tinged with 
malice; npositive" laughter is "laughter with," or laughter from 
pleasure. Although the terms have obvious disadvantages, I use them 
for their convenience. 
2P~etics, V, 1. 1449 a. The old Attic comedies support the 
malicious interpretation. And see Plato, Philebus, pp. 48-50. 
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separation of the ridiculous from the merely painful places a limit 
on the negativity of the ridiculous--for example, he excludes personal 
satire and vindictive caricature from true comedy--but this limit was 
frequently forgotten or minimised as classical theory modulated into 
neo- classical. Sidney was presumably stating a generally accepted 
conviction vThen in 1591 he said that "comedy is an imitation of the 
common errors of our life, w·hich [ the comic poet] representeth in the 
most ridiculous and sccrnefull sort that may be; so as it is impossible 
that any beholder can be content to be such a one."1 
As neo-classic theories of literature declined during the 
eighteenth century, the negative theory of comedy declined too, and 
gave way to a rationale in which the comic ideal became sympathetic 
2 humour. "In Restoration theory of comedy," points out Stuart Tave, 
whicH is 
largely a. derivative and a reduction of Renaissance theory, 
it was a commonplace that the function of comedy is to copy 
the foolish and knavish originals of the age and to expose, 
ridicule, satirize them. By the middle of the nineteenth 
century, it was a commonplace that the best comic works 
present amiable originals, often models of good nature, vThose 
little peculiarities are not satirically instructive, but 
objects of delight and love.3 
1An Apology for Poetry, ed. G. Gregory Smith, in Elizabethan 
Critical Essays (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1904)~ I, 176-177• 
2The School for Scandal (1777) embodies both aspects, and is 
a good example of the difference between the two. Lamb recognised its 
hybrid nature, and at the same time indicted contemporary morality for 
its insipid and hypocritical emphasis on the sympathetic aspect at the 
expense of the negative. See "On the Artificial Comedy of the Last 
Century. 11 
3stuart M. Tave, ~ Amiable Humorist (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1960), p. viii. 
l 
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The change in theory is partly the result of that growing emphasis 
upon the Sjimpathetic imagination as a basis for action uhich v1as 
outlined at t he beginning of this study. The strikingly pervasive 
· character of this re-orientation is apparent from the fact that 
during the century laughter itself participated, in its motivation, 
in a distinct change of direction, a moveL1ent touard l'lhat might be 
called a "humanisation." It Has long ago indicated that 
a modern \<Triter like Eastman is am.using in h i s perplexity 
over Hobbes and his followers. He cannot understand un-
sympathetic or anti-sympathetic theories. There need be no 
perplexity if Hobbes lived in a less sympathetic age than 
the present . Laughter has responded to the grouth of sym-
pathy and become more sympathetic itself. A survey of 
laughter and a comparison of estimates of its nature show 
t hat it has s teadily tended to become less contemptuous 
and more sympathetic.l 
Laughter tends to be ne~ative or positive according to one ' s con-
ception of it, but the writer of this passage \ias certainly '(rong 
i£ he meant to suggest t nat it is essentially one or the other. 
Modern critics insist that laughter is both. This is not merely a 
t heor-.t ~;rhich attempts to account for the diversity of comic tone 
by accepting the opposing attitudes. Rather, it is an attempt to 
expl ain certain incidents throughout the ~ange of comedy in terms 
botn of acceptance and of rejection. But there is a great diff-
erence between feeling the need for such a unifyi ng theory, and 
actually explaining how it is possible. Hazlitt's thesis is an 
interesting step in this direction . 
The development of Hazl itt ' s views on comedy illustrates 
1 J. G. Gregory, ~Nature of Laughter (London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trfibner & Co., Ltd., 1924), p . 18. 
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the direction taken by thought on this subject during the Romantic 
period. He treated it directly on three different occasions: first 
in 1807, when he abridged Abraham Tucker ' s The Light of Nature 
Pursued, and in doing so added his stamp to Tucker's psychology of 
laughter; again in 1818-1819, in his Lectures .Q.U ~ English Comic 
W~iters, which include the much-anthologised introductory lecture 
"On \>/it and Humour11 ; and finally in 1829, the year before his death, 
in the essay entitled "Definition of Wit," which su:rprisingly has not 
received any consideration by students of his work . Hazlitt ' s theory 
i s also valuable because it shows, in the midst of what might be 
called a representative romantic attitude, t he continuation of certain 
eighteenth-century theories. 
We have seen t hat the principle of imagination was more to 
ilazli·l;t that a. t,-uide &o morality: it "lias the basis of his aesthetics. 
Through the sympathetic imagination, we identify ~Tith others, and in 
the greatest art this identification acts morally in raising, expanding, 
and developing the sympathy of the reader. In one sense, t he sympathetic 
imagination has been part of traJ ic theory since Aristotle observed 
that of t he emotions aroused by tragedy , pity is occasioned by undeserved 
misfortune of a kind ~rhich 1-re might expect to happen to ourselves, and 
pity is transformed into fear when the object is so nearly related to 
us t hat the suffering seems to be our ovn. But wher eas Aristotle 
expressly provides for the possibility of a less-than-perfect morality 
on the part of t he tragic hero, and admits a deeree of revulsion into 
the audience ' s attitude toward him, Hazlitt is in favour of complete 
sympathetic identification uith the hero. Ancl uhcreas Aristotle stresses 
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the social gulf, in the most effective tragedies, betueen the hero 
and the audience, Hazlitt emphasises their common humanity, and thus 
sees the possibility of a greater degree of sympathetic identification. 
Tra~edy makes the man uho \'fitneeses or reads it "a partaker vTith his 
kind11 because it "substitutes imaginary sympathy for mere selfish-
1 
ness." His belief in the validity and the fundamental nature of the 
sympathetic character of the imagination has a shaping affect on 
Hazli ·;;t 1 s theory of tragedy; it provides him ui t h a firmer basis 
than poetic justice for estimating tragic effect, and it enables him 
to express the nature of tragic greatnes~ in democratic and moral 
terms. He is not, of course, the first to "democratise" the tragic 
ll.ero--ui tncss the great eighteenth-century voe:,-u.e for domestic drama; 
.. 
he does, however, give critical sanction to that long trend toward 
the eeneralj.sation of the idea of tragic greatness rhich in our 0\m 
day has produced "heroes" who arc too seldom heroic and tragic. 
Vie have seen, too, that Hazli tt 1 s adherence to the doctrine 
o.r sympathetic ima0ination does not mean that he believed n1an to be 
necessarily benevolent. Zeitlin is urong \vhen he refers to the Essay 
.9.!l: ~ Principles .2.:£ Human Action as an "attempt to prove that men 
are by nature alt:cuistic.112 A mo1.·e proper vieu is indi<Bted by the 
Essay' s subti t:; e: ".An Argument in Defence of the Uatural Disin·terest-
edneos of the iluman Mind ." Ha~li t·t explains ilhat .ue means by ttdis-
interestednces11 in the folloVTilt6· manner: 
1
"0thello," Characters of Shakespear ' s Plays, \Forks, IV, 200. 
") 
'-"William Hazlitt: An A:p:preciation of a Great Literary 
Journalist," Saturday; Review of Literature, Y.I (Jc:m. 12th, 1935), 417. 
The scheme of ~Thich I have here endeavoured to trace 
the general outline differs from the common method of 
accounting for the origin of our affections in this, 
that it supposes what is personal or selfish in our 
affections to be the growth of time and habitt and the 
principle of a disinterested l ove of good as such, or 
for it ' s own sake without any regard to personal 
distinctions to be the foundation of all the rest. In 
this sense self-love is in it's origin a perfectly 1 disinterested, or if I may so say impersonal feeling. 
Hazli tt does use the i.zord "benevolent" to describe man ' s nature, 
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but this benevolence is a rare .bird not known to Shaftesbury nor 
to Godwin: 
When I say therefore that the human mind is naturally 
benevolent, this does not refer to any i~~ate abstract 
idea of' good in general, or to an instinctive desire 
of general indefinite unkno1.m good but to the natural 
connection betueen the idea of happiness and the desire 
of it, independently of a~y particular attachment to 
the person who is to feel it.2 
Near the end of the Essay, when he tUXllS again to attacking the 
doctrine of innate selfishness, Hazlitt introduces Hhat was to 
become an increasingly familiar note in his work: selfishness, 
though it is acquired and not innate, is more commonly found than 
its opposite: 
It is chialy from this greater readiness and certainty 
with which we can look forward. into our own minds than 
out of us into other men, that that strong and uneasy 
attachment to self which comes at last (in most minds) 
to overpower every generous feeling takes it ' s rise, not, 
as I think I have shewn, from any natural hardness of 
the human heart, or necessary absorption of all it's 
thoughts and purposes in an exclusive feeling of self-
intereat.3 
1works , I, 12. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., P• 42 .. 
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If Ha.zli tt could say ·this in 1805 at the age of twenty-seven, it is 
hardl y surpx-ising tL.at in. 1817, after a series of domestic upheavals 
and financial disappointments. he could \-Iri te that Shakespeare 11 kne1-1 
tha.t ·~he love of pow·er, which is another name for the love of mis-
chief, is natural to ma.n. "1 Neither is his anrn1er to Goduin, made 
in 1825, evidence of sudden ~sgiving: 
He conceived teo nobly of his fellows • • • he raised the 
standard of morality above the reach of humanity, and by 
directing virtue 'to the most airy and romantic heiffhts, 
made her path dangerous., solitary, and irlpracticable. He 
places the human rri.nd on an el evation, from 11l"!..ich i·i; 
commands a view of the uhole line o£ moral consequences ; 
and reQuires it tc conform its acts to the lar0er arrcl more 
enl ightencO. conscience which it has thus a.cquirecl. Ue ab-
solves man from the [;Toss and narrm·r ties of sense, custom, 
authority, private and l oc&l attachment, in order that he 
nay devote l.d.r.1self to the bov.ndless f>ur::mi t of universal 
benevol ence . ~tt. Godwin gives no quarter to the amiable 
ueakltess of our nature, nor does he stoop to avail hiraself 
of the suppl ementary aids of an imperfect virtue.2 
I t is perfectly clear that Hazlitt was f ully conscious of both 
sides of ma.n' s nat ure--rtman is nei tiler a God nor a brute; but there 
is a prosaic and a poetical s i de to everything concerning him, and 
it i s ao impossible absolutely and for a constancy to exclude either 
one or the other f rom the mind, as to make him live \dthout air or 
food"; 3 and it was to account for this duality that Hazl itt held to 
his doctrine of the sympathetic imagination, which fo:r· him v1as the 
only valid answer to the extremes re~resented by Hobbes and_Godwin. 
11 I s nan a mere anime.l, 11 he asked in The Plain Speaker , "is man a 
1 [ !rQ!;hello, 11 IV, 20u . 
? 
- "\hlliam God1-1in, 11 !h.£ Snirit of~ A.~e, \larks, XI, 18-19 . 
j"On Cant and Hypocrisy, 11 \'forks, XVII, 349 . 
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mere animal, or a mere machine for phil osophical experiments?"1 
The r~.tion between a theory of human nature and a theory 
oi comedy m:;.s clearer to Hazlitt than it might be to us, since his 
\oras a time ·when attitudes to man, and to the rep:resentation of man 
in a:rt, ";ere undergoing a profound change.. \ihile one might expe:rience 
difficulty in demonstrating a necessa:ry counection betileen Hobbes ' s 
view of human nature and his theory of laugh ter, a logic al connect-
ion there certainly a.ppears to be. If i'JC conceive of men, as Hobbes 
did, as beine naturally and necessarily selfishly-Jnotivated in all 
t heir actions, 'ilhether voluntary or: involuntary, ue arc likely to 
d£lfine laughter as a sort of self-exaltation, or, in Hot)bes ' s famous 
words on the trpassion of lauchter, 11 as a "Su.<lden G1 o-r·y • • • caused 
ei thor by sonc sudden act of their mm, the.t pleaseth them; or by 
the apprehension. cf some deformed thin.; in anot.a.er, by compn.rison 
\ihereof they suddenly applaud themselves. 11 And it will be remembered 
that "Joy, arising from imagination of a man ' s own pm·rer ~nd ability, 
is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING. 112 It is 
logical, too 11 that the first effective a.ns•o~er to this :uegative theory 
should spxing from banevolist concepts of human nature. Tave credits 
Hutcheson vith being 11the first phi losophical critic 'tTi-th sufficient 
leisure and sufficient confidence in lau;;hter to at·t ack Hobbes 
strongly at this point.'1 3 
111The Nev1 School ~or Reform, 11 Works, XII, 194 · 
2 I 6 ) 6 1\.;!viatha.n (. Loudon: Printed for Andrew Cr ooke, l )1 , pp. 2 · -2.7. 
3The Amiable Humorist, p. 56. 
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Hutcheson, using the nom-de-phune ''Philomeides, tt published three 
essays in the Dublin Journal in 1725, the avowed purpose of the first 
being to refute Hobbes. He notes that Hobbes ' s 11 grand Vim-1" was to 
"deduce all human Actions from Self-Love," and continues 
Hence it is that the old Notions of natural Affections, 
and ~ ;trkstincts, the Sensus communis, the Decorw:u, a...Yl.d 
Honestum, are almost banish 1d out of our Books of Morals; 
we must never hear of them in any of our Lectures for fear 
of innate Ideas; Laughter it self must be a Joy from the 
same Spring .1 
Hut che son docc not deny that neGative lauf;l1ter exis ts; he simply 
d enies t hat all laughter is neaative, and he distini:)uisl;.cs betwEEn 
11 cimplen and ne6 ative l au ghter. Tnis type of di stinction is made 
vTi t ll. i ncreasine5 f requency tlu·ou0 llou.t t h e t. i c;htcenth c ontury. 
"Ridicule," llutches on maintains, is only one opccies of "Laub}lter, 11 
and it exis to 11uhcn 1-re are laughing aJti the ]'ollies o.f others • 112 
Ins tead of the f eeling of superiority, which he rules out as a cause 
of laug-hter, liutche sou suggests that r ecognition of inconGruity in 
some form or another i s its source: nrt is thio Cm1tras t, or 
Ovpoai tion of Ideas of Dij,'$'Ili't;y: and Hea.nness, vrhicll is the Occasion 
oi' Laug·hter. 11 .; 
T:w final f o· ·r.1 of t lle eiL:.d;centh-ccntl.r~- distinction io to 
be found in the theory of James Bea·btie. 11Some au't;hors have treated 
Ridicule , "ti thout making t h e distinction bet1.veen Ri<liculous and 
1Hibe:rnicus ' s Letters: or,_! Philosonhical Miscellany 
eo .• J ames Arbuckle \Lonoon: 1734), reprints the essays .. See I, 78. 
2I. . . n A ~•f P• U l.f o 
jiJ>id . s P• 92. 
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Ludicrous ideas," Beat·~ie says; "things ludicrou~ and things ridiculous 
have t.lis in common, that both excite laughter; but the former excite 
pure laughter, the latter excite laughter mixed vTi th disapprobation or 
1 
contempt." This positive luughter has some aesthetic significance, as 
Beattie d:r:a•,:s on it in hiz dincussion of the tone of Dor~ Q.uixotc: 11The 
knight of La Manchat though e ludicrous, was never intended for a 
contemptible personage . He often moves our pity, he never forfeits 
2 
our esteem." :aut Beattie doos not demonstrate just ho\1 it is aesthet-
ically si~vnificant, and the reason for his failure h : tl.at he sees 
nothing negative in it . I t is easy to see that some laugh~er expresses 
rejection, but if it doe& so only tl-U'ough the admixture of ~ome 
extraneous element, then there exists no clue to vlhat laughter ca.n 
express 1d t.G.out this element. The majority of the eicihteen.th-ct.:ntury 
theorists haO. ready at ha...nd a simple ailSI>~e:r to the problem: 1-:i t llou.t 
nce,rativi ty, they IJroposedt laughter can express nothing, and tr.erefore 
the simply laughable is of little significance. John Brm;n made the 
point q_u.i tc neatly in 1 "(51: 
Pure Y.' i t, '..rhen not applied to the Cha:t.~acters of' 1-len, is 
properly a Specias of Poetry. It amuses and delights tho 
Imagination by those sudden Assemblages and pleasing 
Pictures of things w"llich it · creates; and from every common 
Occasion can ra.ice sunh striking .A.ppea:r·anceG, as t1.rou the 
nost phlegmatic Teupers into a Convulsion of £Cod-humoured 
Mirt~1 9 and und.esii&lliur; Laughter. • • • fro.lt Rid.icult.o or 
Raillery o • • hath a further scope and Intention. It 
solely regards the Opinions, Passions, Actions, and. Charac-
tet-s of Uen: and may be properly denominated "tllat Species 
1
"An Essay on Laughter and Ludicrous Composition, 11 1764 in 
Essays (Edinburgh: E. and C. Dilly, a.nd \{ . Creech, 177&), )26-327 . 
2I1id. . , P• 350. 
l 
of \lri tintS Iillich exci teL Contempt ~Ti th Laughter • 11 
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It is true that Ero,·r.a \-TaG only one of the host i·Iho i·Te:t'e el'@.ged in 
the controversy over the usefulness of ridicule, and that he 11as 
one of those uho was sufficiently imbued ,.i th the e;rouinG benevolism 
to deprecate its utility; nevertheleas his statement o~ t he resolution 
to the problem is typical. Under the influence of ben0volism, tho 
eie;hteenth-<.:entury theorist '3 defined clca:dy a concept of :posi tivC' 
laughter~ i·Thich, if it had beer. nothing ne'" to certain dramatists 
a century or so b t:"fore--! Nidsunnner Ni ; ·ht 1 s Dream comes to mind as 
an example of its existence uitn negative la.uehter--wc.s to become the 
t ouchs·lione .for comedies aspiring to public approbation in the nine-
teenth cent-:.u';y-. :But it~ acceptance as that touchstone 1..,-y practisiug 
c.r·i tics and drama tints d.id not take place overniijht . 
Abraham Tucker, \oTt.ose seven-volume philosophy of r.1ind 
!h!l Lif>!l.t .Q[. Nature Pursued appeared under the pseudonyu1 nEdivard 
Search11 be+.,..,een 1768 and 1778, is usually classed in older histories 
of thouc:;l1t as a theological utilitarian. 2 Today, :perhaps, C. S. 
Lout r s te:r·m "t:J.eolocical hedohist 11 i!ould probably be thoubht to fi·t 
hin more closely, since Tucker recommends doing GoO ' s will, no matter 
bov1 unpleasP-nt its carrying-out may be, in order that after death one 
may enjoy a ll the ploe.sures f'o:t.'et;one on earth plus a la::ct;~ amo1u1t of 
1Essays .ill:! the Chara.c·teristi cs (London: C. Davis? 1751), 
:fill• ~ 1-42. 
2cf . Sir Leslie Stephen, History~ English Thought~ !h£ 
Ei!Al;.teen·til Centur.r ( rev . ed.; 2 vols.; Lcndon: John Murray, 192'1), 
II , 109-121 . 
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his psychology, in the exposition of which he frequently declares 
his discipleship to Locke and as often disagrees with him, usually 
with an apology for not having understood him fully. There is thus 
some justice in Hazlitt~s remark that "Tucker i·Tas certainly an 
1 
arrant truant from the system he pretends to adopt." Hazlitt spent 
almost tl'lO years in preparing his abridgement of the work . He had 
long known and admired it, and he hoped by its publication under his 
editorship to realise some of the financial re'\'Tard of i·Thich the 
failure of the Essay gg ~ Principles £! ll~man Action had disappointed 
him. ~ut he tended to praise the man rather than the book, the style 
rather than the content, the literary merit rather than the philo-
sophical . urr ( TuckerJ l.Zas surpassed by one or two writers in 
logical precision and systematic profundity, there is no uetaphysical 
Yriter who is equal to him in clearness of apprehension, and a various 
2 insight into human nature," is perhaps Hazlitt ' s closest approach 
to a considered encomium in the fourteen pages of his preface. 
When we read this, and remember that Hazlitt never expressed 
admiration for Tucker ' s system, it is not surprising to find that he 
made small changes in Tucker ' s arguments. His claim to his publisher 
that he was trying to perfect Tucker ' s intention and to prune his 
work of confusing repetition3 is, judging by the results he achieves, 
atrue one, and he does his work skilfully. But in trying to bring 
1Preface to the Abridgement. Works, I, 130. 
2Ibid., p. 124 . 
3Letter to Joseph J ohnson, August 30th, 1806. See Wo Carew 
Hazl itt, Four Generations 2£ ~Literary Family (2 vols.; London: 
G. Redway, 1897), I, 96. 
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order out of chaos, he frequently brings Hazlitt out of Tucker. His 
alterations and omissions are not particularly startling--they have 
not been studied before--but they show that he made Tucker 's theory 
of laughter slightly more negative and subjective. 
Tucker ' s theory is not an "objectivist" one (if such a 
thing is possible), but it is more subjective in Hazlitt •s abridgement. 
One of the passages \ihich Ilazli tt omits ccntains Tucker ' s sole reference 
to any such thing as a comic object: "Besides that a despicable object 
contemplated ever so long will appear equally sc, but a diverting one 
cannot keep up your merriment for ever."1 IIazlitt 1 s omission of this 
could, of course, be a move to save space, but the sentence does not 
occur in an extended omitted passagee On the contrary, Hazlitt 
keeps the clause precedinG it and the sentence follotdng it. Also, 
changes of this nature are changes which one comes to expect in 
reading nineteenth-century abridt;ements of older works. The increasing 
subjectivity of aesthetic theory in the Age of Reason has been well 
documented, and one can feel more than a little justification for 
thinking that the demise of the sublime object and of the beautiful 
object was paralleled by the demise of the diverting object. 
Again, Tucker says that laughter "has been commonly held 
by our moderns to arise from contempt, upon a comparison of ourselves 
~iith something apprehended gTeatly inferior."2 Hazlitt corrects 
11 our modernsn to "some personsn and changes "apprehended" to "thoue;bt."3 
18j2), I, 
1lli Light .Q.f. Nature Pursued (2 vols.; London: H.G.Bohn, 
170. 
2Ibid. 
5!!.! Abrid[jment of lli Light of Nature Pursued (London: J. 
Johnson, 180'/), p. 10:,. 
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The effect is to make Tucker even less a disciple of Locke. ':lhat 
becomes important in the abridgement as a result of Hazlitt ' s change 
is no longer phenomena impressine themselves upon the senses, but 
the mind ' s reaction to phenomena. 
The second alteration is primarily one of emphasis, and 
its siE,-nificance amounts to this: Tucker maintains that lau13hter 
cannot, in essence, be negative, while Hazlitt ' s abrid~ement leaves 
the impression that it need not be. To accomplish his result, Tucker 
simply denies that negative laur;hter is really laughter: 
Contempt beine so apt to show itself in derision, hence 
the making a thing appear despicable and silly, has been 
called rendering it ridiculous. But ridiculous, although 
derived from the Latin l>rord standing for laughter, does 
not alw·ays imply a qual ity of exciting even that affected 
laugh which is the expression of contempt: you shall see 
men t.d th a very grave countenance go about to d.emonstra te 
the ridiculousness of a thing without ever raising mirth 
in themselves, or expectin.:; to raise it in others: there-
fore ridiculous is not synonymous with comical or 
diverting, but rather coincideo with absurd or foolish, 
and tends more to provoke your spleen than your leughter.l 
Hazlitt omits this passage, as he does Tucker ' s substitute for the 
contempt theory. Tucker thought that laughter lo~as the result of a 
relaxation of attention, and hence of pent-up spirits "when some 
1Tucker, I, 172. This laughter-which-is-not-really-laughter 
is common in eighteenth-century t.i1eories, but at the beginning of the 
century it was identified \<tith positive rather than ne~:>ative l aughter. 
Thus in Steel e t s Tatler no. 63 (September 3rd, 1709), vlill Truby, uhose 
laughter "proceeds only from a general benevolence," is rebuked by 
r Humpw Slyboots: "That motion which you now make 1d th your mouth open, 
/.. and the at;,i tation oi' your stomach, which you relieve by holding your 
sides, . is not laughter: laughter is a more weigL.ty thing than you 
imat;.ine; and I will tell you a secret, you never did laugh in your life: 
and truly I am afraid you never "'ill, except you take e;rea t care to 
be cured of those convulsive fits." 
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pleasurable idea opens the sluices at once," but Hazlitt omits this 
open statement that laughter 's source is pleasure, and retains Tucker ' s 
more vague account, that mirth is "occasioned by a sudden influx of 
spirits."1 This stressing of the negative is also apparent in those 
passages where Hazli tt rephrases Tucker. In speaking of the laugllter 
arisin& from our perception of the follies and blunders of others, 
Tucker says that 
every bl1xnder implies a deliberate endeavour tc attain 
some purpose by means not condHcive thereto, ana tb.e sight 
or thought of earnestness and expectation, in the persons 
so labouring, fills ou:r· own imagination by sympathy wi til 
the like ideasp which are immediately dissipated upon the 
reflection of their being ineffectual and nugator·y .. 2 
Eazlitt changes this to 
every bluno.er implies a deliberate purpose to attain 
some end into '1.-ihich we ente:r· by sympathy, and the sight 
of this end suddenly frustrated by the absurdity of the 
means employed produces t hat contrast, and disjointedness 
in our ideas which causes laughter.,) 
As far as Tucker is concerned, we laugh at blunders when our sympathetic 
expectations come to nought; if we laugh ~ anything, that thing is 
Fate. ]'or Hazli tt, we laugh at blunders because our expectations are 
frustrated by the absurd means used to fulfil them. Fate is not out 
o£ joint; some person is at fault and is risible for the disproportion 
between his ends and the means he employs. The import of the altaration 
is that here Hazlitt puts back into laughter that element of the absu.rd 
which Tucker specifically denies it contains. 
Thoug'll Hazli tt ' s disinclination to use technical teJ.·ms in his 
1 Tucker, I, 171; .Abrid>?'Illent, p .. 10). 
2Tucker, I, 171. 
3Abridgment, p. 106. 
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popular works tends at times to obscure his sources, the main influences 
on his comic theo~J are the eighteenth-century philosophers of mind. 
He draws chiefly on the associationists, Tucker and Hartley, but he 
is also familiar with a good deal of Reid, Hutcheson, Beattie, and 
Stewart, all of whom made contributions to comic theory. In the 
Lectures ~~English Comic Writers he mentions specifically Addison ' s 
Spectator essays on \vi t: Mol iere ' s C:ri tiguc 1!.£ l ' Ecole ~ Femmes, and 
Rousseau ' s Lettre ~ D' Alembert, ~ ~ Spectacles; he also singl~s out 
the treatment of wit and humour in George Ce~pbcll ' s ~ Philosopl!Y 
.2.£ Rhetoric. Whatever the exact relation may be between Hazlitt ' s 
theory of laughter and Tucker ' s, there is one important respect in 
which they are more or less similar, and in which they differ from 
-other contemporary theories. In Tucker we read 
Mirth I conceive occasioned by a sudden influx of spirits, 
generally, if not always, turned from some other cha.nnel, 
to which they have been drawn by an earnest attention: and 
therefore perhaps it is that to make merry is called to 
divert, as being a diversion of the spirits out of the course 
that they have been strongl y thrown into before. For that 
attention gathers a considerable fund of them appears manifest 
from the fatigue and wasting it brings on if continued long, 
and when some pleasurable idea opens the sluices at once, it 
lets in so large a f l ood that reflection cannot employ them 
all, having no other business for them than to contemplate 
that idea, and the superi·lui ty over.flot-Ts upon the muscles 
causing the convulsions of laughter.. Thus there seems to be 
three causes concurring to excite laughter when not produced 
mechanically, as by tickling, by fits of hysterics or the 
like: viz. a stretch of attention loosened at once, the 
suddenness of such relaxation, and ,.,ant of employment for the 
spirits so discharged upon the mind.l 
Similarly, Hazlitt in the introductory lecture "On Wit and Humour" 
1 Tucker, I, 171. 
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in Lectures ~~English Comic Writers says that 
to understand or define the l udicrous, 1·1e 1!lust first knot·T 
what the serious is. Now the serious in the habitual stress 
which the mind lays upon the ex:pecta tion of a given ordei' of 
events, follmifing one another \Ti th a certain regularity and 
wei~1t of interest attached to them. When this stress is 
increased beyond its usual pitch of intensity, so as to over-
strain the feelings by the violent opposition of good to bad, 
or of objects to our desires, it becomes the pathetic or 
tragical. The ludicrous, or comic, is the unexpected loosening 
or relaxing this stress belot·l its usual :pitch of intensity, 
by such an abrupt transposition of the order of our ideas, as 
taking- the mind unauares, throws it off its guard, startles it 
into a lively sense of :pleasure, and_leaves no time nor 
inclination for :painful reflections.~ 
The similarity of the two passages exists primarily in the assumption 
on wJJich each is bas<=~d . For centuries comic theorists had begged the 
question by asnerting that lauchte~ is caused by a sudden surprise 
wLich is not serious. In those passaces, however, there is an 
implication ior the first time that the tileorist kno\.zs ><Jhat the 
serious is . In speculating on the nature of a relatively ~Ulusual 
mental phenomenon, both feel competent to speak of ordinar~· mental 
operations. And it is perhaps a mark of the modernity, in one respect, 
of Hazli tt ' s ·l;heory of comedy that he formulates it with his theory 
of tragedy at hand to oet it in perspective. 
The source of this theory of the normal mind is , of course, 
the associationist psychology developed primarily by llartlcy. Hazlitt 
was fond of pointing out that the basic formulation of associationism 
originated with Hobbes, t·rho gave several pages of the first book of 
Leviathan to an explanation of vihat he called "Consequence," "Trayne 
of Thoughts," o:1: "Montall Discourse": 
1 Horks, VI, 7• 
\'lhen a man thinketh on any thing vhatsoever, His next 
Thought after, i s not altogether so oasuall as it seems 
to be. Not every Thought to every Thought succeeds 
indifferently. But as wee have no Imagination, whereof 
~re have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts; 
so ve have no Transition from one Ima&ination to another, 
whereof ~e never had the like before in our Senses.l 
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I n the eighteenth-century elaboration of associationism, Hobbes ' s 
materialist basis Has somewhat softened. Over and over again, one 
finds in theories of the time suggestions for a "t:ru.e basis of 
associationou Tucker substitues for Hobbes ' s conti&uity of impressions 
a very tame version of the pleasure principle: 
What first links ideas into trains, I take to be the 
succession of objects causing or leading to our satis-
factions: for having observed that things agreeable 
come to us through several steps, \Thenever the first 
of them is made, it carries the thought on to all the 
rest, and having perceived that our desires carrnot be 
gratified without using some means to obtain then, 
imagination runs back to all that is necessary to be 
done for that purpose.2 
Actually, Hobbes distinguishes nunguided" from "regule.ted11 trains of 
thought,3 and Tucker stresses the latter at t he expense of the former~ 
thus postulating a more purposive type of train formation and recollection. 
The result is that in the normal intellect, as Tucker sees it, there is 
a continual expectation of what is to followo The accents of the 
associationists and more than an echo of Tucker can be heard v1hon Hazli tt 
says 
The mind having been led to form a certain conclusion, 
1Leviathan, p. 8. Cfo Hazli tt, "On the \•lri tings of Hobbes/' 
Lectures ~ English Philosophy, Works, II, 1~3-134· 
2 Tucker, I, 96 . 
3Leviathan, P• 9a 
and the result producing an immediate solution of 
continuity in the chain of our ideas, this alternate 
excitement and relaxation of the imagination, the 
object also s·t;riking upon the mind more vividly in 
its loose unsettled state, and before it has had time 
to recover and collect itself, causes that alternate 
excitement and relaxation, or irregular convulsive 
movement of the muscular and nervous system, which 
constitutes physical laughtero The discontinuous 
in our sensations produces a correspondent jar and 
discord in the frame.l 
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The essence of t_le laughable, then, is fo~' Hazli tt t l.te incongruous, 
a.nd the distinction..; he me..de bot1•1een type3 of incon{Srai ty and their 
effects constitute his comic theory. 
1110n \lit and I:Iumou:r," \~orks, VI~ 1· 
CHAPTER IX 
If laughter is built on incongruity, then a comparison 
of the laughable and the serious is likely to result in a somewhat 
intellectualised or f ormalistic notion of the nature of laughter. 
But sometimes the incongruous is not at all laughable; sometimes 
it gives rise to terror or to tears. Thus the laughable must b~ 
further isolated as a special kind of incongruity or reaction to 
incongruity. 
\llhen he differentiates bet't-1een laughter and tears, 
Hazlitt holds that any uncomplicated unexpectedness is n~turally 
laughable, and that it is only through some sort of impurity, such 
as a veiled but perceptible threat to the individual involved, that 
tears arise: 
The mere suddenness of the transition, t he mere baulking 
our expectations, and turning them abruptly into another 
channel, seems to give additional liveliness and gaiety 
to the animal spirits; but the instant the change is not 
only sudden, but threatens serious consequences, or calls 
up the shape of danger, terror supersedes our disposition 
to mirth, and laughter gives place to tears.l 
"A disposition to mirth, 11 then, is the natural reaction to the 
perception of an incongruity, but this disposition is follo"l!Ted 
by tears wham the incongruity is dangerous. It is interesting 
to remark that Hartley and Hazlitt ~ere two of the very small 
1
"0n \'lit and Humour," Lectures .2!l ~ English Comic \'lri te~ 
Works, VI, 6.-
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number of writers of the period who compared tears and laughter, and 
that Hazlitt ' s view is directly qpposed to that of the associationist: 
NoY it may be observed, that young Children do not laugh 
aloud for some Months. The first Occasion of doing this 
seems to be a Surprize, which brings on a momentary Fear 
first, and then a momentary Joy in consequence of the 
Removal of Pain. This may appear probable, inasmuch as 
Laughter is a nascent Cry, stopped of a sudden; also 
because if the very same Surprize, which makes young 
Chil~ren laugh, be a very little increased, they w~l 
cry. 
For Hartley, la.ughter is a "nascent Cry"; Hazli tt 's conclusion could 
perhaps justly be paraphrased as "crying is a nascent laugh." 
The reason for this radical divergence is Hartley ' s 
grounding of laughter in the removal of psychic pain; in the history 
of English comic theory he is, it would appear, the first to do so, 
although the groundwork for his contribution had been laid by Hobbes, 
who was only the first to note the fact that a sudde11 psychic shock 
2 is characteristic of laut,;hter. The "re:J_ief" theory is still the 
·dominant opinion in modern attempts to explain the genesis of 
laughter. 3 \/hat is relieved may not necessarily be pain--Hartley 
himself speaks of "sudden alarming Emotions and Expectations" being 
"dissipated" in laughter,4 and Tucker, as we have seen, noted a 
"superfluity of spirits" overflo,·ring to the muscles. Charles Dar1-1in 
sounds much more modern when he speaks of the expenditure in laughter 
1
observations ~ ~ (London, 1749), I, 437· 
2J. Y .. T. Greig, ~ Ps}chology .Q.f. Laughter~ Comedy (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1923 does not notice the relief theory 
before Herbert Spencer. 
3see Greig, p. 49 ff.; Gregory, PP• 20, 59, 64, 77, 81, ~seq.; 
Arthur Koestler, Insight and Outlook (London: l1acmillan & Co. Ltd., 
1949), pp. 54-70. 
4 Hartley, I, 438. 
of "superfluous nervous energ7" •1 Follo\dng Freud, Jacob Levine 
has put the relief theory quite succinctly--"a joke seems funny 
only if it arouses anxiety and at the same time relieves it."2 
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Similarly, V.K. Krishna Menon calls laughter "a safety-valve for 
:pent-up emotions," a means of "demobilization of forces." 3 These 
theories all tend to characterise laughter as a kind of psychological 
sublimation of fear, anxiety, and so forth, the :p~ysiological aspect 
of which process has been fully described both by Gregory and Koestler.4 
When Hazlitt comes closest to a relief theory, his opinion does not 
appear to be consistent with what he had previously 'l'lri tten: 
if a child is playing at hide-and-seek, or blindman's-buff, 
'-rith persons it is ever so fond of, and either misses them 
where it had made sure of finding them, or suddenly runs 
up against them where it had least expected it, the shock 
or additional impetus given to the imagination by the 
disappointment or the discovery, in a matter of this 
indifference, will only vent itself in a fit of laughter.5 
Previously, Hazlitt had said that 
if the child mee·ts [a person of whom it is particularly fond] 
unexpectedly after long absence, the same effect [tears] will 
be produced by an excess of joy, with different accompaniments; 
that is, the surprise and the emotion excited will make the 
blood come into his face, his eyes sparkle, his tongue falter 
or be mute, but in either case the tears will gush to his 
relief, and lighten the pressure about his heart.6 
Hazlitt began by saying that the unexpected--when non-threatening--
1The ExJression .Q.f ~ Emotions ,m ~ ~ Animals (London: 
John Murray, 1872, p. 199· See also Herbert Spencer, "The Physiology 
of Lattgh·~er, 11 1-ta.cmillan's Magazine, I (March, 1860), :pp. 395-402, for 
an elabt:::.: e;.:. tion of Dar\dn ' s theory. 
2 
uResponses to Humor, 11 Scientific .American, CXCIV (l!'ebruary, 
1956) , P• 31. 
5~ Theory£! Laughter (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1931), p. 19. 
4G~egory, p. 27; Koestler, p. 8 ff. 
Juon Wit and Humour," VI, 6-7· 
6Ibid., p. 6. 
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is inher~ntly pleasurable; now he indicates t hat i t is painful. The 
first explanation postulates a play basis for l aughter, the second a 
relief basis. It is quite possible that the reason for the inconsis-
tency may be an attempt by llazlitt to follo'\'7 Har tley, an attempt sub-
verted by imperfect memory; the space given by both writers to the 
laughter of children, and the similarity in the experiments they cite, 
make this explanation at l east a feas i bl e one. A likelier one, however, 
iB t he s imple fact t hat Tiazlitt did not labour over matters of detail 
in his popul ar pronouncement s . 
\tl.a tever t he rea son may be, Hazlitt finds that both l aughter 
and tears may follOi.r the sudden perception of an incongruity . His 
probl em now is to descry the conditions gove~~ing each response . 
Tears result, he says, when the perception of the incongruity is 
accompanied by sympathy, laughter, when it is not: 
\{e shed tears from sympathy '\d t h real and necessary distress; 
as \'le burst into l aughter :from want of sympathy vi th that 
which is unreasonabl e and unnecessary, the absurdity of l·thich 
provokes our spleen or mirth, rather than any serious 
refl ections on it. To explain the nature of laughter and tears, 
i s to account for t he condition of human life; for it i s in a 
manner compoltnded of these two ! It is a tragedy or a comedy--
s ad or merry, as it happens. '~he crimes and misfortunes that 
are inseparable from it, shock and 1.-round the mind when ·they 
once seize upon it? and when tile pressure can no longer be 
borne, seek rel ief in tears: the follies and absurdities that 
men commit, or the odd accidents that befall them, afford us 
amusement from the very rejection of these false clai~a upon 
our sympathy, e.n<l end in l aughter.l 
This may a~pear to be lit t l e more t han a slightly modernised version 
of Hobbes ' contempt theory, and it is more negative than Hutcheson 
1
"on With and Humour," Lectures ..sm ~English Comic Wri ters, 
Works, VI, ) . Cf. \'!alpol.e ' s well-kno'm epi-->ram "The -vrorld is a. comedy to 
those that think, a tragedy to those who feel," and Bergson ' s equally 
\'lell-k.novm statement, "The comic appeal s to int el ligence pure, and 
requires a temporary anaesthesia of the heart." 
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and Beattie. But it may look more negative than it is. In fact, 
it is negative only insofar as an attitude of indifference implies 
a negative judement. Compared to sympathy, which for Hazlitt is so 
important, indifference ~ negative; compared to contempt, it is not. 
Also, the distinction between the laughable and the pathetic, which 
ah1ays makes the laughable appear relatively negative, is stated in 
even more negative a form than Hazlitt ' s in George Campbell ' s 
Philosophy£! Rhetoric, which, as we have seen, is a source of Hazlitt 1 s 
theory. Thus Hazlitt can be seen to soften somewhat in reality the 
following distinction: 
A just exhibition of any ardent or durable passion, 
excited by some adequate cause, instantly attacheth 
sympathy, the common tie of human souls, and intensely 
communicates the passion to the breast of the hearer. 
But when the emotion is either not violent or not 
durable, and the motive not anything real, but imaginary, 
or at least, quite disproportionate to the effect; or when 
the passion displays itself preposterously, so as rather to 
obstruct than to promote its aim--in these cases a natural 
representation, instead of fellow-feeling, creates amusement, 
and universally awakens contempt.l 
The presence or absence of sympathy is not for Razlitt the only 
determinant of the pathetic or laughable nature of sudden incongruity. 
He continues~ 
VI, 5. 
If every thing that went wrong, if every vanity and 'tveakness 
in another gave us a sensible pang, it would be hard indeed: 
but as long as the disagreeableness of the consequences of a 
sudden disaster is kept out of sight by the immediate oddity 
of the circumstances, and the absurdity or unaccountableness 
of a foolish action is the most striking thing in it, the 
ludicrous prevails over the pathetic, and we receive pleasure 
instead of pain from the farce of life which is played before us, 
and which discomposes our gravity as often as it fails to move our 
anger or our pityl2 
1
campbell, pp. 37-38. 
2
"0n vli t and Humour," Lectures .Q.a ~ English Comic Writers, 
When we are the object of laughter, Hazlitt says, 
ve are occupied \d th the disagreeableness of the result 
instead of its oddity or unexpectedness. Others see 
only the conflict of motives, and the sudden alternation 
of events; \'re feel the pain as well, which more than 
counterbalances the speculative entertainnent 1-1e might 
receive from the contemplation of our nbstract situation.1 
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These pasaages show that what separates, as far as Hazlitt is concerned, 
the pathetic from the laughable is something larger than, and yet em-
bracing, sympathy. It might be called abstraction or perspective, 
but these label s, like "indifference,'* merely indicate forms of it. 
A better term is "distance," a very useful word the development o.f 
which in the field of aesthetics was furthered in the Romantic period. 
2 Hazlitt himself frequently uses both the term and the concept, and 
the value he attached to it can be measured in the fact that he saw 
fit to discuss it at some length in the seminal lecture "On Poetry 
In General" in 1818: 
Objects must strike differently upon the mind, independently 
of what they are in themselves, as long as we have a 
different interest in them, as 1>1e see them in a different 
point of view, nearer or at a greater djat.~ce (morally or 
physically speaking) from novelty, from old acquaintance, 
from our ignorance of them, from our fear of their 
consequences, from unexpected likeness.3 
In another instance, Hazlitt allies distance with his concept of 
t he imagination: "Time , like distance, spreads a haze and a glory 
round imagination. Not to percej_ve this, is to uant a sense, is to 
be without imagination. 114 One might be tempted to call the operation 
of distance in laughter a kind of unsympathetic imagination. 
1
"0n Wit and Humour," VI, 9· 
.., 
~Greig seems to believe that it was first used by Edward 
Bullough; see ~ Psychology of Laughter~ Comedy, p. 69. 
3Lectures Qa ~English Poets, V, 8-9. 
4non Egotism,"~ Plain Speaker, Works, XII, 157. 
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Essentially, an act of imagination for Razli"tt is an escape from, 
or ratl.ler an annihilation of self. The most common method of 
achieving this is through sympathy vd th others--hence nsympathetic 
imagination. 11 :But · althoue;h there is not sympathy in laughter, there 
is some degree of abstraction of the self in the experience, and thus 
laughter presupposes an act of the imagination. 
I·t might be as well here to examine further both the 
meaning of na.istance" and its application to comic theory. Edward 
Bullough has written what seems to be the classic treatment of the 
subject, stressing its wide application to a number of aesthetic 
problems. He does not so much define it as explain the metaphor 
involved: 
It is a difference of outlook, due--if such a metaphor is 
permissible--to the insertion of Distance. This Distance 
appears to lie between our ot·Jn self and its affections, 
using the latter term in its broadest sense as anything 
which affects our being, bodily or spiritually, e.g. as 
sensation, perception, emotional state or idea. Usually, 
though not ah1ays, it amounts to the same thing to say 
that Distance lies between our own self and such objects 
as are the sources or vehicles of such afi'ections .. l 
Of the relationship between the normal outlook and the Distanced 
outlook, :Bullough writes, 
It has a negative, inhibitory aspect--the cutting-out o£ 
the practical sides of things and o£ our practical attitude 
to them--and a positive side-~the elaboration of the 
experience on the new basis created by the inl1ibitory action 
of Distance. 
Consequently, this distanced vievl of things is not, and 
cannot be, our normal outlook. As a rule, experiences 
1E e Bullough..; . 11 'Psychical Distance ' as a factor in Art and 
an aesthetic principle," British Journal .91 Psycho1ob"'Y, V (June, 1912) , 
p. 89. 
constantly turn the same side towards us, namely, that which 
has the strongest practical force of appeal.l 
The main use Bullough makes of psychical distance is to define the 
aesthetic experience, which he, like Kant, finds to be characterised 
by a type of indifference. However, he goes on to make psychical 
distancing· the only requirement for creating as aesthetic experience. 
The result is that the province of aesthetics includes much that is 
not ar'ts 
Even muscular sensations may pr~sent aes thetic possibilities, 
in the free exercise of bodily movement, the swing of a 
runner, in the ease and certainty of a trained gymnast; 
nay, such diffuse organic sensations as the buoyancy of 
well-being , and the elasticity of 'bodily energy, can, in 
privileged memento , be aesthetically en.joyed. That they 
admit of no material fixation, aa objects of sight and 
hearing do, and for that rea son form no part of Art in 
the narrower sense; that they exist as aesthetic objects 
only for the moment and for the single being that.enjoys 
them, is no argument against their aesthetic character. 
Mere material exiatence and permanence is no aesthetic 
criterion.2 
Since , according to the relief theory, laughter results from the 
mind 1 s passing from involvement in an inconbTUity to non-involvement 
in it, psychical distancing would seem to be essential to laughter. 
But if Bullough admits that laughter involves distancing, he has to 
find the experience of laughter aesthetic; which would extend even 
more the concept of the aesthetic experience. Thus he finds laughter 
below the threshold of the aesthetic experience because it is marked 
by a 11non-distanced, practical and perscnal appeal." 3 The higher 
forms of comedy, houever, are marked by increasing degrees of 
llill·' p. 109. 
2 Bullough, p. 111. 
3rtid., p. 112. 
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distancing, so that "the supreme achievement of comedy is unquestionably 
that 'distanced ridicule ' \-Illich we call humour. n 1 Though Bullough does 
go into the matter, he is here in a similar difficulty: he must say 
either that humour exists only in art, or that all the humour one 
finds in life is an aesthetic experience . 
Perhaps it would be better to distinguish betv1een psychical 
distance and aesthetic distance--terms •<~hich Bullough uses inter-
changeably. A detailed distinction would be difficult, but a start 
might be made by saying that aesthetic distance is a form of psychical 
distance, initiated outside, rather than inside, t he observer. Thus 
the existenc0 ot a. uork of art v1ould be necessary to the aesthetic 
experience. ( I am not sure that elegant chess combinations, for 
example, cannot be considered in the same light as works of art, and 
I feel that the enjoyment experienced. in watching the controlled 
movements of a modern dancer [ballet is something else again] or an 
athlete springs largely from the sort of projective physiological 
response which we call empathy.) If such a distinction, like 
Bullough ' s formulation, leaves us without a defini·!iion of art, it 
at least serves ·to separate the field of aesthetics and psychology. 
:tio:c does it keep us from seeing some similarity betueen lau~hter, 
which is psychically distanced, and art, which is aesthetically 
distanced. Thus we can understand why Arthur Koestler can begin an 
examination of aesthetic principles \vi th a comic theory. \ve can 
understand, too, how Hazlitt can say that he who laughs is, as it 
were, treating life as if it were art and laughing at "the farce of 
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life \<Thich is played before us. n 
Thus, although the terms laughable, ridiculous, and ludicrous 
were distinctive labels in critical terminology long before Hazlitt 
came to pronounce upon the, the degree to which he develops them 
results in certain neu :points of departure in comic theory. :f.iost 
obviously, in Hazlitt ' s usage, they are indications of tone, or 
attitude towards the objects of l aughter, as can be seen in Hazlitt ' s 
distinguishing them in order of increasing negativity: 
The accidental contradiction betueen our expectations 
and the event can hardly be said, houever, to amount to 
the ludicrous: it is merely lauchable. The ludicrous is 
whore there is the same contradiction betueen the object 
and our expectations, heightened by some deformity or 
inconvenience, that is, by its being contrary to what is 
customary or o.esirable; as the ridiculous, uhich is the 
hig-hest def;ree of the laughabl e, is that '·rhich is 
contrary not only to custom but to senoe and reason, or 
is a voluntary departure from -vrhat \:Te have a right to 
o;p ~ct from those who are conscious of absurdity and 
propriety in words, looks, and actions.l 
Although we might agree with Rene Wellek that these distinction~ are 
"fuzzy and groping" it is difficult to see hovr they "are not 
focused on the use of wit and humor in art. 112 Wellek is rib'ht in 
asserting that the problem of the laughable as such is different 
from the problem of the comic. Laughter is exploited in literature 
in many different \'lays, varying 'ddely in tone if in nothing else from 
negative to positive, from neutral to mixed. It is possible to 
believe that Hazlitt ' s distinctions do not demarcate clearly enough 
the gap betueen psychology and aesthetics, but \ve must credit him 
1
"on Vit and Humour," VI, 7-IJ. 
2Wellek, II, ~· 204. 
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with the fact that they are at least intended to focus on the use of 
laughter in art. And there is evidence that Hazlitt has succeeded in 
some degree, since these distinctions are co-ordinate with others 
manifested in his practical criticism of comedy, a subject well covered 
1 by Stuart Tave. The following table will clarify the relationships 
discernible in Razlitt •s references to comic drama: 
Type of Laughter 
Laughable 
Ludicrous 
Ridiculous 
Tone 
Negative or neutral 
Mixed (negative and positive) 
Negative 
Literary Use 
Farce and nonsense 
Romantic Comedy/ Humour 
Comedy of Manners, Satire. 
The degrees of the laughable, in addition to indicating an increasingly 
negative tone, show an increasing viability in the comic contrast on 
which the laughter is based. In the simply laughable, the expectation 
is not only suddenly reversed, but is immediately abandoned after the 
reversal--
Of these different kinds or degrees of the laughable, 
the first is the most shallow and short-lived; for the 
instant the immediate surprise of a thing's merely 
happening one way or another is over, there is nothing 
to throw us back upon our former expectation, and renew 
our wonder at the event a second time.2 
One literary form using the simply laughable is farce, which Hazlitt 
treats in discussing Moliere in "On Wit and Humour." His appreciation 
of Moliere was limited, principally because he could not find in the 
dramatist ' s work sufficient credibility to sustain the comic contrast: 
He was unquestionably one of the greatest comic geniuses 
1Tave ' s fullest treatment of Hazlitt occurs on pp. 209-217 
of ~ Amiable Humorist. 
2 
"On Wit and Humour," VI, 8. 
218 
that ever lived; a man of infinite wit, gaiety, and 
invention--full of life, laughter, and whim. But it 
cannot be denied, that his plays are in general mere 
farces, without scrupulous adherence to nature, 
refinement of character, or common probability. The 
plots of several of them could not be carried on for 
a moment without a perfect collusion between the 
parties to wink at contradictions, and act in defiance 
of the evidence of their senses.l 
He goes on to say that Moli~re indulges in "outrageous caricatures 
of nature," and considers that although the Medecin malgr~ ~ is 
uone of the most laughable and truly comic productions that can well 
be imagined, 11 it, like the Bourgeois Gentilhomme, Monsieur Porceaugpac, 
and Georges Dandin, is characterised by "the utmost license of 
burlesque imagination ••• and ••• intoxication of animal spirits." 
Elsewhere he remarks, concerning the first performance of Arnold's 
~ ~ ~ ~ Magpye, a p~e he considered to be suffused with the 
spirit of the French stage, that "the French ••• have the advantage 
of us in playing with the common-place surface of comedy, in the 
2 harlequinade of surprises and escapes." 
Another literary use of the simply laughable is nonsense, 
and IIazlitt 1 s great exemplar in this field is Rabalais. In the sixth 
o£ the Lectures £a~ English Poets he compares Swift, Voltaire, and 
Rabelais: 
Swift ' s wit ••• was serious, saturnine, and practical; 
Rabalais' was fantastical and joyous; Voltaire ' s was light, 
sportive, and verbal. Swift's wit was the wit of sense; 
Rabelais', the wit of nonsense; Voltaire's, of indifference 
1
"0n 'Wit and Humour," VI, 28. 
2
"The Maid and the Magpye," .! ~ of lli English Stage, 
Works, V, 244-245· An adaptation of Caigniez ' ~ pie voleuee: ~' 
~ servants ~ Palaiseau. 
to both •••• Rabalais loved~bsurdit~, exaggerated it 
with supreme satisfaction, luxuriated in its endless 
varieties, rioted in nonsense ••• He dwelt on the absurd 
and l~dicrous f~r the pleasure they gave him, not for the 
pain. 
In the 1825 essay entitled ••Merry England, 11 Hazli tt grounds the 
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French taste for nonsense in a natural levity of mind, marked by 
flippancy and impertinence. But the older French "nonsense," though 
more extravagant than the English, is akin to it: Moli~re and 
Ra.belais "approach and exceed the English licence and extravagance 
of conceptiono112 English "nonsense" is marked by its contrast to 
English gravity and seriousness: 
I flatter myself that we are almost the only people left 
who understand and relish nonsense •••• When we trifle, 
we trifle in good earnest; and having once relaxed our 
hold of the helm, drift idly down the stream, and delighted 
with the change are tossed about "by every little breath" 
of whim or caprice, 
'That under Heaven is blown.' 
All we want is to proclaim a truce with reason, and to be 
pleased with as little expense of thought or pretension to 
wisdom as possible.) 
If David Hume was one of the earliest theorists to recognise the 
contrasting and relieving function of the comic scenes in tragedy,4 
Hazlitt was one of the few to take up the hint, as is evident from 
his discussion of "nonsense" in serious dramal 
This licensed fooling is carried to its very utmost length 
in Shakespear, and in some other of our elder dramatists, 
without, perhaps, sufficient warrant or the same excuse. 
Nothing can justify this extreme relaxation but extreme 
1
works, v, 112. 
2 
"Merry England," Works, XVII, 158. 
3Ibid., p. 159. 
4see 110n Tragedy, .. ~ Dissertations, p. 185. 
tension. Shakespear 's trifling does indeed tread upon 
the very borders of vacancy: his meaning often hangs 
by the very slenderest threads. For this he might be 
blamed if it did not take away our breaths to follow 
his eagle flights, or if he did not at other times 
make the cordage of our hearts crack. After our heads 
ache with thinking, it is fair to play the fool.l 
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Since the simply laughable is a species in a genus called by Hazlitt 
~ laughable, its co-species are, according to our expectations, 
distinguished from it merely by certain circumstantial features. 
For Razlitt, as for Beattie and Hutcheson, the feature distinguishing 
the ridiculous is contempt. 
Of these different kinds or degrees of the laughable • • • 
the third sort, or the ridiculous arising out of 
absurdity as well as improbability, that is, where the 
defect or weakness is of a man ' s own seeking, is the 
most refined of all, but not always eo pleasant as the 
ludicrous, because the same contempt and disapprobation 
which sharpens and subtilises our sense of the impropriety, 
adds a severity to it inconsistent with perfect ease and 
enjoyment. This last species is properly the province of 
satire.2 
If the simply laughable leavened with contempt is the ridiculous, 
and the ridiculous is the highest form of the laughable, contempt 
would seem to be honoured with a high place in Hazlitt's theory. 
The highest form of the laughable really ought to be that in which 
the essence of the simply laughable reaches its highest perfection, 
if we are to take at anything more than its face value Razlitt's 
statement that "a thing is not more perfect by becoming something 
else, but by being~ itself."3 The question then is whether 
l"Merry England," XVII, 158. 
2
non Wit and Humour," VI, 8. 
'"The Ideal," Works, XX, 303. 
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contempt, the distinctive feature of the ridiculous, perfects the 
essence of the simply laughable. Beattie's answer was no, but Hazlitt 
says yes-"it sharpens and subtilises our sense of the impropriety,n 
and we recall that impropriety, or incongruity, is the essence of 
the simply laughable. Thus contempt is a necessary element in the 
ridiculous, because it brings about the formal perfection of the 
lowest species . It is necessary to remember in dealing with Hazlitt's 
development of this theory that the superiority of the ridiculous 
rests directly on its form, and only indirectly on its content, which 
to some extent is negative. 
The ridiculous, Hazlitt has indicated, is properly the 
province of satire. Since the ridiculous is a species of the laughable, 
Hazlitt holds that satire is a form of comedy. Thus, he can call any 
work employing the ridiculous a comedy or a satire with some propriety, 
even though at times he appears fully to equate the two. Hogarth, he 
says, 11 is essentially a comic painter; his pictures are not indifferent, 
unimpassioned descriptions of human nature, but rich, exuberant satires 
upon it. He is carried away by a passion for the ridiculous.n1 Since 
the ridiculous expresses a negative judgment, the comic artist is 
responsible for a just assessment of character: 
The fools in \fycherley and Congreve are of their own, or 
one another ' s making, and deserve to be well scourged into 
common sense and decency: the fools in Shakspeare are of 
his own or nature ' s making; and it would be unfair to probe 
to the quick, or hold up to unqualified derision, the faults 
which are involuntary and incorrigible, or those which you 
yourself encourage and exaggerate, from the pleasure you 
1
"0n Mr. Wilkie ' s Pictures," Worke, XVIII, 98. 
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take in witnessing them.1 
This is of course the old distinction between acquired follies and 
natural follies, 2 though Hazlitt is too much a formalist and not 
enough a benevolist to believe that natural follies are not laughable. 
He asserts that in addition to this danger--making the comic char-
acter insufficiently culpable to excite ridicule--there is the 
opposed danger of making him too detestable. Donne's sa~ires, for 
example, he considered "too clericaln: 
He shews, if I may so speak, too much disgust, and, at 
the same time, too much contempt for vice. His dogmatical 
invectives hardly redeem the nauseousness of his descript-
ions, and compromise the imagination of his readers more 
than they assist their reason. The satirist does not write 
with the same authority as the divine, and should use his 
poetical privileges more sparingly.3 
If vice as such is too contemptible, and folly as such is sometimes 
not contemptible enough to be ridiculous, the problem of the object 
of the ridiculous arises. The standard answer, which we have seen 
Hazlitt using, is "acquired follies"; if vice is made to look like 
folly freely chosen, it can be the object of both contempt and 
laughter, and is thus ridiculous. Henry Fielding gave another 
answer: "The only source of the true ridiculous (as it appears to 
me) is affectation."4 A third answer given by Ha.zlitt is "the 
proper object of ridicule is egotism."5 These three concepts are 
111 0n Shakspeare and Ben Jonson, 11 Works, VI, 35. 
2For the genealogy of this idea, see Tave, p. 49 ff. 
3"0n Cowley, Butler, Suckling, Etherege, &c.," Lectures ,ga 
1h& English Comic Writers, Works, VI, 53. 
4"Preface," ~History£!.. Joseph .Andrews. (1742.) 
5"0n the Comic vlriters of the Last Century," vlorka, VI, 151. 
223 
similar in at least one respect: they make the ~ qua ~ of the 
ridiculous a moral or behavioural flaw viewed in its intellectual 
aspect. Because of this flaw, contempt is possible; because the 
attention is diverted to the intellectual genesis of the flaw and 
the effects of this genesis, contempt is limited and laughter occurs. 
As we have seen, Hazlitt considers the ridiculous to be simple laughter 
sharpened by contempt, and simple laughter to be based on the perception 
of an incongruity. Thus the ridiculous requires the perception of 
folly or vice as an incongruity, and not simply as a behavioural flaw. 
The efect of this theory is not, however, to remove morality from 
comedy, but to shift the reader's or the audience's attention--and, 
of course, the attention of the critic holding the theory--from the 
violation to the thing violated. Egotism, the object of ridicule, is 
a form of comic hubrisJ unlike its tragic counterpart, it is, in Hazlitt's 
theory, bad in itself; like its tragic counterpart, it serves to focus 
moral issues. This is another reason, and a more than formal one, 
for Hazlitt's belief that the ridiculous is the highest form of the 
laughable. 
The ridiculous is properly the province of satire, and satire 
implies something more than contemptuous laughter. It implies also 
that this contempt is directed at an action, at an attitude, by an 
author or actor. Satire is made, not simply found. In his Prefatory 
Remarks !Q Oxberry' s ~English Drama in 1818, Hazlitt noted that 
nothing can be more ridiculous or more instructive than 
the scenes[ in Colman ' s The Jealous Wife] of which Mrs. Oakly 
is the heroine, yet they are all serious and unconscious: 
she exposes herself to our contempt and ridicule by the part 
she acts, by the airs she gives herself, and the fantastic 
behaviour in the situations in which she is placed. 
In other words, the character is pure comedy, not 
satire. Congreve ' s comedies for the most part are 
satires, in which, from an exuberance of wit, the 
different speakers play off the sharp-po~ted 
raillery on one another's foibles, real or supposed. 
The best and most genuine kind of comedy, because 
the most dramatic, is that of character or humour, 
in which the persons introduced upon the stage are 
left to betray their own folly by their words and 
actions. 1 
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The difference between pure comedy and satire is the same as that 
which Hazlitt frequently draws between the dramatic and the didactic--
as, for example, in his discussion of Hudibras: the 
poem in its essence is a satire, or didactic poem. It 
is not virtually dre~tic, or narrative. It is composed 
of digressions by the author. He constantly breaks off 
in the middle of a story, or incident, to comment upon 
and turn it into ridicule. He does not give characters 
but topics, which would do just as well in hie own 
mouth without agents, or machinery of any kind.2 
The best comedy is the most dramatic; it is difficult to create, 
given this qualification, the necessary contempt, since the 
dramatic development of character tends naturally to arouse 
sympathetic identification, to a greater or smaller degree, with 
t hat character. As Hazlitt maintained in the Essay~~ Principles 
.2£ Human Action, 11 ou.r sympathy is always directly excited in pro-
portion to our knowledge of the pain, and of the disposition and 
feelings of the sufferer."3 Thus a genuinely dramatic representation 
of character can undermine satire& "Cowley 's character of Oliver 
1The ~ English Drama. "The Jealous ''life, II vlorks , IX, 73· 
2 
"On Cowley, Butler, Suckling, Etherege, &o.," VI, 65. 
3\forks, I, 23. 
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Cromwell, which is intended as a satire, (though it certainly produces 
a very different impression on the mind), may vie for truth of outline 
and force of colouring with the masterpieces of the Greek and Latin 
historians ."1 
Hazlitt tends to associate satire vith wit, and he defines 
them in roughly the same way--"wit is, in fact, a voluntary act of 
the mind, or exercise of the invention, shewing the absurd or ludicrous 
consciously, \'lhether in ourselves or another. 112 Moreover, he differ-
entiates between wit and humour precisely as he had between pure 
comedy and satire: 
Humour is the describing the ludicrous as it is in itself; 
wit is the exposing it, by comparing or contrasting it with 
something else. Humour is, as it were, the growth of nature 
and accident; wit is the production of art and fancy. Humour, 
as it is shewn in books, is an imitation of the natural or 
acquired absurdities of mankind, or of the ludicrous in 
accident, situation, and characterl wit is the illustrating 
and heightening the sense of that absurdity by seme sudden 
and unexpected likeness or opposition of one thing to another, 
which sets off the quality we laugh at or despise in a still 
more contemptible or striking point of view.3 
He does grant that "wit may sometimes, indeed, be shewn in compliments 
as well as satire," but he insists that "the favourite employment of 
vit is to add littleness to littleness, and heap contempt on insig-
nificance."4 Although wit sometimes does not excite contempt, its 
111 0n Cowley, Butler, Suckling, Etherege, &c.," VI, 61. 
2
"0n Wit and Humour," VI, 22. It is "this kind of wit of 
the humourist, where the person makes a butt of himself," Hazlitt says, 
which is the principle on which the character of Falstaff is founded. 
3Ibid., p. 15. To compare Hazlitt•s idea of wit with that of, 
say, the Metaphysicals, would be interesting but hardly relevant to the 
present study. Tave ' s book is in one res,ect a conspectus of changing 
conceptions of wit through the eighteenth century into the Romantic 
period, and is likely to become a standard reference on the subject. 
4" On Wit and Humour, " VI , 15 • 
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opportunities for doing so are favourable, because it is even more 
negative than simple laughter. Many writers in the eighteenth 
century had pointed out that Locke's famous distinction between 
wit and judgment1 ignored the possibility of finding wit in contrast, 
rather than comparison; Hazlitt goes further, and makes the in-
dispensable basis of wit the perception of dissimilarity in 
similitude: 
The detection and exposure of difference, particularly 
where this implies nice and subtle observation, as in 
discriminating between pretence and practice, between 
appearance and reality, is common to wit and satire 
with judgment and reasoning, and certainly the comparing 
and connecting our ideas together is an essential part 
of reason and judgment, as well as of wit and fancy. 
Mere wit, as opposed to reason or argument, consists in 
striking out some casual and partial coincidence which 
has nothing to do, or at least implies no necessary 
connection with the nature of the things, which are 
forced into a seeming analogy ••• 2 
For this reason, feels Hazlitt, it is dangerous to base a work 
entirely upon wit, not because wit arouses "necessary sympathy or 
lasting hatred," but because it arouses neither. It is the "eloquence 
of indifference,") and indifference--which is by no means the same 
as disinterestedness--is a serious defect of character in Hazlitt•s 
view: 
A common and also a very pleasing ornament to a clock, 
in Paris, is a figure of Time seated in a boat which 
Cupid is rowing along, with the motto, ~'Amour f!ii 
passer 1& Tems--which the wits as ain have travestied 
1~ Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, ch. xi. 
211 0n \.lit and Humour," VI, 19. 
3 ~., p. 15. 
into ~ ~ ~ Easser 1 ' Amour. All this is ingenious 
and well; but it wants sentiment. I like a pecple who 
have something that they love and something that they 
hate, and with whom every thing is not alike a matter 
of indifference or pour passer ~ ~· • • • When the 
volatile salt has flown off, nothing but a caEut mortuum 
remains.l 
Hazlitt has a theoretical dislike of wit because its message is 
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that appearance is just as important and just as real as reality. 
In an essay "On the Question Whether Pope was a Poet," published 
in the Edinburgh Magazine in February, 1818, he wrote 
What discrimination, what wit, what delicacy, what fancy, 
what lurking spleen, what elegance of thought, what 
refinement of sentiment! It is like looking at the world 
through a microscope, where every thing assumes a new 
character and a new consequence,--where things are seen 
in their minutest circumstances and slightest shades of 
difference,--when the little becomes gigantic, the deformed 
beautiful, and the beautiful deformed. 2 
And again, in the lecture 11 0n Dryden and Pope" in Lectures .2!! _ill 
English Poets, 
he was the poet of personality and of polished life •••• 
He preferred the artificial to the natural in passion, 
because the involuntary and uncalculating impulses of 
the one hurried him away with a force and vehemence with 
which he could not grapple; while he could trifle with 
the conventional and superficial modifications of mere 
sentiment at will, laugh at or admire, put them en or off 
like a masquerade-dress, make much or little of them, 
indulge them for a longer or a shorter time, as he pleased; 
and because while they amused his fancy, and exercised his 
ingenuity, they never once disturbed his vanity, his levity, 
or indifference. His mind was the antithesis of strength 
and grandeur; its power was the power of indifference.3 
Obviously Hazlitt has a good deal of relish for the indifference of 
1uon a Sun-Dial," Works , XVII, 240. 
2works, XX, 92. 
3works, v, 70-71. It should be noted that while Hazlitt felt 
that Pope was not a "poet of Iiature," he was unequalled as a "poet of 
art." 
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the artificial life, as can be seen when he discusses Millamant, 
"who arrives at the height of indifference to every thing from the 
height of satisfaction, 111 or \'Then he to~ri tes--albei t ironically--
on the age of Charles II, 2 and the age of Louis XIV: 
Happy time! Enviabl e time to think of ! When vanity and 
folly expanded in full bloom, and were spread out 
ostentatiously like the figures in a gaudy tapestry, 
instead of being folded up and thrust into a corner by 
the hand of a cynic and austere philosophy; when personal 
appearance and amorous intrigue v1ere all in all; 1ihen a 
Marquis stalked the God of his Olm idolatry, and Madame 
la Marquise vTas held for something divine by Monsieur 
Jourdain; when the whol e creation was supposed to be 
concentred in the fantastic circl e of lords and ladies, 
and the universal, the abstract, and the critical i·Tere 
held in the utter contempt which they deserve--and which 
they regeive at the hands both of the i e,-norant and the 
adept l 3 
From a life-long radical and apologist for sympathy, this is quite 
a tribute to the intellectual appeal to be found in the over-
distancing of wit. It recall s Hazli tt' s frequently-voiced \'lish 
that he had been born "poor, a Papist, and a Lord." 
The most distinctive feature of Hazlitt ' s theory of 
comedy is his treatment of the ludicrous. The separation of the 
ludicrous and the ridiculous had been made comparatively early in 
the eighteenth century, but l-Thile the critics of the Age of Reason 
had based their distinction on two grounds--the ridiculous to them 
implied meaningful laughter, and the ludicrous did not; hence the 
former had aesthetic value, and the latter had not--Hazlitt, as we 
1
"0n Wycherley, Congreve, Vanbrugh, and Farquhar," \~orks, 
VI, 73. 
2 11 Kean's Bajazet and the Country Girl," XVIII, 206-207. 
3"French Plays,lt Works, XVIII, 380. 
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have seen, defines three dimensions of comedy, in which the ridiculous 
is defined roughly in eighteenth-century terms, and the simply laugh-
able as the eighteenth century had defined the ludicrous. It is not 
unhelpful, perhaps, to see the laughable and the ridiculous in Ha.zlitt ' s 
scheme as the thesis and antithesis forming the ludicrous. His concept 
of the latter is what is unique in his theory; like those or all 
critics, Hazli tt ' s terms are at times liable to a li-t;tle slippage; 
when, however, he considers the ludicrous strictly, he sees it as a 
source of meaningful laughter: 
The ludicrous is where there is the same contradiction 
bet\-1een the object and our expectations 9 heightened by 
some deformity or inconvenience, that is, bl its being 
contrary to what is customary or desirable. 
In the context of this definition, the ludicrous is more negative 
than the laughable and less so than t he ridiculous; Hazlitt, in 
other words, follows the eighteenth century in finding negativity 
es sential to meaningful laughter. Confirmation for this vie'\'/ may 
be found in many of his essays, in "Merry England," for example, 
where he \'lri·tes that "without a given portion of hardness and 
repulsiveness or feeling the ludicrous cannot 1-rell exist. 112 But 
\'le may compare this to the folloHing sentence , which is complementary 
rather than contradictory--11It requires a considerable degree of 
sympathy to enter into and describe to the life even the ludicrous 
eccentricities of others.113 Thus in treating Fielding, uhom he 
considered a master of the ludicrous, Hazlitt insists on the validity 
ln On \'.Ji t and Humour," VI, 8. 
2 Works, XVII, 15'1· 
.::>non Cowley, :Butler, Suckling, Etherege, &c.," VI, 55· 
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of respecting Parson Adams at the same time as one feels superior 
to him: his "unsuspecting simplicity makes it not only more amiable, 
but doubly amusing, by gratifying the sense of superior sagacity in 
the reader. Our laughing at him does not once lessen our respect for 
The relation between respect and superiority in the ludicrous 
may be hard to discover. For one thing, Hazlitt fairly frequently 
uses tho term loosely as being synonymous ·vri th laughable, and \>then 
he does so, respect is not a necessary ingredient in the experience 
which he is describingo Also, ludicrous objects or actions command 
varying degrees of respect .. At a:ny rate, respect is possible in the 
ludicrous, and this is its most distinctive characteristic. 
When Hazlitt says that the ridiculous sharpens the impropriety 
of the laughable contrast between what is expected and what occurs, 
he takes his metaphor from his first love, painting, in \ihich contrast 
is intensified by lightening areas of light and darkening areas of 
more sombre hue. In creating the ridiculo~s, the comic writer inter-
poses his c~n negative judgment between the object and the spectator. 
The effect, to continue the metaphor, is to darken the grey of 
actuality in order to make the 'ihi teness of the ideal stand out more 
clearly and sharply. This idealisation w·hich is involved in the 
ridiculous has the advantage of emphasising principle, but the price 
which literature pays for emphasis on principle is loss of veri-
similitude, of realism, and Hazlitt regretted the loss. 
The ludicrous, on the other hand, preserves the greys in 
1
"0n the English Novelists," Lectures .9.!! the English Comic 
Writers, Works, VI, 115. 
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the comic contrast. If the ridiculous represents an intensification 
of the contrast, the l udicrous represents its extension. The former 
is a move toward perfection in the ideal, where perfection is possible; 
the latter is a move toward perfection in experience, where perfection 
is not possible. Notice how llazlitt distinguishes the laughable from 
the ludicrous: 
Of these different kinde: or degrees of the laughable, 
the first is the most shallow and short-lived; for the 
instant the iiJlLlediate s1:.rprise of a thing ' s merely 
happening one way or another is over, there is nothing 
to throw us back upon our former expectation, and renew 
our wonder at the event a second time. The second sort, 
that is the ludicrous arising out of the improbable or 
distressing , is more deep and lasting, either because 
the painful catastrophe excites a creater curiosity, or 
because the old impression , from its habitual hold on 
the imagination, still recurs mechanically, so that it 
is longer before rle can seriously make up our minds to 
the unaccountable deviation from it.l 
The ludicrous presents the contrast between the old and the ne'\v, 
between ought-to-be and is, as a contrast between fairly equal pouers. 
It is longer before we can make up our mindc about the deviation from 
rrha.t was expected, and '\ihen rTe do, there is still a good deal of mental 
oscillation between the ideas contrasted. This is a temporal extension 
of the contrast. One might think that the ridiculous, the highest 
form of the laughable, would present an even greater extension of the 
comic contrast, and Hazlitt suggests that this is indeed so: 
The principle of contrast is, however,m,the same in all 
the star;es, in the simply laughable, the ludicrous, ·&he 
ridiculous; and t !1e effect is only the more complete, 
the more durably and pointedly this principl e operates.2 
1
n On \1 i -~ and llumour·, 11 VI, o. 
2Ibic1. 
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But although Hazlitt does claim more pointedness for the ridiculous, 
he does not claim more durability for it. On the contrary, the 
refining of the sense of incongrv.i ty necessary for the ridiculous 
can be achieved onl y by bringing to an end the oscillation between 
the elements of the comic contrast, and this cessation must certainly 
occur when the new, or actual, is discredited for the sake of the old, 
or ideal. 
If the ridiculous is simple laughter plus contempt, the 
ludicrous is simple laughter in \.rhich is mingled superio:ei ty and 
sympathy--or at the least a seriousness '.Tllich is not co:ntempt. These 
are two opposed points of view, and so the ridiculous and the lud-
icrous cannot occur toe:;ether, but one may follot-r the other in the 
same experience. Hazli tt often cited the "ludicrous dialoguen bet'\'reen 
Shallow and Silence on the death of old Double--"in one point of view, 
they are laughable in the extreme; in another they are equally affecting.111 
Similarly, he remarks of ~ ~ 
Perhaps that middle point of comedy was never more nicely 
hit in lvrlich the ludicrous blends with the tender, and our 
follies~ -tu:cning round at;ainst themselves in support of 
our affections, retain nothing but their humanityu2 
Again, in speaking of Hogarth, 
28). 
There is in general a distinction, almost an impassable 
one, betl'l'een the power of embodying t he serious and the 
ludicrous; but these contradictory faculties >'Tere reconciled 
in Hogarth, as they were in Shalcspeare, in C1mucer; and as 
1
"Henry IV' II Characters of Shakespear ' s Plays, vlorks, IV' 
2 
"Much Ado About No·t~ling," Characters of Shakespear ' s 
Plays, \•! arks, IV, 3 3t3. 
it is said that they were in another extraordinary and 
l a ter instance, Garrick ' s acting.l 
Hazlitt ' s conception of the ludicrous as partly positive is of 
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course assisted by his having before him the work and examples not 
only of Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Cervantes, but also of Fielding, 
Sterne, Goldsmith, and Sheridan. Of 1h£ School for Scandal, for 
ins~ance, he remarks that 
besides the rit and ingenuity of this play, there is a 
genial spirit of frankness and generosity about it, that 
relieves the heart as t-:ell as clears the lungs.. It 
professes a faith in the natural goodness, as well as 
habitual depravity of human nature. while it strips off 
the mask of hypocrisy, it inspi:I'es a confidence between 
man and man. 2 
The comedies ''hich are essentially based upon and which most typically 
express the humour of the ludicrous are those of Shakespeare ; and 
Hazlitt, believing that the highest fo1~ of the laughable is the 
ridiculous, is driven by his t heory to place Shakespearean and all 
"romantic" comedy on a lower level th.an "genteel'1 comedy, the "comedy 
7. 
of fashionable ·life, and of artificial character and manners. 11 ;> 
The fault, then, of Shakspeare ' s comic Muse is, in my 
opinion, that it is too g-ood-natu.red and magnanimous. 
It mounts abov-e its quarry. It is "apprehensive, qu.ick, 
forgetive, full of nimble, fiery, and del ecta"ble shapes:" 
but it does not take the highest pleasure in making 
human nature look as meEill, as ridiculous, and contemptible 
as possible. It is in this respect, chiefly, that it 
differs from the comedy of a later, and (uhat is called) 
a more refined period •••• This is a comic character; 
its essence consists in making lignt of things from 
familiarity and use, and as it is formed by habit and 
1
"0n the Works of Hogarth.--On the Grand and Familiar 
Style of Painting, 11 Lect-ures .2.!1 _lli English Comic \{ri ters, 1-Jorks, 
VI, 144• 
2
"0n the Comic 1:/riters of the Last Century," VI, 165. 
3"0n Shakspeare and Ben Jonson, 11 VI , 35. 
outv1ard circumstances, so it requires actual observation, 
and an acquaintance \lith the modes of artificial life, to 
describe it \'Ti th the utmost possible grace and precision. 
• . • I do not, in short , consider comedy as exactly an 
affair of the heart or the imagination.l 
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Another distinction between Shakespeare ' s comedy and the comedy of 
manners is the difference between "natural and artificial life, 
between tile world of fancy and the world of fashion." 2 The highest 
forms of comedy, in other 'wrds, are based on a considerable degree 
of aesthetic distance; romantic comedy, "natural" and of "the world 
of fancy" by definition, is less the product of "art" than of the 
imagination. That is, 
Shakspeare was a b'reater poet than \'tit: his imagination 
was tlJ.e leadinr.:; and master-quality of his mind, uhich was 
always ready to soar into its nativ~ element: the ludicrous 
was only svcondary ar1d subordinate. 
Theoretically~ t hen, Hazlittts relegation of tho romantic comedy of 
Shakcapearc is perfectly consistent.. But what is not consistent is 
t he tone of his jud~:ments of that type of comedy. ConLider, in 
&.ddi tion to thoee already quoted, the follovring passage: 
In genel.'al it uill be found (if I am not mistaken) that 
even in t he very best of Shakespeare's comic characters 
the opirit of humanity and the fancy of the po0t greatly 
prevail over the nei:e \'lit and satire, and that -vre sym-
pathize with his characters oftener than we laugh at 
them. His r:i.clicule "tTants the stine of ill-nature . He had 
hardly such a thing as spleen in hie composition.4 
And uhen IIazlitt says thgt nit is for this reanon only that I think 
I 
Shakspea.re t s comedies deficient,":.> it in clear that his theory has 
1nen Shaksp~~are and Ben Jonson," YI, 35-38 . 
2~., p. 37. 
" 
.) 1..1.1£. , lJ • 
4Ibid. 
7.: ,-1 )'-• 
t: 
:;Ibid., P• 38. 
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has broken down in the face of his personal prejudice and practical 
preference--as, indeed, must all those theories, when faced '\-Tith• the 
fact of humour, which treat laughter and the comic as the province 
of the intellect alone. 
If for Hazlitt the literary mode of the ludicrous is humour 
and romantic comedy, the standard of humour is comic keeping, or 
consistency of character~ and this consistency is \'That the discerning 
critic looks for i n the ludicrous. The followinG lengthy pass~e 
'l<Till make this clear, and will also define the basis of Hazli tt 's 
practical approbation of, as opposed to his theoretical strictures 
on, humour and romantic comedy: 
There is nothing more pol"rerfully humorous tlwn vrhat is 
called keeping in comic character, ~s ve see it very 
finely exemplif'iecl. in Sancho Panza and Don Quixote. The 
proverbial phlegm and the romantic sravi ty of these t\'TO 
celebrated persons may be regarded as the height of this 
kind of excellence. The deep feeling of character 
strengthens t he sense of the ludicrous. Keeping in comic 
character is consis tency in absu-rdity; a determined and 
laudabl e attachment to the incongruous and sinb~lar. The 
regularity completes the contradiction, for the number 
of instances of deviation from the right line, branching 
out in all directions, shows the inveteracy of the 
original bias to any extravagance or folly, the natural 
improbability, as it were, increasing every time with 
the multiplication of chances for a rGturn to common 
sense, and in the end mounting up to an incredible and 
unaccountably ridiculous heie,ht, whan we find our 
expectations a.s invariably baffled. • • • But wltil e t his 
characteristic clue to absurdity helps on the ridicule, 
it also softent ~nd harmonises its excesses; and the 
ludicrous is here blended with a certain beauty and 
decorum, from t::'lis very tr-uth of habit and sentiment, 
or from the principle of similitude in dissimilitude •••• 
That tihich excites so lively and lasting an interest in 
itself, even though it should not be wisdom, is not 
despicable in the sight of reason and humanity . \1e cannot 
suppress the smile on the lip, but the tear should 
also stand ready to start from the eye.l 
And he goes on to cite as a further example of keeping in the 
ludicrous that ~ plus ultra in sympathy of the eighteenth-· 
century benevoliat critics, My Uncle Toby. In one sense, 
Ha.zli tt • s insistence on comic keeping e,ligns him vli th ·!;he 
eighteenth-century uri ters '\·tho censured Congrove and other 
Restoration comic drama.tiot::> for excess of wit and a conseg_uent 
failure to create cllc::.ro.cter; in anot her, it places him Sc.Lllarely 
in that tra.di tion -:.:hich, in its extolling of' tho virtues--both 
moral and aer;thetic--of feeling and the sympathetic imaeination, 
is so distinctively Romantic. 
1 
:tOn Wit and Humour, 11 VI, 11. 
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CHAPTER X 
The ludicrous and the ridiculous, as modes of comedy in 
Hazlitt ' s theory, are based on psychological assumptions, but he 
considered them to have an historical foundation too . In Characters 
g! Shakespear•s Plays he had distinguished three ages of comedy: the 
first was the age of natural or romantic comedy, founded on the 
ludicrous; the next was the age of artificial comedy, founded on the 
ridiculous; and finall y there was the age of sentimental comedy, the 
1 
comedy of his O'liTn day, \·thich \·Tas not founded on laughter at all. 
He thought well enough of this formulation to include it i n the last 
of his lectures on the English comic writers, to explain \-rhy "the 
attempt at getting up genteel comedy at present is a sort of Galvanic 
experiment, a revival of the dead": 
There is a certain stage of society in which people 
become conscious of their peculiarities and absurdities, 
affect to disguise what they are, and set up pretensions 
1cf. "Miss O'Neill ' s Hidow Cheerl y," \'Iorks, XVIII, 212: 
"The comedy itself, of the Soldier ' s Daughter, is the~ ideal 
of modern comedy. It contains the whole theory and practice of 
sentimentality, of which a bank-note offered and declined is the 
circulating medium, and a white cambric pocket-handkerchief, that 
catches the crystal tear in the eye of sensibility ere it fallst 
the v-isible emblem. Mr. and 11rs. Mil ford ••• utter their com-
plaints, but are too delicate to touch upon the cause, and you 
sympathise with their sorrows, not \d th their misfortunes. They 
have a little girl , who has a little doll, which she christens 
' ~as Good Gentl eman, • after a person whose name she does not know. 
This io a very palpable hit, and tells amazi ngly . 11 Hazli tt goes 
on to quote the passage in Lamb ' s Specimens on "the insipid 
levelling morality" of the modern stage . 
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to \'that they are not. This gives rise to a corresponding 
style of comedy, the object of which is to detect the 
disguises of self-love, and to make reprisals on these 
preposterous assumptions of vanity, by making the contrast 
between t he real and the affected character as severely as 
possible, and denying to those, who vrould impose on us for 
vrhat they are not, even the merit Hhich they have. This is 
the comedy of artificial life, of wit and satire, such as 
l-Ie see it in Congreve, Wycherley, Vanbrugh, &c. To this 
succeeds a state of society from which the same sort of 
affectation and pretence are banished by a greater kno\'rledge 
of the ,.,orld, or by their successful exposure on the stage; 
and which by neutralizing the materials of comic character, 
both natural and artificial, leaves rio comedy at all--but 
the sentimental.Such is our modern comedy. There is a period 
in the progress of manners anterior to both these, in which 
the foibles and follies of individuals are of nature ' ~ 
planting, not the growth of art or study; in which they are 
therefore unconscious of them themselves, or care not who 
knmis them, if they can but have their whim out; and in 
Hhich, as there is no attempt at imposition, the spectators 
rather receive pleasure from humouring the inclinations of 
the persons they laugh at, than wish to give them pain by 
exposing their absurdity. This may be called the comedy of 
nature, and it is the comedy which we generally find in 
Shakspeare.l 
The ago of no comedy at all, the age in which the materials of the 
comic character have been neutralised, is one of Hazlitt ' s favourite 
topics. In the autumn of 1813 he wrote tloro letters to the editor 
of ~ Horning Chronicle in reply to the assertion of the paper ' s 
dramatic critic that t here was still a great deal of material l eft 
for the comic writer to exploit. The sequel to the publication of 
the letters was Hazli tt ' s oim appointment ·to the post of dramatic 
critic. It is the first of these letters Hhich Hazlitt used at the 
beginning of the lecture "On the Comic \/ri ters of the Last Century, 11 
in uhich he discusses the decline of comedy. Basically, he holds, 
comedy has declined because men and manners have changed. The style 
of conversation, for instance, has changed from the personal or 
1t•Qn the Comic Writers of the Last Century," VI, 154-155n. 
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dramatic to 1-lhat Hazlitt calls variously the didactic, dogmatic, 
critical, and analytical, -v1hich 11consists almost entirely in the 
discussion of general topics" such as nascertaining the merits of 
authors and their works ."1 The change in men has to some extent 
been brought about by comedy itself, vThich 11 destroys the very food 
on which it lives; and by constantly and successfully exposing the 
follies and weaknesses of ma~~ind to ridicule, in the end leaves 
itself nothing worth laugl1..ing at. 112 Comed.y has not of course 
eradicated folly, but it has driven it underground, and has encouraged 
men to look and act alike , to conform, regardless of what they might 
privately think. 
Wellek finds Hazlitt •s theory excessively simple~ and he 
dismisses it as " a naturalistic theory too much in the style of the 
'conjectural' histories of the 18th century."3 This may 1o1ell be 
true, but t h ere remains about Hazlitt ' s theory something of interest 
and of insight \..rhich does help to explain the decline of comedy. 
He suggests that it has declined because seriousness has declined, 
to be replaced by self-consciousness and "dano.yism, n or 11hat -vrould 
nO\f be called "romantic irony": 
As to the gross ru~d palpable absurdities of modern manners, 
they are too shallov1 and barefaced, and those 1.·1ho affect 
them are too lit~ serious in them, to make them worth the 
detection of the Comic !.fuse. They proceed from an idle, 
impudent affectation of folly in general, in the dashing 
1
"0n the Comic Writers of the Last Century," VI, 153. 
2
,!lli., P• 149· 
3! History~ Modern Criticism, II, 208. 
bravura style, not from an infatuation '\'ri th any of its 
characteristic modes.l 
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Jacques Barzun, who unlike Hazlitt has had the assistance of reading 
Freud, sees the purpose of this "uneasy and immediate laugh"; it is 
2 
"intended to forestall derision by another or by oneself later." 
Whether this extreme self-consciousness is considered as being 
deadly serious or less than serious, it is a defence-mechanism by 
which tho mind ignores principle through an habitual over-use of 
psychic distancinc;. Recently9 this tendency has been widely diG-
cussed in the debate on "commitment" and "engagement." Uithout 
some kind of commitment, actual or potential, \Iorth"\·lhile comedy is 
impossible. Th~ Restoration rake may have been immor al (or amoral), 
but, as many critics of Restoration comedy have pointed out, tl1is 
imcorality or amorality is itself a principle, not simply a habit, 
and it is certainly not a form of mental illness . }~ has changed, 
and if we take into account the limited psychological theory and 
knowledge at Hazlitt 1 s disposal, we can credit him with a valuable 
suggestion toward the reason for the decline of comedy. 
Hazlitt ' s preference for artificial comedy over the comedy 
of nature is based on his finding in the ridiculous a. focus on moral 
principle that is lacking in the ludicrous. Yet to achieve this 
focus, artificial comedy forfeits verisimilitude, and for this reason 
1uen the Comic Vriters of the Last Century," VI, 151. 
2Rona.nticism ~ ~ Modern Ego (Boston: Li tt1c, BrOi'm 
ru1d Company, 1944), P• 169. 
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Hazlitt is at times very hard on such comic writers as Ben Jonson--
Shakspeare'a characters are men; Ben Jonson's are more 
like machines, governed by mere routine, or by the con-
venience of the poet, whose property they are. In reading 
the one, >fe are let into the minds of his characters, we 
see the play of their thoughts, how their humours flow 
and work; the author takes a range over nature, and has 
an eye to every object or occasion that presents itself 
to set off and heighten the ludicrous character he is 
describing. His humour ( so to speak) bubbles 9 sparkles, 
and finds its way in all directions, like a natural 
spring. In Ben Jonson it is, as it \>Tere, confined in a 
leaden cistern, where it stagnates and corrupts; or 
directed only through certain artificial pipes a:c1d con-
duits, to an::mer a given purposc.l 
Another stricture on the comedy of manners is that it tends to 
degrade characters. Of Butler ' s Hudibras, for example, Hazlitt 
remarks rrit is somethin5 revolting to see an author :persecute his 
cnaracters, the cherished offsprin.5 of his brain, in this manner, 
without mercy. Hudibras and Ralpho have immortalised Butler ; and 
what has he done for them in return, but set them up to be ' pilloried 
2 
on i.Iuany~s high and lasting stage?'" If then the ridiculous can 
be excessi\1\'iy negative, the characteristic flaH of the ludicrous 
is that it can be insufficieutly so. We have seen that Hazlitt 
thought Shakespeare 's comedy too positive to be great comedy (although 
it qualif'ies, according to Hazli tt' s own criteria, a.s great poetry); 
his remarks on Twelfth Night are .typical: 
This is justly considered as one of the most delightful 
of Shakes:pear's comedies. It is full of sHeetness and 
~leasantry. It ia perhaps too good-natured for comedy. 
It has little satire, and no spl een . It aims at the 
1
"0n Shakespear and Ben .Tonson,n VI, 39. 
2110n Col-rley, Butler, Suckling, Etherege, &c., 11 VI, 65. 
-
ludicrous rather than the ridiculous. It makes us laugh 
at the follies of mankind, not despise them, and still 
less bear any ill-will towards them.l 
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It "ras indicated in the last chapter that this is an "eighteenth-
century" observation, based upon the negative comic theory of the 
time. A comic character can never, of' course, be as sympathetic 
as a tragic one can,. for laughter implies a measure of' rejection. 
Since, therefore, true comedy cannot hope to achieve its ends by 
developin~' ·the emotions or the imagination, it must address the 
intellect to be significant.. To do so, it must deal Hith ideas and 
J;>rinciples~ t he objects of the i ntellect , and to deal -vri th them in 
a significant manner it must not approach them from the s·tanupoint 
of the individual: 
1 am not for going so far as to pronounce Shakspeare•s 
'manners da..mnable, because he had not seen the court;' but 
I thinlt: that comedy does not find its richest harvest till 
individual infirmities have passed into general manners, 
and it is the example of courts~ chiefly, that stamps folly 
with credit and currency, or glosses over vice vd th 
meretricious lus·i;re. I conceive, therefore, that the golden 
period of our comedy was just after the age cf Charles II. 
vrhen the town first became tainted \'1i th the affectation of 
the manners and conversation of fashionable life, and before 
the distinction between r·ustici ty and elage.nce, ar·ii a.rLd nature~ 
was los t (as it afte~vards was) in a general diffusion of 
knovTledge, and the reciprocal advantages of civil intercourse.2 
The need for 11general mannersfl is a need for issues \'lhich really divide 
and 11stra tify11 people. \·le .feel the issues in tragedy insofar as we 
temporarily identify with the hero. But we do not identify to the 
same extent •vi th even the most sympathetic of comic he:roes, and it is 
111T1velfth Night; or, What You \!J ill, a Characters .2f. 
Shakespear1s Plays~ Works, IV, 313. 
2non Shakspeere and Ben Jonson , " VI, 36-37. 
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to forestall such identification that the usual comic hero is of a 
comparatively lmv social station. Ilippolytus is a man uhose only 
flaw is that he is too virtuous, and "YTe can identify vi th him; 
Mal volio is a pushi'ul servant vTho also is too virtuous t and >•Te do 
not identify 'vi th him. 
I.L comedy were sympathetic, Hazli tt \fOuld have fe .... r 
valid means of distinguishing it from tragedy, as ·He ca.YJ. see when 
he complains of Lam~ 1 s Reflector essay on ilogarth t~at it confounds 
the two.1 Another reason for Hazlitt ' s preference for artificial 
comedy over natural comedy is that the former is, in a sense, closer 
to tragedy. And tragedy, because it is more ideal, is su~erior to 
any kind of comedy. One peculiarity of llazlitt ' s arh~ent for the 
superiority of tragedy to comedy is that the point of comparison 
which tells so heavily against comedy affec·Gs the artificial comedy 
more thau the comedy of nature. Basically, comedy is inferior to 
tragedy because it uithhol C:s sympathy, yet the comedy of nature does 
not really do so--
It is easier to let do\.'n than to raise up, to ,.,eakEm tho.n 
to strengthen, to disconnect our s;rlllpathy from passion and 
povTer, that to attach and rivet it to any objcat of t;randeu:r· 
and interest, to startle and shock our preconception ... by 
incongruous and equivocal combino.tionsy them to coufi:r.m~ 
ell_f'orce, and erpand them by pmo~erful and lasting associations 
of ideas, or striking and true analogies. A slight cause is 
sufficient to produce a slight effect. To be indifferent or 
sceptical, requires no effort; to be enthusiastic and in 
ea.:r·nest~ xequires a strong impulse, nu.J..d collective po~ICr .. 2 
1
u Hogarth and Fielding ... -M:r. Northcote ' s Opinions, 11 \'lorks, 
xx, 270. 
2
non \lit and llumour, 11 VI, 23. 
-
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Tragedy is great because it affirms the ideal. Artificial comedy is 
ranked immediately below it, since it is at least concerned with the 
ideal. The literary work which arouses sympathy is STeater than that 
which completely forestalls it, but the latter is greater than that 
in which sympathy is only partial, or is imperfect. 
When it is seen in this way, Hazlitt 1s preference for 
tragedy may be thought to rest on a quibble.1 And though it uill 
seem less of a quibble if 'tve appreciate the great value which Hazli tt 
plcwed on the sympathetic imagination, we have per:laps just as much 
right to believe that the absence or presence of the sympathetic 
imagination itself is merely another form of quibbling. Then too, 
we may sec in tragedy some negation--even of the ideal. Surely 
Oeclipus Rex~ though it affirms the inevitability and the value of 
intellectual curiosity, or pride, or that form of hubris which drives 
a. man on regardless of consequences toward uhat he conceives as 
Truth, also negates this ideal to some exten'G? It is by no means 
entirely the ribht answer to say that comedy and traciedy are con-
cerned with different forms of ideal--one would have to be rather 
mo:ee than subtle to find such a difference bet-vreen the ideals held 
by Oedipus and by Hr. Shandy·. The difference lies more in the t;y-_pe 
of negation which takes place. At any rate, llazlitt sees a difference 
between what mieht be called. the sanctions of tragedy wlc1 of comedy, 
and this difference is important, since it is one of his most original 
ideas on the comic: -
1
see \'1 • P. Albrecht's 11Hazlittts P.refe:t.•ence for Tragedy, 11 
~' LY~I (1956), 1042-1051, for a discussion of the ~uestion from 
a different point of vie1~T. 
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Before we can laugh at a t hing, its absurdity must at least 
be open and palpable to common apprehension. Ridicule is 
necessarily buil t on certain supposed facts, uhether true 
or fal se, and on their inconsistency uith certain acknowledged 
maxims, lV'hether r i ght or wrona. It is, therefore, a fair 
teet, if not of philosophical or abstract truth, at least 
of \·rhat is truth according to public opinion and common sense •1 
This view is of course simpl y a deduction from t he common notion 
that l aughter is subjecti ve and relative, but its aesthetic 
application is not a collll!lonplace. Moliere someuhere called comedy 
"the out,.mrd and palpable shape that a provision of nature has 
stamped on everything irrational ," but for Hazl itt this i'Iould come 
closer to dofinin.?; tragecly. The. comic may represent the shape that 
a provision of human nat1rre has stamped on everything irrational, 
but huo.an nature and society are subject in some re::;;_pccto t o change, 
~md the nature which provides the sanction of tragedy is not . This 
is indeed a limitation on comedy, and Hazlitt deserves credit for 
noticinc it, and for recog~isin5 it ao a characteristic of conedy. 
Then, too, it is another way of scyintS t hat comedy is l ess ideal 
th.al.'l. tragedy, and that of course is <Jhat Hazli tt ' s argument for the 
superiority of tragedy is baaed upon ~ 
It has alreao.y been noted that the ei.;htccnth-ccntuxy 
critics did not immediately succeed in creating an aesthetic of the 
ludicrous, and in fact most of' them--Beattie is the outs li£l.l'ld.ing 
exception--did not even t:ry . Like :Beattie, Ha.zlitt asserted in 1 818 
the aestr.etic sienificance of the ludicrous~ but he too did not really 
1
non \lit and ilumo1ll', 11 VI, 20 . 
succeed. The trouble is that Hazlitt ' s aesthetic of sympathy 
deprives the ludicrous of a function . Insofar as the ludicrous 
character is sympathetic, the comedy of nature can affirm an ideal, 
just as tragedy does . Eut tragedy achieves this affirmation far 
more effectively because it does not undercut the i deal at the same 
time--at least not to the extent and in the same way that comedy 
does .. On the other hand. insofar as the ludicrous character is not 
sympathised with, comedy is negating the ideal for which he stands. 
But artificial comedy can achieve this negation far more effectively 
because it does not uphold the ideal at the same time . Perhaps the 
root of the troubl e is that the giving or withholding of sympathy is 
an either-or proposition: unlike the concept of distance, uhich 
Hazlitt could have nade more ofi it docs not really admit of degree . 
One reason for Hazli·bt ' s inability to handle debrees of sympathy is 
his faculty psychology, which frequently leads him to forget the 
oneness of the mind . If a character excites sympathy, he can arouse 
identification, appeal to the imagination, and become a positive 
moral force . If he does not arouse sympathy, he forfeits or inhibits 
identification, appeals to the reason, and becomes a negative force. 
But if he is both sympathetic and distanced to a degree somewhere 
between acceptance and rejection, there is no faculty of the mind to 
which he can appeal. He must appeal to the mind as a \Thole, and 
Hazlitt t s psychology gives him no way to explain such a character . 
Despite this weakness in llazlitt •s theory, he does make 
two suggestions which, whether he recognised the £act or not, lie 
along the paths which an attempt to find a function for the ludicrous 
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might take. One, though not ver.y creditable in the eyes of modern 
criticism, ~e escape. Restoration comedy9 as Tave notes a little 
too sweepingly, is attractive to Hazlitt "for its romance-like 
qualities. He likes Farquhar because his heroes are romantic, not 
knavish, because vre have more sympathy Hi th them than 1'1i t}l V anbrugh ' s 
heroes, and because of what are evidently Farquhar' s good-natured 
and ·good- humored Shakespearean traits in making us laugh from 
pleasure oftener than from malice.n1 Such an appeal, moreover, need 
not be limited to artificial comedy, though it is in connection '\d th 
artificial comedy that Hazlitt often notes it: nin turnine over the 
pagea of the best comedies, we are almost transported to another 
world, and e scape from this dull age to one that was all life, and 
2 
l-Thim, and mirth, and hunour." The ueakness of an escape theory is 
that it explains only the conditions and circumstances under· uhich 
significance ~ight emerge. It does nothing to explain the nature of 
this significance. 
Another possible function of the ludicrous in comedy 
night be arrived at by our apprehension that it can acllieve something 
positive through a combination of acceptance and rejection, just as 
a scientific experiment accepts an hypothesis for the purpose of 
limiting it, but not necessarily annihilating it. Such an analogy 
is made in Hazlittts lecture "On the Periodical Essayists": 
1~1e Amiable Humorist, p. 217. 
2 11 0n \lycherley, Congreve, Vanbrugh, and Farquhar," VI, 70. 
Tl1is i s essentially different from Lamb's contention that the Res tor-
ation audiences themselves saw in the playa a series of miraGes. See 
"On the Artificial Comedy of the Last Century.n 
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By this sort of writing, ' The act and practic part of life 
is thus made the mistress of our theorique.' It is the best 
and most natural course of study. It is in morals and 
manners what the experimental is in natural philosophy, as 
opposed to the dosuatical ~ethod. It does not deal in 
sweeping clauses of proscription and anathema, but in nice 
distinctions and liberal constructions. It makes up its 
gene:L·al accounts from details, its few theories from many 
facts. It does not try to prove all black or all white as 
it wishes, but lays on the intermediate colours, ( and most 
of them not unpleasing ones,) as it finds thom blended 1-1i th 
' the web of our life, which is of a mingled yarn, good and 
ill together. ' 1 
Hazlitt had, of course, favourably reviewed Schlegel •s Lectures for 
the Edinburgh Review two years before he delivered his own series on 
the comic writers, and the passage quoted above may be regarded as 
an elaboration of the Geman critic ' s \'lell-lmmm and often-borrowed 
statement that "the -whole moral of the Uew· Comedy, just like tll..at 
2 
of the Fable, is nothing more than a theory of' prudence." But hou-
ever that may be, it is the only passage of its kind in the Lectures 
,2.n ill English Comic Writers. Further ele.boration had to uai t for ·the 
1829 "Definition of Wit." 
The "Definition of Wit" was Hazlitt 1 s last venture into comic 
theory, and partly because of its mode of publication, it is not a 
well-known essay. It is a product of Hazlitt ' s return to journalism 
after his completion in 1828 of the~ of Napoleon, and it was 
probably intended to form part of the series of essays "Specimens 
of a Dictionary of Definitions," many of which appeared in the Atlas. 
1
woxks, VI, 91-92. 
21l. \-1 . Schlegel, A Course of Loctures on Dramatic Art and 
Li~e~ature, tr. John Black (rev. ed.;-London: llenr,y G. Bohn, 1846}7p. 177. 
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The "Definition of Wit" uas not published in Hazlitt ' s lifetime; it 
was first printed six years after his death in the Literary Remains, 
----~whe~e it carries a note by his son to the effect that it had been 
written in 1829.1 Since it was written at least six months prior 
to Razlitt •s death on September 18th, 1830, _and at a time when he 
wae desperately in need of money and when he 't'Tae publishing similar 
pieces in the Atlas, it was perhaps not considered complete: this 
assumption is reinforced by the fact that Hazlittts son printed it 
with a row of asterisks after its terminating sentence. Perhaps he 
was prevented from finishing it by the onset of the final stage of 
the illness--probably cancer of the stomach--which cut short his 
contributions to the Atlas in April, 1830, and killed him five months 
2 later. The likelihood that it is unfinished may also explain why 
it is unclear on certain points--whether, for example, wit is 
negative or-positive, and whether it is laughable. But probably a 
more fundamental reason for the essay ' s laok of final clarification 
of these problems is that Hazlitt was not simply repeating the 
formulations he had made in 1818, but was thinking the \·Thole question 
through again, and arriving at somewhat different conclusions. 
Generally, Hazlitt was nothing if not consistent in his 
opinions--he once told Coleridge that he, Hazlitt, did not seem to 
have altered any of his ideas since he was sixteen years old3--and 
1Li terar;y Remains of the Late William Hazli tt, ed. \of. 
Hazlitt. (2 vola.; London: Saunders-and Otley, 1836), I, 36. 
2see Baker, 1-lilliam Ha.zlitt, p. 467. 
'"On Consistency of Opinion," \-larks, XVII, 22-23. Coleridge ' s 
rather devastating reply was "Why then, you are no wiser now than you 
l~ere thenl 11 
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for this reason a search for important developments and changes in 
his thought is usually signally unsuccessful. In fact, there are a 
great many similarities bet1.1een the Lectures of 1818 and the "Definition." 
Hazlitt ' s reliance on association of ideas is still evident, as is the 
distinction he dra\fs from it betl'teen the serious and the ludicrous: 
The serious is that which is closely cemented together 
by experience and prejudice, or by common sense: the 
ludicrous is the incoherent, or that which wants the 
cement of habit and purpose.l 
Also similar is his notion of the destructiveness of wit--"But while 
gravity and imposture not only exist, but reign triumphant; while 
the proud, obstinate1 sacred tumours rear their heads on high, and 
are trying to get a new lease of for ever and a day; then ohl for the 
Frenchman ' s art ( 1Voltaire 1s?--the same•) to break the torpid spell, 
and reduce the bloated mass to its native insignifica.noel 112 It is this 
destructiveness,. furthermore, l'Thich still distinguishes \-Tit from 
imagination, and which still makes wit inferior to imagination: "the 
imagination is serious, even to passion, and exceeds truth by laying 
a greater stress on the object; wit has no feeling but contempt, and 
exceeds truth to make light of it."3 The "Definition of Wit," then, 
does not so much repudiate the ideas 1..zhich Hazli tt published in 1818, 
as it extends and develops them. In doing so it suggests ne1.·1 ideas 
\vhich are both interesting and valuable. 
In 1818, Hazlitt had found wit to be an agreeable surprise 
1
"Definition of \>fit," Works, XX, 363n. 
2Ibid., P• 353. 
3Ibid . , p. 360. 
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resulting primarily from the perception of some incongruity, and 
the intensification of that incongruity. Since the context of 
his characterisation of wit l-Tas at that time a series of lectures 
on comic literature, and since he was interested in the use of 
wit, his account uas largely a descriptive one (except in the first 
lecture, 11 0n Wit a.nd Humour'}). In 1829, however, his subject i .s 
wit itself, and Hazli.tt ' s account is more psychological than aesthetic . 
Instead of emphasising the effect of wit 9 he tries to account for 
its genesis; instead of trying t o relate it to literary meaning, he 
he tries to isolate it. \fuat he calls the "double problem" of 1-rit 
in 1829 is nwhy the mind is at once surprised and not shocked [by the 
allusion which wit ma.ke~. 111 In other words, why should the perception 
of an incongruity or the intensification of that incongruity, or both, 
cause an agreeable surprise? The solution to the problem lies in 
Hazlitt ' s conception of wit as a "mixture of sense and nonsense.tt2 
And this conception, although it is derived primarily as a matter 
of psychological interest, has some merit and place in aesthetic 
theory. 
"l4ere sense is not wit,"3 Hazlitt says, even though at 
times it may mimic wit. 
Wit, then, according to this account of it, depends on the 
rapid analysis or solution of continuity in our ideas, 
which, by detaching, puts them into a condition to coalesce 
more readily with others, and form new and unexpected 
combinations: but does all analysis imply wit, or vthere is 
111Defini tion of \</it, rt XX, 361 . 
2Ibid., P• 358. 
3Ibid., P• 363. 
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the difference? Does the exa.nun1.ng the flowers and leaves 
in the cover of a chair-bottom, or the several squares in 
a marble pavement, constitute '~it? ••• The mathematician 
abstracts in his reasonings, and considers the same line, 
now as forming the side of a triangle, now of a square 
figure; but does he laugh at the discovery, or tell it to 
any one else as a monstrous good jest?l 
Even the special type of sense communicated by wit--the sense of 
absurdity--is not to be confused with wit . It is the material as 
\'lcll as the meaning of the wit-product, but Hit itself is a ''mode 
of viewing and representing nature or the differences and similitudes, 
harmonies and discords in the links and chains of our ideas of things 
2 
at large.H Wit is to be thought of first and foremost as a technique, 
a point upon which Freud was later to insist. In fact the passage in 
which Hazlitt isolates sense from technique, and finds wit in the 
latter, sounds rather like Freud--
A gallant calling on a courtesan (for it is fair to 
illustrate these intricacies how ~1e can) observed, 
the should only make her a present every other time. ' 
She answered, ' Then come only every other t~e.• This 
appears to me to offer a sort of touchstone to the 
question. The sense here is, ' Don' t come unless you 
pay. 1 There is no wit in this: the '\'lit then consists 
in the mode of conveying the hint.3 
The reason for this insistence is that the truly absurd is not 
laughable , even though it furnishes the material, motive, and meaning 
for wit, 'tThich ~ay be laughable. Furthermore, the sense of wit ia, to 
a degree, discovered, uhereas wit itself is a process of creating. 
1
"Def'ini·tion of \!it," L"'<, 354. There is a hint here of the 
language of Coleridge ' s definition of the imagination, but as I go on 
to explain, I:!azli·&t saw >ri t as a creative process similar to the 
imaginative process. See his explicit parallel in 110n Poetry in General," 
\·forks, V, 7-8. 
211Defini tion of 1oJi t, 11 X.X:, 359 . 
3Ibid . , :P• 358. 
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Specifically, wit is the process of creating nonsense, 
although Hazlitt insists that it is not to be confused with nonsense . 
I n 1818 he spoke of l<Ti t as "illustrating and heightening the sense 
1 
of that absurdity," and his metaphor of contrast from painting 
has alread.y been discussed. In the "Definition" he develops this 
idea--
First of ell, wit implies a jest, that ist the bringing 
forward a pretended or counterfeit illustration of a thing; 
which, being presently withdrawn, makes the naked truth 
more apparent by contrast . It is lessening and undermining 
our faith in any t hing (in which the serious consists) by 
heightening or exaggerating the vividness of our idea of it 9 
so as by carrying it to ext remes to sho'\'T the error in the 
first concoction.2 
·wit is then a ltind of reductio ~ absurdUlll in uhich "hat is absurd 
in fact, becomes embodied in what is literally absurd; sense, in 
other words, is embodied in nonsense: "You give that 1-1hich is stupid 
in itself the additional accompaniments of what is still more stupid, 
to enhance and verify the idea by a falsehood.") 
Wit t hen is the action or process of relating sense to 
nonsense, and in the "Definition of \rii t" Hazli tt is frequently 
concerned '\'Tith this relationship. I n one of his most extended 
statements of it he says 
Wit is the conjuring up in the fancy any illustration of 
an idea by likeness, combination of other images, or by 
a form of words, that being intended to point out the 
eccentricity or departure of the original idea from t he 
class to which it belongs, does so by referring it 
contingently anc1 obliquely to a. ·totally opposite class, 
1non Wit a.ud Humour," VI, 15. 
211Definition of \'lit," XX, 359-360. 
3Ibid., I>• 359. 
.. 
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vhere the surprise and mere possibiliti of finding it, 
proves the inherent want of congruity. 
Despite the fact that the product of l>Tit is a 11falsehood, 11 there 
must be congruence between the sense and the nonsense: "the 
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ridicule must be just and pointed from this very circumstance, that 
is, from the coincidence in that one particular only, which is the 
fla.w and singularity of the first object.n2 It is interesting to 
compare this with Hazlitt ' s statement of 1818, to the effect that 
"mere uit, as opposed to reason or argument, consists in striking 
out some casual and partial coincidence w~ich has nothing to do, or 
at least implies no necessary eo:nnection \fi th the nature of the 
things • 
"' 
• • Although these passages express essentially the same 
idea, the emphasis in the earlier is on the lack of coill:lection, and 
in the later it is on connection. 
One of Hazlitt ' s examples may help to clarify the point--
"Compasn.ons $!! lys, may mean either the companion::: .2£ ~ order .2.£ 
~ flower-de-~, or the companions .£! Ulysnes--"i·rho -.. ,ere tra:nsformed 
into suine--accorC.inG as you lay ti:1e emphasis. The French 'Tits, at 
the restoration of Louis XVIII., 't·lith admirable point and. truth, 
applied it in this latter sense . u4 The first otcp in creatinG wit 
is for the "prosing judgment" to discover a serious absurdity or 
incongruity in the Compap;nons du lys. This inconr;rui ty, vrhich forms 
the "sense" of the wit., consists in the failure of t lte object to be 
1
":0ei'ini tion of \'ii t, 11 XX, 360. 
2Ibid. 
) 11 On 1tfi t and H-Ulll.our, " VI, 19 • 
4"))efinition of Wit," XX, 355. 
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true to its own nature. Here, the honourable society has become a 
dishonourable one. Then, because of the homophony, the Compagpons 
~ Lye are forced into a mock identity with the Compagnons £ 1Ulysse. 
If the similarity in sound were the only similarity, nonsense alone 
would result, and this nonsense would be unrelated to the sense 
present at the beginning of the process. Dut the similarity in 
sound discloses another similarity, which Hazlitt calls the moral 
similarity, and this is what is important for congruence. The 
statement "the Compagnons ~ ,W. are swine" is both absurd and untrue, 
but it expresses the absurdity which is truly to be found in the 
Compagnons ~ lys . This is how Hazlitt solves the problem of 
explaining how the mind is at once surprised and not shocked by wit. 
The literal dissimilarity causes a surprise which, because of the 
moral similarity, does not shock. Sense and nonsense go together to 
make up the product of wit: 
Wit consists in two things, the perce~v1ng an incongruity 
between an object and the class to which it generally 
belongs, and secondly, the pointing out or making this 
incongruity more manifest, by transposing it to a totally 
different class of objects in which it is prescriptively 
found in perfection. The medium or link of connexion 
between the opposite classes of ideas is in the unlikeness 
of one of the things in question!£ itself, ~· the class 
it belongs to: this peculiarity is the narrow bridge or 
line along which the fancy runs to link it to a set of 
objects in all other respects different from the first, 
and having no sort of communication, either in fact or 
inclination, with it, and in which the pointedness and 
brilliancy, or the surprise and contrast of wit consista.l 
1ttDefinition of Wit," XX, 361-362. Professor Albrecht ' s 
recent article, "Hazlitt on the Poetry of Wit, 11 PMLA, LXXV (1960), 
245-249, makes no reference to the unefinition" and aims more at 
an explanation of Hazlitt's reasons for placing the poetry of wit 
below the poetry of nature in his scale of poetic value. But the 
-
The process of wit may be likened to the process of 
symbolisation; in fact, as Freud has shown, it is just such a 
process. In both, there is a literal dissimilarity between reference 
and referent, and a "moral" similarity, so that the literally untrue 
is accepted for the sake of the morally true. There is congruence, 
but not identity--"this is the perfection of wit, when the physical 
sound is the same, the physical sense totally unlike, and the moral 
sense absolutely identical."1 
Razlitt assigns to wit the purpose of verifying ideas, so 
that if he ever developed his 1818 analogy between comedy and scientific 
experiment, he did so in the "Definition." This verification, like 
an experiment, may serve two purposes: to illustrate and to clarify 
ideas. In the first case, it tells us no more than our "prosing 
judgments." It is merely a rhetorical device to convince the 
imagination of that which the understanding already knows. It tends 
to enlist the passions on the side of reason, and Hazlitt considered 
the main problem of morality to be the means of achieving such an 
enlistment. It operates on that which the understanding has already 
article does deal with some points which would otherwise have to be 
discussed at length in the present study. Professor Albrecht shows, 
for example, that Hazlitt admires wit because it does achieve a "kind 
of internal order ••• at the expense of external congruity,n and 
because it is objective in its detachment--although the detachment 
can imply the severance of sympathy. He also points out that Wellek 
is justified in calling Hazlitt's attitude to "witty and conceited 
poetry" non the whole ••• quite negative." (Wellek, II, 204-) L:tke 
Dr. Johnson, Hazlitt felt that the metaphysicals "spciled nature by 
art," applying to serious poetry a style which suita only the light 
and ludicrous. Albrecht also shows that while the poetry of wit is 
not, for Hazlitt, in the first rank, its practitioners in the 18th 
cetury, led by Dryden and Pope, gave it a very high rank indeed. 
1
"Definition of Wit," XX, 355. 
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adjudged absurd : "from a received practical truth and object of 
l grave assent, to turn it into a laughing stock to the fancy. " In 
this sense, presumably, the basic absurdity is only suspected, and 
the process of wit is as much a test as an illustration. Hazlitt's 
example is Swift's "The house of brother Van I spy, / In shape 
resembling a goose-pie." He comments 
Here, if the satire was just, the characteristics of want 
of solidity, of incongruity, and fantastical arrangement 
were inherent in the building, and written on its front 
to the disoe%tng eye, and only required to be brought out 
by the simile of the goose-pie, which is an immediate test 
and illustration (ooing an extreme case) of those qualities. 
The absurdity, which before was either admired, or only 
suspected, now stands revealed, and is turned into a 
laughing-stock, by the new version of the building into a 
goose-pie (as much as if the metamorphosis had been effected 
by a play of words, combining the most opposite things), 
for the mind in this case having narrowly escaped being 
imposed upon by taking a trumpery edifice for a stately 
pile, and perceiving the cheat, naturally wishes to cut 
short the dispute by finding out the most disc~rdant object 
possible, and nicknames the building after it. 
What is essential here is that wit puts the mind at ease by forcing 
ideas which are not entirely conscious into the consciousness and 
testing them. Hazlitt's theory of wit is more intellectual than 
Freud's, but this satisfaction which wit brings to the mind by 
symbol formation makes their theories similar on an important point. 
The use of wit to clarify ideas can be viewed in two ways. 
On the one hand, wit is essentially a poetic process, as Hazlitt 
indicates' "The putting a wig on a stupid face and setting it on a 
barber's pole is wit or humour:--the fixing a pair of wings on a 
1
"Definition of Wit," XX, 360. 
2Ibid., P• 357• 
-
258 
beautiful figure to make it look more like an angel is poetryJ so 
that the grotesque is either serious or ludicrous, as it professes 
to exalt or degrade."1 Since wit clarifies through rejection, how-
ever, it performs an essentially negative role. But if we consider 
the clarified idea whioh results, we can think of wit as achieving 
something positive. And certainly when this rejection is thought 
of merely as a tool to whioh little attention is paid, we are at 
some remove from the folly-and-vice theory of comedy: 
This I think is the cause of the delightful nature of wit, 
and of its relieving, instead of aggravating, the pains of 
defect or deformity, by pointing it out in the most glaring 
colours, inasmuch as by eo doing, we, as it were, completely 
detach the peccant part and restore the sense of propriety 
which, in ita undetected and unprobed state, it was begin-
ning to disturb. It is like taking a grain of sand out of 
the eye, a thorn out of the foot. We have discharged our 
mental reckoning, and had our revenge. Thus, when we say of 
a~-~, that it is like an aoe of clubs, it is less 
out of spite to the individual than to vindicate and place 
beyond a doubt the propriety of our notions of form in 
genera1.2 
Hazlitt is also much closer to a "modern" formUlation of the "relief" 
theory than he was in 1818, and he has moved toward a position from 
which the 11comedy of sentiment" of his day would no longer appear 
to be "no comedy at all." 
The wit which holds little spite against the individual 
laughed at is certainly not the only kind of wit in Hazlitt•s theory, 
but it is the kind which over the years eame to be the most important 
for him. He sees it as meaningful, and he tries to show hm·r it is 
1
"Definition of \'lit," XX, 362. 
2Ibid., PP• 356-357• 
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meaningful through both its positive and its negative characteristics. 
I n 1818 he had given no indication of seeing anything in wit but the 
annihilation of the ideal . In 1829 he has turned over the coin, and 
he sees that it can vindicate the ideal. His final excursion into 
comic theory places wit quite clearly in the service of the imagination. 
........ 
CONCLUSION 
-
CHAPTER XI 
The Drama • • • is the most substantial and real of all 
things. It represents not only looks, but motion and 
speech. The painter gives only the former, looks without 
action or speech, and the mere writer only the latter, 
words without looks or action. Its business and its use 
is to express the thoughts and character in the most 
striking and instantaneous manner, in the manner most 
like reality. It conveys them in all their truth and 
subtlety, but in all their force and with all possible 
effect. It brings them into action, obtrudes them on the 
sight, embodies them in habits, in gestures, in dress, 
in circumstances, and in speech. It renders everything 
overt and ostensible, and presents human nature not in 
its elementary principles or by general reflections, but 
exhibits its essential quality in all their variety of 
combination, and furnishes subjects for perpetual 
reflection. 
"On Modern Comedy," Works, XX, 9-10. 
Hazlitt's critical position has a four-fold basisa in nature, in 
the artist, in the spirit of the age, and in the reader's response 
to the work of art. All these elements overlap and shape each other, 
and ideally all are involved in the total harmony of the greatest 
art. Nature includes the inner, balanced, perceptive, feeling and 
thinking harmony of a human being, and its complement, the informing 
principle in the visible world. On the basis of this human and 
ex ternal nature, the artist creates with force, clarity, and pre-
cision, achieving a work of art which is harmonious and integrated 
in itself, and which catches and communicates the fundamental 
harmony of nature. That harmony differs according to the period in 
261 
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which the artist lives; it involves both the permanent and universal, 
and the historically particular. The great artist's productions 
will exhibit a combination of nature and the spirit of his age. Re 
will find his materials in his store of "common sense," and in the 
creative moment, which is characterised by a distinctive emotional 
and intellectual excitement, he will fuse them into a reality which 
will be unique and true. Imagin~tion is his associating, perceiving, 
synthesising and selecting instrument; it is immediate and intuitive 
in its operation; and in the greatest artists, it is the faculty of 
mind by which personal identity is obliterated and sympathetic 
identification with the essence of his subject achieved. Gusto, the 
peculiar heightening of the imagination which is available only to 
the greatest artists, enables the writer or painter to express in 
the most telling manner that essence, that distinguishing character 
which informs the subject. The work of art will arouse the imagination 
of the alert and sensitive reader, who in turn will feel and com-
prehend the truth and force of the work, imaginatively re-creating 
in his own mind the excitement experienced by the artist. The critic's 
function is to help express the artist's experience of nature, his 
skill, the truth of the work to nature and to the age; he will 
evaluate the work of art on the standard of its effectiveness for 
the general mass of readers. His real task is to grasp the unity 
which is the work, and to aid the reader to comprehend it. 
The highest form of art, in Hazlitt•e view, is drama~ 
and the highest form of drama is tragedy. Both tragedy and comedy 
depend upon incongruity and discontinuity: tragedy detaches its 
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audience from an obscure first cause and from an equally obscure 
and frighteningly capricious scheme of things, and enlists its 
sympathies for a protagonist whose fate is incongruous with hie 
great moral qualities, whose suffering and destruction are 
tragically ironic; comedy enlists its audience's sympathies with 
a moral scheme of things, and detaches them from the follies and 
egotistical affectations, in their very nature defying that scheme, 
induJ@d in by the protagonist. Sympathetic identification with 
others is the foundation of Hazlitt'e aesthetic and moral systems; 
he gives tragedy pride of place over comedy not because the latter 
depends for its effect on a measure of detachment or distance--
both forms, as we have seen, imply detachment--but because comedy 
demands detachment from, and a severance of sympathy with, human 
beings, while tragedy brings us closer to man, makes us suffer 
with him, enlarges our sympathy, and directs our desires to the 
good. Comedy, in short, does nothing to diminish our selfishness; 
tragedy enables us to realise our potential benevolence. Both 
tragedy and comedy are ntruen; but the truth of comedy is by 
definition downgraded from that of tragedy, which is a collateral 
reason for tragedy's superiority. Comedy's truth is internal 
consistency of structure, "keeping" in the intrinsic relationships 
of its characters, and faithful imitation of the nature of the 
society it portrays. The truth of tragedy includes all this, but 
transcends it in its fidelity to the permanent and universal 
qualities of humanity which are its substance. 
Hazlitt's insistence upon sympathetic identification 
with the dramatic character, and his natural interest in humanity, 
lead him toward. a theory of drama in which plot and action are 
subordinate. "Lead., I use advisedly, because we r...ave seen that 
he does not by any means ignore plot and action; in fact, at bottom, 
his theory assumes that character is shaped by the two. But to 
say that drama is character in action, or character developed by 
action, is to focus the emphasis upon one aspect of drama at the 
expense of others, with the result that the unity and distance 
required of drama for our appreciation of it as an aesthetic ~ 
are rejected as unnecessary or are ignored. Such a theory as 
Hazlitt•s is built upon a conviction, express or implied, that 
dramatic plot and action are in reality little more than occasions 
for the semi-autonomous development of the characters. wnat becomes 
important to the critic holding this view is the skill with which 
the dramatist creates character, the verisimilitude of the events 
in which the character is involved, the vraisemblance o.f the 
characters themselves. vlliat fades into the background is the view 
that drama is meaningful as art--as controlled and organised 
experience. (It is unfortunate that a good many of the critics who 
do see drama ' s significance as inhering in the fact that drama is 
art, yet do not see that what men have always praised as the very 
greatest art oannot be divorced from its moral centre. In art there 
is no such thing--and this applies especially to dramatic art--as 
form uithout content, or content without form.) If sympathetic 
identification, immediate and intuitive as it is, constitutes our 
dominant mode of attention to a play, then we must see the play 
as a not-very-far-from-fortuitous framework for the display of the 
character's personalityf and we will come to explain the events and 
situations set on the stage in terms of the light they cast upon 
that personality. 
We might, when faced with Hamlet, explain the play itself 
by analysing Hamlet's character. We might believe that "he seems 
incapable of deliberate aotion, and is only hurried into extremities 
on the spur of the occasion, when he has no time to refleot."1 
At other times, when he ia most bound to act, he remains 
puzzled, undecided, and sceptical, dallies with his 
purposes, till the occasion is lost, and finds out some 
pretence to relapse into indolence and thoughtfulness 
again. ~ .lli!, reason h!, refuses 12, .£.ll ~ King when 
he is at his prayers, and by a refinement in malice, 
which is an excuse for his own want of resolution, 
defers his-revenge ~a-mQr;-Fa~opportunity, when 
he shall be engaged in some act 'that has no relish of 
salvation in it.•2 
Hamlet's soliloquies, which presumably explained to the Elizabethan 
audiences much of the moral context in which the play is set and 
Hamlet's own relationship vis-a-vis that context, become intricate 
"refinements in malice," "pretences," "excuses.•• Because we 
sympathise with Hamlet, and understand him so well, we see that 
these revelations are actually "speculations,» attempts to reason 
himself out of his nown infirmity," l.'ationalisations of that 
infirmity which "only afford him another occasion for indulging it."3 
Because everything the character says is, on our theory, character-
1
uHamlet," Characters E!. Shakespear•s Plays, Works, IV, 234. 
2Ibid. My italics. 
3Ibid., ;. 235. 
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istio, seemingly contradictory or uncharacteristic statements made 
by him must contain some hidden key to their correct interpretation. 
Our theory will tend to blind us to the fact that in every dramatic 
soliloquy there might be an alternation of two kinds· of discourse--
the characteristic or confessional, and the revelatory, in which 
the speaker steps out of himself, so to speak, and sets that self 
and its actions more clearly for the audience in the general moral 
context of the play. Our psychological examination of the dramatic 
character will also make us f ocus our attention on his progress 
through the plot, not on hie progress ~ the plot, eo that we will 
tend to lose sight of nactionu as the totality of the play and will 
see it rather as "business." 
The Aristotelian concept of drama may be said to have been 
augmented or to have been degraded--according to the degree of one ' s 
conservatism in matters dramatic--since the rise of the doctrine of 
sympathy in the eighteenth century. There can be little doubt that 
Aristotle ' s definitions are inadequate when applied to much modern 
drama; there can be equally little doubt that an appreciable measure 
of the change is directly attributable to the importance accorded 
character at the expense of plot and action by the influential 
theories of Hazlitt, his contemporaries, and his immediate predecessors. 
It would be ridiculous, of course, to say that Hazlitt is wrong any 
more than it would be ridiculous to say that Aristotle is wrong: 
their theories are conditioned by the spirit of the age and the 
spirit of the drama which informed them. The point is, rather, 
that no theory of drama or of art in general can be absolutely 
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inclusive. Drama, because it is a living art, is dynamic; like the 
English language, it continually explores new possibilities, entombs 
worn-out cliche, and derives its vitality from a blend of the trad-
itional with the contemporary and the avant-garde. If men as dis-
parate ae Aristotle and Hazlitt would have found much to admire and 
much to deplore in an anthology which printed, say, plays by Ibsen, 
Shaw, Brecht, Pirandello, Ionesco, Miller, Eliot, 0 1 Casey, Osborne, 
Pinter, Wesker, O'Neill, Maxwell Anderson, Odets, and Tennessee 
Willie~s, they would also have been heartened, one hopes, by the 
richness and diversity which it would afford. And in spite of 
the fact that we might disagree with ~uch of what Aristotle and 
Hazlitt say, it is instructive to remember that they took as models 
of dramatic art those plays which are still regarded and esteemed 
as such today. 
It is for its relev~~ce to the drama of our own day that 
Hazlitt's dramatic theory is valuable. It is hoped that some of the 
reasons for the permanent value and significance of the criticism 
which he wrote on the basis of this theory have been indicated in 
the present essay. Few critics have been blessed with such a happy 
combination of unmercenary disinterestedness, common sense, and 
sympathy. His remarkably unified sensibility, by which he fused 
thought and feeling and kept his head in an emotional age, his 
capacity for synthesising and balancing complex elements--all these 
qualities make him a major critic. It is not presumptuous to say 
that in many respects he resembles and, indeed, rivals Dr. Johnson. 
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Apart from the fact that they both wrote for a living, they both 
had a strong sense of tradition and their criticism is remarkably 
English. They are both able to stand outside and above personal 
frailties, and to write as men of taste and common sense. They 
both speak with public voices. 
Johnson's criticisms are more objectively formulated; 
they take the character of judgments. Hazlitt ' s are written in a 
more personal, lees formal, style. As a result, they are more 
inspiring. It might be said that what Coleridge did for Razlitt 
as a young man, Hazlitt was able through his writing to do for 
others: to inspire them, to make them responsive, articulate, and 
humane. He wrote for the average intelligent reader; he is anti-
provincial, supremely English and yet more than English, literary 
but also concerned with philosophy, art, music, and life in general; 
a man of his period, yet concerned with traditional values and with 
the perspectives of history. Because of these perspectives, he is 
able to put an authoritative finger on defects as well as on merits, 
and what he pointed to as bad is usually what we see as bad also . 
His doctrine of the sympathetic imagination, his conviction 
that the true artist expresses not merely what he imagines, but 
what he knows and sees and feels intimately in the world of thought 
within him and the world of sense without him, and that he presents 
all of this in a manner which broadens his readers--his doctrine was 
pertinent not only for his contemporaries, but remains so for writers 
and readers in the twentieth century. It has validity for all arts 
and for all periods, particularly for those which are characterised 
by a strong emphasis on individuality, uniqueness, and originality. 
His trust in the imagination and in the truth which art embodies is 
accompanied, in his practical criticism, by a meticulous fidelity 
t o the t ext before him; together, his practice and the theory upon 
which i t is based illustrate and affirm that 
in art, in taste, in life, in speech, you cleoide from 
f eeling, and not from reason; that is, from the 
impression of a number of things on the mind, which 
impression is true and well- founded, though you may 
not be able to analyse or account for it in the several 
particulars.l 
1
"0n Geni us and Common Sense, 11 Table-1m, \<forks , VIII , 31. 
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